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PREFACE
The earliest conception of this work came from a discussion I had in April of 2007. I
had just spent that last six months with a group of students grappling with the design
challenges associated with the slow transition towards a new paradigm in aircraft sub-
systems design. The ‘More Electric’ aircraft wasn’t a new concept. However, recent
traction towards the integration of electrical technologies led the Energy Optimized
Aircraft and Equipment Systems Program Committee (EOASYS) from the AIAA to
sponsor a “Grand Challenge.” A handful of students from our lab were tasked to
explore design oriented solutions towards the development and evaluation of novel
aircraft vehicle systems.
What proceeded was one of the most formative experiences of my academic career.
Our team was deluged by the magnitude of this integrative ‘nightmare.’ The physi-
cal complexity associated with electrifying aircraft subsystems was dizzying enough.
While the implementation of ‘more electric’ concepts are attractive in some respects,
the jury was still out considering improvements at the system level. Any promised
benefits seemed to lose their distinction when considering all of the unannotated side
effects. This challenge was compounded by the organizational complexity of industry
players, a fundamental need to avoid programmatic risk, large certification question
marks, and unknown impacts on aircraft maintenance operations.
Elusive as this challenge was, our team did come to see some clarity. The status
quo of traditional aircraft vehicle systems decomposition was under fire. A dra-
matically different architecture concept demanded a dramatically new method for
development and design. A physical and disciplinary decomposition based on the
ATA Chapter decomposition began to be supplanted by a focus on the functional
iv
interdependencies of aircraft technologies.
Needless to say, six months was insufficient time to solve all of the problems
associated with revolutionary subsystem architecture design and evaluation. However,
we made a meager start. And as with all good research, the more questions we felt
we answered, the more questions arose. And this leads me back to spring of 2007.
Our team had just presented to the External Advisory Board at the Aerospace
Systems Design Laboratory. The questions were pointed and the feedback was encour-
aging. However, one comment stood out in my mind regarding architecture sizing.
While at the reception following the presentation, an experienced and particularly
interested engineer asked rhetorically, “What actually sizes an aircraft component?”
Before waiting for a response he proceeded to the effect, “It’s not what you want
the component to do, it’s what the component has to do when the system
is doing what you don’t want it to do.”
This anecdote became the essence of my research for the next few years. What
followed were forays into systems engineering: optimization, robust design, scenario
based design, reliability theory, system safety analysis... What is a component actu-
ally tasked to do and how does one systematically identify this for non-conventional
architecture concepts? How can one avoid biasing the selection of an architecture con-
cept by defining or applying requirements in an architecture specific manner? What
emerged was a new perspective.
This thesis represents my humble endeavor to provide insights towards these lofty
and imposing interrogatories. I have benefited much from the experience and insights
of others. And there is still much to be accomplished towards managing the impacts
of complexity during architecture definition. However, I hope this work incites appro-
priate deference to off-nominal requirements early in the exploratory design process.
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SUMMARY
Increases in power demands and changes in the design practices of overall equip-
ment manufacturers has led to a new paradigm in vehicle systems definition. The
development of unique power systems architectures is of increasing importance to
overall platform feasibility and must be pursued early in the aircraft design process.
Many vehicle systems architecture trades must be conducted concurrent to platform
definition. With an increased complexity introduced during conceptual design, accu-
rate predictions of unit level sizing requirements must be made. Architecture specific
emergent requirements must be identified which arise due to the complex integrated
effect of unit behaviors.
Off-nominal operating scenarios present sizing critical requirements to the aircraft
vehicle systems. These requirements are architecture specific and emergent. Standard
heuristically defined failure mitigation is sufficient for sizing traditional and evolution-
ary architectures. However, architecture concepts which vary significantly in terms of
structure and composition require that unique failure mitigation strategies be defined
for accurate estimations of unit level requirements.
Identifying of these off-nominal emergent operational requirements require exten-
sions to traditional safety and reliability tools and the systematic identification of
optimal performance degradation strategies. Discrete operational constraints posed
by traditional Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) are replaced by continuous re-
lationships between function loss and operational hazard. These relationships pose
the objective function for hazard minimization. Load shedding optimization is per-
formed for all statistically significant failures by varying the allocation of functional
xxviii
capability throughout the vehicle systems architecture.
Expressing hazards, and thereby, reliability requirements as continuous relation-
ships with the magnitude and duration of functional failure requires augmentations to
the traditional means for system safety assessment (SSA). The traditional two state
and discrete system reliability assessment proves insufficient. Reliability is, therefore,
handled in an analog fashion: as a function of magnitude of failure and failure du-
ration. A series of metrics are introduced which characterize system performance in
terms of analog hazard probabilities. These include analog and cumulative system
and functional risk, hazard correlation, and extensions to the traditional component
importance metrics.
Continuous FHA, load shedding optimization, and analog SSA constitute the
SONOMA process (Systematic Off-Nominal Requirements Analysis). Analog sys-
tem safety metrics inform both architecture optimization (changes in unit level capa-
bility and reliability) and architecture augmentation (changes in architecture struc-
ture and composition). This process was applied for two vehicle systems concepts
(conventional and ‘more-electric’) in terms of loss/hazard relationships with varying
degrees of fidelity.
Application of this process shows that the traditional assumptions regarding the
structure of the function loss vs. hazard relationship apply undue design bias to func-
tions and components during exploratory design. This bias is illustrated in terms of
inaccurate estimations of the system and function level risk and unit level importance.
It was also shown that off-nominal emergent requirements must be defined specific
to each architecture concept. Quantitative comparisons of architecture specific off-
nominal performance were obtained which provide evidence to the need for accurate
definition of load shedding strategies during architecture exploratory design.
Formally expressing performance degradation strategies in terms of the minimiza-
tion of a continuous hazard space enhances the system architects ability to accurately
xxix
predict sizing critical emergent requirements concurrent to architecture definition.
Furthermore, the methods and frameworks generated here provide a structured and
flexible means for eliciting these architecture specific requirements during the perfor-




A complete overview of the work presented in this thesis is outlined in figure 1. This
image outlines the structure adopted in the composition of this thesis towards the
development and testing of hypotheses.
The second and third chapters of this thesis begin by reviewing the motivation
for this work. This includes a historical perspective of advances made with respect
to the ‘more-electric’ aircraft and a review of the technological and organizational
implications of increasing the technical complexity of the aircraft vehicle systems. The
need to introduce innovative power systems concepts during platform level conceptual
design requires a sytematic means for identifying sizing critical emergent requirements
early in the design process.
The fourth chapter begins to explore the sources of emergent requirements in terms
of different aspects of architecture complexity. Time, operating mode, and safety
and reliability dependence are specifically reviewed. It is observed that off-nominal
operating scenarios pose sizing critical requirements for aircraft vehicle systems and
require consideration of all of these behavioral aspects of complexity. The objective
for the thesis is therefore to provide a risk based means for identifying off-nominal
operational requirements which can be rapidly deployed during conceptual design.
Chapter five poses the exploration of off-nominal emergent requirements in terms
of a process which expands traditional safety and reliability tools and systematic
load shedding optimization. In so doing the hypotheses are generated. The first
addresses the benefits for load shedding optimization during exploratory design. The


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































relationship. Three methods are introduced which constitute the Systematic Off-
Nominal Requirements Analsys (SONOMA) process: Continuous Functional Hazard
Assessment, Load Shedding Optimization, Analog System Safety Assessment.
Chapter six gives an overview of how the hypotheses were tested. The function/-
hazard relationships used for hypothesis validation are introduced for two aircraft ve-
hicle systems concepts: conventional and ‘all-electric’. The concept architectures are
defined and structured for load shedding optimization. Unit level capability transfer
functions are defined for each of the units in both architectures. Finally, the optimiza-
tion process is formalized. This includes the definition of all statistically significant
failure cases and the process for identifying optimal capability allocation.
Chapter seven gives the results of this evaluation in terms of analog system safety
assessment metrics. These metrics are intended to inform both architecture aug-
mentation and optimization. Metrics introduced in this chapter inform architecture
augmentation and include system and function level hazard probabilities, analog and
cumulative risk, and hazard correlation. Analog extensions of Birnbaum’s and com-
ponent criticality importance inform architecture optimization. An additional im-
portance metric is also introduced which assesses unit level importance in terms of
variations in unit capability.
The results are summarized in terms of their connections to the overall thesis
objective and motivations in chapters eight and nine. Additional comments are also
made regarding the significant contributions and potential future research opportu-




With significant advances in aircraft electrical technologies in the last century the de-
mand for electrical power on commercial and military platforms is increasing dramat-
ically. Many international research efforts have addressed the implication of electrical
technologies. Conventional systems technologies are perceived to be approaching the
limits of their performance potential and electrical technologies retain promise for
future growth. While benefits in take off gross weight are uncertain, electrical tech-
nologies have the potential to improve maintenance, reliability, and efficiency.
Addressing the architectural complexity of aircraft power systems during concep-
tual design poses difficult issues in the generation and deployment of requirements.
This chapter discusses the motivations for this thesis and the current environment
for vehicle systems design. First, it addresses what is meant by classifying the terms
platform, system, unit, etc. Second, it introduces the increased power demands seen
by the industry and reviews the historical developments in vehicle systems. Third,
it explores the trend towards design outsourcing as can be found in the literature.
Lastly, it looks at the change in responsibility of the subsystem contractors. This
lays the stage to further explore how architectural complexity effects the ability of
the aircraft designer to generate and manage unit level requirements during concep-
tual architecting as discussed in the next chapter.
2.1 Aircraft Systems
There are many definitions of the term “system.” The International Council on Sys-
tems Engineering defines a system as:
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“a collection of components organized to accomplish a specific function or
set of functions [126].”
The Reliability Engineering Design Handbook is more detailed in outlining types
of responsibilities and components involved in a system. They describe a system as:
“a composite of equipment and skills and techniques capable of performing
or supporting an operational role, or both. A complete system includes all
equipment, related facilities, materials, software, services, and personnel
required ... to be considered self-sufficient in its intended operational
environment [163].”
Although the general definitions of a system denote various elements with inter-
relationship fulfilling some need, further qualification is necessary. The first quali-
fication which must be made is the system’s complexity. Complexity is a measure
or property which greatly impacts the difficulty of system definition, evaluation, and
design [59]. Crutchfield defined complexity as the measure of difficultly in predicting
the optimal forecasts of a system [58]. The more information necessary to generate
optimal performance of a system, the higher the statistical complexity. Given the
intractability of the aircraft systems architecture design space, it can be safely classi-
fied as a complex system. Wilkins’ definition of a complex systems applies to aircraft
vehicle systems. This definition states:
“a system which has heterogeneous smaller parts, each carrying out some
specialized function, not necessarily exclusively, which then interact in
such a was as to give integrated responses [59].”
Complex systems, like military and commercial aircraft, are modeled and envi-
sioned with multiple levels of abstraction in order to manage design scope. Traditional
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systems engineering involves a process of decomposition. This process, although use-
ful for the sake of complexity, provides difficulty due to the standardization of as-
sumptions and a fixed conception, which may limit innovative possibilities.
The second system qualifier concerns the level of control the engineer has over
unit level attributes to drive performance. Different types of systems require different
approaches and tools during the design process. Both an airplane and the world wide
web fit the definition of a system. However, each has a vastly different form and
must be approached in different ways. Thus, a distinction should be made between
complex monolithic systems and complex systems of systems.
A monolithic system, is comprised of components which are intended to operate
strictly within the context of the system and which are not intended to be used
independently of the system as a whole [198]. An example of a monolithic system is a
personal computer. Many elements of this complex system can be qualified as systems
on their own (hard drive, graphics card, keyboard, mouse, etc.) and they all operate
to fulfill some task within the overall system. The system (computer) is comprised of
system elements (mouse, hard drive, etc.). However, each of these system elements
is intended to be used only within the context of the personal computer system. The
monitor, for example, could be described as a complex system independently, but it
does not fulfill its intended function unless it is integrated with the other elements
of the PC. Therefore, the computer is not a system of systems but a monolithic
system consisting of exchangeable complex elements. The operation of the system
relies on the performance of the individual system elements and the system elements
are intended to perform functions within the framework defined by a system.
A system of systems, on the other hand, consists of a group of autonomous ele-
ments which can and do operate to fulfill functions independently from the conglom-
erate system [198]. The elements within a system of systems operate to fulfill specific
functions which are not necessarily directly determined by the system of systems.
6
Some have gone so far as to described a system of systems as a physically distributed
group of elements which interoperate by means of central or distributed management
[267, 84]. This indicates that the elements within the system can be and are often
geographically distributed. The Internet, the US Missile Defense Network, and the
World Wide Air Transportation Network are excellent examples of systems of sys-
tems. The elements within these systems fulfill functions (often multiple elements
fulfilling the same function) imposed/derived independently from the system as a
whole. However, these elements combine to fulfill an overall task.
Difficulties arise when systems are misclassified as monolithic or ‘system-of-systems.’
These stem from the amount of control the designers assume when defining the sys-
tem and performing system trades [198]. For this thesis, it is assumed that all re-
quirements, functions, and environments driving the sizing of systems technologies
originate from the development of the aircraft as a whole. Although aircraft systems
architects do not have complete control over all attributes of the outsourced design
elements, all requirements are assumed to originate in context of the aircraft platform.
The aircraft can thus be considered as a monolithic system. Assuming a monolithic
system has allowed the systems designers to decompose the problem hierarchically
with relatively fixed physical and functional relationships between the decomposed
groupings.
Traditionally the aircraft platform is decomposed into ‘systems’ whose require-
ments flow down to lower levels of abstraction. Moir and Seabridge describe the
aircraft in terms of four primary systems: vehicle systems, avionics systems, cabin
systems, and mission systems [210]. Each of these systems represents packages which
must be developed in order for the system to be designed. These packets of work
receive requirements from functions and specification allocated to this specific system
regarding its physical components and disciplinary sub elements. Furthermore, sys-
tems are further decomposed into ‘subsystems’ as shown in table 1. Subsystems are
7
Table 1: Aircraft Systems Decomposition [210]
Propulsion System
Fuel System










Vehicle Systems Management System
Crew Escape
Canopy Ejection






Commercial Cabin Systems Telecommunications
Toilet Waste Water
Gaseous Oxygen
Cabin and Emergency Lighting
Displays and Controls
Communications (including IFF and SFR)
Navigation (including DME and ADF)
Flight Management System
Avionics Systems Automated Landing Systems
Warning Equipment (TCAS/GPWS/TAWS)
Altimeter/Air Data Measurement/Weather Radar
Accident Data Recorder/Cockpit Voice Recorder
Internal Lighting
Sensing (Electro-optical, MAD, Acoustic, Radar, Cameras)
Armament (Weapons Systems, Defensive Aids)
Electronic Warfare Systems






composed of elements referred to as ‘units’ or ‘components’.
Typical systems decompositions has led to the development of specifications which
assist aviation manufacturing and maintenance. In 1956, the Air Transport Associ-
ation of America (ATA) introduced numbering schemes for classifying standard sys-
tems in terms of component groupings [5]. The ATA Chapters classify groupings of
elements based on physical and disciplinary similarity and are broken down further
into segments, or lower level groupings of similar components. Although intended
primarily for aircraft maintenance, ATA Spec 100 has acted as the decomposition
framework for aircraft systems design [204, 294].
Revolutionary technologies introduce significant changes to conventional vehicle
systems decomposition. As will be discussed in the next sections, advances in electri-
cal generation, distribution, and storage, power electronics, ice protection, environ-
mental control/pressurization, flight control actuation, utility actuation, and support
systems have the potential to fundamentally change vehicle systems breakdowns. Ad-
ditionally, advances in in cabin, avionics, and missions systems introduce dramatically
increased electrical demands which fundamentally alter the traditional integration
considerations for these technologies. Increases in the performance promised by sys-
tems requiring increased electrical power has impacted the implementation of every
aircraft system function.
In discussing complex systems it is necessary to identify what is mean by the terms
system, subsystem, component, and unit. The window of abstraction used for these
terms can refer to any level of the systems hierarchy. For this work the total aircraft is
termed the ‘platform’. This platform interacts with the environment in performing in
its mission and other significant scenarios. The combination of all traditional vehicle
systems is termed the system. Finally, units and components represent the lowest
level of decomposition in the architecture.
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Figure 2: Trend in Commercial Aircraft Power Demand [15]
2.2 Future Electrical Power Demands
With the development of electrical technologies the modern aircraft is facing a marked
increase in power demand on aircraft in the last ten years. As illustrated in figure
2, the 787 represents a dramatic increase in the amount of power required on a
conventional platform due to electrical ECS and ice protection. The 787 requires
over five time the power available on the 777 (Boeing’s most recent commercial class
aircraft). In order to reliable support critical functions, the 787 is reported to have
generation capacity of approximately 1.45 MW using four engine mounted and two
APU mounted generators [238].
While the power increase necessitate by A380 systems architecture is much lower,
an upward trend remains in required power per seat for conventional architectures (see
figure 3). The A380 requires approximately double the power per engine compared
to other Airbus commercial platforms in order to provide electrical actuation.
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Figure 3: Commercial Aircraft Power per Seat for Conventional, More Electric, and
New Aircraft Concepts [205]
Conceptual design decisions regarding systems architecture technology pose dra-
matically different power demands. An approximate 300kW difference in power de-
mand per engine exists between the two modern ‘more electric’ commercial archi-
tectures (Boeing’s 787 and Airbus’ A380). The sensitivity of platform performance
to architectural decisions is becoming a critical factor for the optimal design of next
generation aircraft.
The electrical power requirements on the military side are more pronounced and
are not primarily driven by electrical technology used in vehicle systems. Electrical
demands from mission systems are drastically increasing required power generated on
a military platform. Directed energy weapons (DEW), such as High Energy Laser
Systems (HEL) [37], [128], High Powered Microwaves (HPM) [17, 239], and other
Active Denial [115] systems have the potential to greatly expand aircraft capabilities
while dramatically increase power required on a platform. Figure 4 displays the power
and thermal demands the Air Force platforms will be subject to in the near future.
Similar trends towards increasing power demands are emerging for all future fixed
wing platforms: commercial, military, manned, unmanned [205].
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Figure 4: Power and Thermal Management Trends and Challenges [217]
The current challenges arising from the implementation and integration of elec-
trical technologies in the aircraft subsystems architecture has been compared to the
revolution necessitated at the advent of the turbojet era [203]. Potential order of mag-
nitude changes in power demand on military and commercial platforms challenges the
historically adopted methods for systems design. With large variations in power and
thermal requirements necessitated by current and future technological developments,
systems architecture becomes a critical consideration for aircraft designer during the
conceptual design phase.
Observation: Advances in electrical technology have led to major increases in the
amount of electric power that must be made available on military and commercial
platforms.
2.3 More Electric Aircraft (MEA)
During the late 1930’s and early 1940’s major developments were emerging which
revolutionized Aerospace Engineering. Gas turbine technology was drastically chang-
ing conceivable aircraft capability. The Heinkel He-178, the Gloster Meteor, and the
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Bell Aircomet (XP-59A) became the first jet aircraft developed in Germany, Eng-
land, and the United States respectively [202]. Airplane designers began to explore
new challenges that came with this enabling technology. Airplanes began to oper-
ate with greater speed and maneuverability, higher altitude, and greater efficiency.
Aerodynamics, structures, controls, and all other aircraft disciplines were adapting to
enhance and enable the performance promised by jet engine improvements [8, 211].
Hickie comments on this period in aircraft design history,
“By the early 1940s it was clear that the major technological challenge
facing the industry in the post-war years would be the advent of the jet
engine... Although the American aircraft industry had no involvement
in the invention of the jet engine ... companies like Boeing had well
managed, well resourced and well educated design teams, a large body of
useful complementary technical knowledge, and an innovatory culture. As
a result they were more quickly and successfully able to exploit the new
scientific and technological knowledge associated with the invention of jet
aircraft in the 1940s [131].”
Concurrent to advances in jet propulsion other design decisions were being made
which set the stage for conventional aircraft systems design. In the late 30’s and
early 40’s US engineers at Patterson Field (now Wright-Patterson Air Force Base)
began looking into the increased need for power-assisted flight control. Studies showed
that hydraulics were superior to electrical power for on board functions. Electrical
generation devices were found inferior due to overall capability and power conditioning
devices proved to be inferior in terms of volumetric concerns [200, 44]. Lockheed’s
Kelly Johnson looked into both electrical and hydraulic sources for powered flight
control with the development of the Constellation. Hydraulics emerged as the design
of choice [150].
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Comparatively few aircraft used electricity for major on board power solutions.
The 1941 Focke-Wulf 190-A utilized electrical devices for on board functions. The
flight control system was not powered, but electrically supported functions did in-
clude actuation and locking of the landing gear, servo-motor actuation for flaps and
tailplane, propeller pitching, and cannon firing. The British Aerospace community
pursued the use of electrical power for flight functions during the 1950’s. The V
bombers (Avro Vulcan, Handley Page Victor, and Vickers-Armstrong Valiant) uti-
lized electricity for many of the actuation functions [155]. The Avro Vulcan went
the furthest in electrical actuation by employing 10 electro-hydrostatic actuators for
flight control with no hydraulic backup. Commercially, British aerospace engineer-
ings also pushed the envelope of electrical usage with the VC-10. Vickers-Armstrong
engineers used a 2 hydraulic, 2 electric flight control actuation architecture. This
control concept has been considered the precursor to the Airbus A380 control archi-
tecture strategy [92]. However, these aircraft developments can be viewed as more of
the exception than the rule. Hydraulic systems outpaced electrical developments and
provided an efficient and less complex approach for powered actuation [155].
Based on a half century of systems engineering and design in the jet age, the mod-
ern aircraft industry almost universally adopted a hybrid of mechanical, hydraulic,
electric, and pneumatic nonpropulsize power systems [15, 210]. However, driven by
maintenance, complexity, flexibility, controllability, and cost issues, and following
significant technological advances beginning in the 70’s, research efforts began to
emerge which explored a more extensive use of electrical systems for nonpropulsive
power [155, 44].
As early as 1972 aerospace engineers could see the benefits of the expanded use of
electrical systems in the aircraft design. Potentially motivated by the impending oil
crisis in 1973 [155], NASA researchers proposed benefits of the removal of the acces-
sory gear box through the integration of a shaft mounted starter generator [264]. As
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early as the late 70’s NASA began to take a holistic look at the aircraft nonpropul-
sive power production and usage leading to the concept of the “All Electric Aircraft”
(AEA) [129, 56].
Cronin wrote regarding a 1979 study,
“Recent NASA/Lockheed studies have identified the all-electric air-
plane as an energy efficient transport and one that offers the benefits of
eliminating such labor-intensive systems as high-pressure hydraulics, en-
gine bleed air, pneumatics and the nonelectric engine-start systems. Also,
there is a significant reduction in the ground maintenance/logistic support,
when the ground equipment associated with the multiple power sources is
replaced with electric power [56].”
The following two decades saw a marked increase in government and privately
sponsored research initiatives towards the development of electrical aircraft systems.
The initial ‘All-Electric’ Boeing and Lockheed studies promised marked improvement
over the conventional architecture. In 1984 Lockheed released results from the Inte-
grated digital/electric aircraft (IDEA) concept study. This all electric concept study
applied electrical generation, distribution, actuation, environment control (ECS), and
flight control system (FCS) technologies to the L-1011/500 (Tristar) as a baseline con-
figuration. These study results showed a 11.3% reduction in block fuel and a 7.9%
reduction in DOC for in the baseline configuration. Then a unique ‘all-electric’ IDEA
configuration was introduced. This configuraiton showed an additional 3.4% reduc-
tion in block fuel and 3.1% reduction in DOC [56]. Boeing all electric studies applied
to a 767 type aircraft promised up to 3% reduction in fuel consumption resulting
primarily to the elimination of the bleed system for the environmental control [283].
These studies spurred further investigation by more ‘impartial’ academic institu-
tions. The college of Aeronautics in the UK launched a study in 1985. This effort
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identified and corrected invalid assumptions in the previous studies. It was found that
the reduction in fuel burn achieved through electric ECS was not on the level of 3% as
predicted by Boeing, but more realistically less than 1%. The performance improve-
ments suggested by Lockheed were also refuted. Weight savings for electrical flight
controls were found to be greatly reduced, if not eliminated altogether. The state
of technological development and questionable performance improvements would not
provided sufficient insentive to adopt the risk of pursuing the all electric aircraft [155].
However, the industry began to feel that a change in the status quo for aircraft
systems design was soon to occur. In 2000, Emadi and Ehsani wrote:
“There is little doubt that the aircraft power system architecture is head-
ing for major changes. Increasing use of electric power to drive aircraft
subsystems that, in the conventional aircraft, have been driven by a com-
bination of mechanical, electrical, hydraulic, and pneumatic systems, is
seen as a dominant trend in advanced aircraft power systems [87].”
Avery summarized this sentiment by generalizing the benefits of electrical tech-
nologies in table 2.
Table 2: Comparison of Aircraft Secondary Power Distribution Systems [15]
System Complexity Maintenance Technological Maturity
Electrical Complex Simple System - Mature
New Technologies - Immature
Hydraulic Simple Complex & Hazardous Mature
Mechanical Very Complex Frequent & Slow Very Mature
Pneumatic Simple Complex Very Mature
Limited performance improvements available through advances in conventional
technologies and advances in high power density, solid state electronics, electric drives,
and microprocessors began to impact electrical aircraft equipment development [87,
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137]. The 80’s and 90’s saw many additional research efforts funded by the US
Air Force, the French and UK governments, and the European Union [92]. These
studies addressed efficient power conversion, generation, and management in addition
to the development of electric actuation technologies. In 1992, the US military’s Joint
Aeronautical Commanders Group formed the More Electric Aircraft Joint Planning
Team, tasked to plan R&D efforts for electrical non-propulsive power for military
aircraft. NASA also became involved in pursuit of US commercial electrical aircraft
concepts [44].
US efforts in the 90’s to pursue the “More Electric Aircraft” (MEA) represented a
fiscal investment of over $290 M [155] with MEA initiatives beginning in 1995. Shortly
thereafter, in 1996, the European Union’s Fifth Framework Program on R&D pro-
posed their own power systems studies towards the Power Optimized Aircraft (POA)
[91]. The MEA and POA objectives were focused on the assessment of specific elec-
tric technologies. Specifically, POA’s motives were to “identify, optimize, and validate
innovative aircraft equipment which contribute to the reduction in consumption of
non-propulsive power [92].” While the intent of the MEA studies were to eliminate
or reduce the need for a centralized hydraulic system, the focus was primarily tech-
nological development and assessment [44].
The results of these research efforts were well summarized during the Technolo-
gies for Energy Optimized Aircraft Equipment Systems (TEOS) Forum in 2006. This
forum observed that electrical technologies are at the demonstration level and were
found to possess the potential for superior performance over conventional technolo-
gies. However, maximum performance improvements cannot be achieved through
integration within a conventional architecture. It was additionally observed that
many challenges still exist and must be addressed in the integration of electrical tech-
nologies and functional thinking is requisite for the integration of these technologies
[94].
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Both the MEA and POA research efforts continued into the 2000’s and have
triggered additional, ongoing efforts in the United States and Europe. Building on
the knowledge generated over the last few decades, the aerospace community then
faced the challenge of integration.
2.3.1 Current MEA Research
While many electric aircraft studies remain primarily interested in validating tech-
nologies, the focus of a few new efforts has moved to the challenges of integration.
Two recent integration focused research efforts are the EU’s More Open Electrical
Technologies (MOET) and the Air Force Research Laboratory’s (AFRL) Integrated
Vehicle Energy Technology Demonstration (INVENT). These programs developed
new architectures intended to be more favorable for the integration of electric tech-
nologies. While these two efforts focus on different issues for electrical systems inte-
gration, detailed platform level modeling of the vehicle systems was pursued.
The European Commission 6th Framework Programme MOET followed a three
year plan starting in July of 2006. Coordinated by Airbus France, 46 companies
and 15 research centers, in 14 European countries worked to address three main
themes. The three objectives were to explore architecture, power electronics, and
platform validation [154] for the more electric commercial aircraft concept. Three of
the five MOET objectives address electrical networks, integration, and platform level
design. These studies include hardware validation testing, modeling and simulation,
and platform level impact assessment.
The platform level impacts of electrical systems integration were assessed following
the results of the technology and systems studies of a conceptual conventional baseline
platform and a conceptual more electric aircraft. The process for these architecture
assessments is shown in figure 5.
At the aircraft level, weight and drag deltas were determined between the baseline
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Figure 5: MOET Architecture Evaluation Process [154]
and more electric concept systems. Changes in maintenance costs were determined by
expected deltas in % direct maintenance cost (DMC) due to technology insertion. The
expected impacts only took changes in the APU, Electic, Bleed, ECS, and Cooling
Systems into account. Results showed that the more electric concept “deliver(s) air-
plane benefits in terms of maintenance, operational flexibility, and technology growth
potential without fuel-burn performance penalty.” Weight was not determined to be
a determining factor between the ‘more-electric’ and baseline concepts.
Concurrent with the EU’s MOET program, the AFRL was assessing the benefits
and challenges of more electric power/thermal systems architecture on military plat-
forms. The Integrated Vehicle Energy Technology (INVENT) program was intended
to maximize platform efficiency while minimizing thermal management issues. The
INVENT architecture consisted of four subsystems: the Robust Electrical Power Sys-
tem (REPS), Adaptive Power and thermal Management System (APTMS), the High
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Performance Electric Actuation Systems (HPEAS), and Advanced Engine Technol-
ogy Integration. 12 major contractors and 3 service teams were brought together in
these studies in a effort to push towards the dynamic total systems modeling, vehicle
level system optimization, and hardware in the loop validation. The INVENT pro-
gram introduced significant technical and organizational integration challenges in the
optimization of vehicle subsystems.
2.4 Design Outsourcing
The aerospace industry is characterized by high an increasing technological risk, rad-
ical fluctuations in demand, sensitivity to political choices, and major organizational
restructuring [131]. Early in the twentieth century, the aerospace industry included
a large number of aircraft design competitors. These companies operated in an envi-
ronment of relatively low risk due to the growing commercial airline markets. World
War II caused the growth and consolidation of some aircraft manufactures but at the
close of the war 35 aircraft manufacturers were still operating worldwide (16 in the
US, 14 in the UK, and 5 in France [114]).
Increased technological complexity, lengthening development times [114], and in-
creasingly price-conscious consumers [121] have not only changed the way airplanes
are manufactured, but, as current trends indicate [196], changed in the way airplanes
are designed. These factors, combined with fierce competition between Boeing, Lock-
heed, McDonnell-Douglas, and Airbus led John Newhouse described the business of
aircraft design a “Sporty Game” in 1982 [223]. Further competition and consolidation
created an industry in the early 90’s dominated by 5 prime commercial manufactur-
ers, approximately 50 prime suppliers, 225 engine and large system manufacturers,
and 2,000 equipment, parts, and material suppliers [114].
The last 20 years have seen additional major changes the aircraft industry struc-
ture. As the breadth of knowledge necessary for aircraft design increases, aircraft
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manufacturers must decide if they can adopt the risk associated with cultivating a
new technical knowledge base in-house [196]. With a lack of in-house skills and a
desire to maintain ‘core competence’, this risk is often offset through outsourcing of
systems and unit level design activities [121]. In 2006, Hickie addressed changes in
the market due to the mitigation of risk referring to literature from Lawrence and
Thornton [183]:
“It has been argued that, in recent decades, Boeing’s leadership has
demonstrated a risk aversion (following the financial crisis associated with
the development of the 747), and a commitment to short-term shareholder
value, that has led the company to be less technologically innovatory,
and has allowed Airbus to take market leadership with superior products
[131].”
In order to maintain a competitive technical edge and while still sidestepping un-
desirable risk, strategic access to development funds became the challenge of the late
20th century for Boeing. This led Boeing to seek out foreign risk sharing partnerships.
Key components and sub-assemblies have become the responsibility of external and
often foreign suppliers. This outsourcing gains access to external government invest-
ment and opened new markets, while avoiding limitations on US government funding.
Pritchard and MacPherson write:
“During this era [1970 - 1992], Airbus could rely on government re-
payable investment up to 100% for a new aircraft program. Although the
1992 EU-US Large Aircraft Agreement limited such launch aid to 33%,
the US abandoned the 1992 agreement in 2004 – cutting repayable launch
investment to 0%. So, in a nutshell, Boeing learned to find government
financial support mechanisms for its foreign suppliers to replace its own
self-funding of aircraft launches ... The goal was to give Boeing a ‘level
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playing field’ by denying Airbus EU repayable launch investment. In ef-
fect, this forced Airbus to become a system integrator along the lines
pioneered by Boeing on the 787 program [237].”
It is estimated that Japan covered approximately half the cost of the development
of parts built by Japanese companies for the 767 [236]. Although the aircraft in-
dustry outsourcing has increased total costs, the systems integrator sees a reduction
of costs for units and subsystems through their risk sharing partners [196]. It has
been estimated that up to 90% of the parts for the 787 have been outsourced [237].
While Airbus and other OEM’s retain more design in-house, general trends indicate
a greater reliance on the design expertise of external entities.
Technological risk is not the sole factor driving the trend towards an increase in
design outsourcing. Alliances are formed for “offensive purposes [121].” Additional
to risk and cost related motivations, these purposes may also include access to new
markets, resources, technology, capabilities, or knowledge [121].
Motivated by technology integration [290], accessing and securing of markets, re-
ductions development costs, risk sharing, large commercial manufacturers are moving
away from the traditional vertically integrated business and supply chain model [131].
An emerging trend for aircraft manufacturing is a combination of increased horizontal
integration through globalization, and increased vertical integration by a lengthening
of the supply chain [121].
A trend towards outsourcing does not just include an increase in manufacturing
from external entities. The traditional decision of “make-or-buy” has been changed
to the decision “make-or-cooperate [171]“. The last two decades has seen a marked
increase in design outsourcing in contrast to manufacturing outsourcing. Pritchard
and MacPherson again observed:
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“Build-to-print subcontracting relationships are being replace by in-
ternationally devolved design and engineering tasks for airframe devel-
opment, signaling a profound change in the structure and geography of
commercial aircraft production ... TodayŠs commercial aircraft industry
is far different from the early days of jet production, when each aircraft
company invented on its own [237].”
Table 3: Distribution of Externalized Design Activity (1995 to 2005): Sample Means
Budget Percentage [196]
Function 1995 % 2005 % % Change Difference
Product Design 13.1 (2.15) 26.2 (2.05) 100 +13.1
Component Design 28.2 (3.12) 43.1 (3.14) 52.8 +22.8
Tooling Design 20.3 (3.73) 36.7 (2.28) 80.7 +16.4
Design Research 11.2 (2.78) 39.4 (2.71) 251.7 +28.2
Contract R&D 10.3 (4.83) 21.3 (3.76) 109.7 +11.3
All Design Activity 21.8 (3.63) 36.6 (3.19) 67.8 +31.2
Note: Sample Number N=51 (Standard Error in Parenthesis)
These design trends are not exclusive to the aerospace industry. In 2009, MacPher-
son and Vanchan [196] surveyed 51 US outsourcing companies regarding their design
outsourcing activities between 1995 and 2005. For their study, corporate managers
of internal R&D or design departments from 68 durable goods manufacturers were
surveyed regarding their design budgets. The manufactures surveyed represented the
aerospace, machinery, electronics, construction equipment, automotive, military, and
household goods industries. Of the 68 companies, 17 indicated that R&D was 100%
performed internally. 9 of which were prohibited from outsourcing. The results of
these surveys are summarized in table 3.
Of the 68 companies surveyed, 9 represented the aerospace community including
firms participating significantly in military markets (10-45% of their sales). Of these
aerospace companies, 2 indicated that they were non-outsourcers and 6 indicated
that they operate under risk sharing agreements. In 1995, 30.3% of the of the design
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Figure 6: Typology of Technological Systems and the Transition from Conventional
to More Electric Aircraft Architectures [134]
budget was allocated to outsourcing compared with 48.7% in 2005. This represents
a 60.7% increase in architecture outsourcing in a ten year timeframe.
As design responsibilities are transferred down the supply chain and greater re-
liance is placed on electrical technologies for mission and flight critical functionality,
the aerospace industry is facing a new paradigm in aircraft design. This paradigm is
discussed in the following section.
2.5 The New Aircraft Systems Integration Paradigm
Coupled with dramatically increasing electrical power demands introduced by mod-
ern technological advances, aircraft OEM’s are moving towards increased reliance on
external companies for innovative systems solutions.
Hobday et. al. [134] introduce a simple typology for technological systems inte-
gration based on literature from Shenhar [268] and Hughes [142]. The intention of
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this typology is to express the nature of the systems and the processes required for
their integration. This mapping consists of orthogonal characteristics of technological
uncertainty and system scope as shown in figure 6. The vertical axis represents sys-
tems with increasing scope and the horizontal axis represents the level technological
uncertainty associated with the system.
As a “product system” with a least moderate technical uncertainty, commercial
and military aircraft can by characterized in row 3 of figure 6. As the level of tech-
nological uncertainty increases, systems integration becomes increasingly complex.
An aircraft designed with exclusively well-established technologies (column A) or a
limited number of new features (column B) poses little difficulty in systems integra-
tion. However, as expressed by Hobday, with higher uncertainty technologies, sys-
tems integration requires not only innovative technical approaches but adjustments in
the relationships between system integrator and component level suppliers. In these
cases, capabilities must be developed which enable systems integration and manage
integrator/supplier relationships [134].
2.5.1 Aircraft Subcontractor ‘Electrification’
This trend towards large scale power systems outsourcing is made evident by the
repositioning and expansion of many of the subsystem manufacturers in order to
market themselves as prime electrical systems integrators. Since 1980, electronics,
controls, and materials were areas which involved knowledge transfer between com-
panies and spurred the consolidation of aircraft systems manufacturers [108]. While
the overall equipment manufacturers (OEM’s) began to contract and outsource, sub-
systems developers began to expand their capabilities from specific equipment design
and manufacturing towards providing a systems integrator role.
One prime example of component suppliers beginning to take a greater role in sys-
tems integration is Hamilton Sundstrand. Hamilton Sundstrand has positioned itself
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as a major aircraft systems platform level integrator. Joe Adams, Hamilton Sund-
strand vice-president, and chief engineer, 787 Programs has expressed their intended
role in the aerospace sector:
“Hamilton Sundstrand’s development and integration of such a broad base
of systems is a unique role for an aerospace supplier [51].”
In 1999 United Technology Corporation (UTC) created Hamilton Sundstrand
through the purchase of Sundstrand Corporation and merging it with Hamilton Stan-
dard [108]. With this acquisition and merger, UTC positioned itself as a prime
provider of propulsion and power systems and established itself as a key systems sup-
plier on the Boeing 787. Approximately 1300 parts per aircraft are provided by UTC
for the 787 [50] which estimate to over $2 million per shipset [199]. On military plat-
forms, additional to the revenue received through the Pratt & Whitney (P&W) F135
engine, UTC’s Hamilton Sundstrand receives over $2 million per shipset [36, 199].
Another US company attempting to adopt a systems integrator role is General
Electric (GE). Since, 1917 General Electric Aviation has developed propulsive solu-
tions for the aircraft industry. GE has kept in step with a developing market through
the technology development and key partnerships. The early 1970’s brought a part-
nership with Snecma enabling extensive access to the commercial turbofan market,
and in 1996, the creation of the GE-P&W Engine Alliance helped push engine tech-
nological development. As the most successful engine manufacturer, since 1990 GE
has been involved in the production of over 18,000 engines.
While propulsion has been their primary focus for the better part of a century, GE
aviation began to pursue a systems integration status around turn of the 21st century.
The desire of GE Aviation to move towards prime systems integrator is expressed by
their president Vic Bonneau:
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“Our integrated electrical power solutions offer superior products and sys-
tems involving starting and generation, control, primary and secondary
distribution and management, and conversion. Integration processes of-
fer constructors greater installation flexibility and on-time delivery in the
initial fit, with higher reliability and reduced maintenance and total own-
ership costs to end users [25].”
In October 2000, GE announced a $42 billion merger with Honeywell. Honeywell
Aerospace’s capabilities originated in environmental control and heating. Additional
vehicle systems design capabilities were developed through a series of mergers and
acquisitions including their 1986 purchase of Sperry Aerospace and 1999 merger with
Allied Signal. In 2000, before their potential merger, Honeywell’s expertise ranged
from primary and secondary power generation, engine start, environmental control,
engine controls and accessories, and landing gear equipment [218].
In 2001, this merger was blocked by the European Commission [218], and GE pur-
sued similar systems capabilities with the $4.8 billion merger with British aerospace
equipment company, Smiths Aerospace, in 2007 [301].
GE is not alone in its move towards power systems integrator. Other large en-
gine manufacturers are also positioning themselves in the systems market. Despite
challenges in the 70’s and 80’s [184], Rolls-Royce has established itself as the second
largest aerospace engine producer. As a primary engine developer for the Boeing
787, Rolls-Royce boasts the Trent 1000 as the first engine to provide power for non-
bleed cabin pressurization. Adam McLoughlin, MOET WP2 leader and lead electrical
system engineer at Rolls-Royce plc:
“Many of the business sectors within which Rolls-Royce operates are now
considering the potential offered by electrically powered systems [205].”
To compete in a more electric era, Rolls-Royce has been involved in developments
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towards the more electric engine, low pressure spool generation [209, 211], and has
also attempted to take the perspective of electrical system integration. Increasing
electrical loads pose problems to the traditional engine design. In order to design
an engine to support high steady state and transient loads, Roll-Royce realized the
necessity to expand its scope and concurrently address the design considerations of
generation and propulsion systems.
Other European companies like Hispano-Suiza are transforming their position
from equipment provider to vehicle system integrator. Emerging from the auto-
mobile industry, Hispano-Suiza participated in the aerospace industry as an engine
developer until the 1970’s. Hispano-Suiza, now out of the engine manufacturing busi-
ness, became a top tier aircraft equipment supplier. A member of Snecma from 1968,
Hispano-Suiza became a subsidiary of the SAFRAN Group in 2005 with the merger
of Snecma and Sagem and is responsible for Safran’s ‘more electric’ strategy. Focus-
ing on power transmission, management, and conversion and leveraging development
from other Safran companies, Hispano-Suiza is working towards “the overall opti-
mization of aircraft electrical architecture (ATA24 equipment), and the integration
of electrical systems... [3]” in an attempt to position itself as a provider of platform
level power management systems.
It is apparent that the strategic redefining of the large scale systems manufactur-
ers is effecting the development of aircraft systems. The evolving aircraft industry
supply chain and increasing technical uncertainty are changing relationships between
OEM and equipment supplier. The new strategic positioning of subsystems contrac-
tors discussed here is an example of the changing way in which aircraft systems are
being designed. Large scale power systems contractors are made responsible for ar-
chitecting conceptual power systems solutions and manage unit level requirements for
component sizing. Companies which were originally responsible for the design and
development of specific equipment solutions as dictated by the system integrator are
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beginning to assume the role of integrator themselves. In all cases, there is a sig-
nificant investment towards electrical solutions integrated at the system or platform
level.
Observation: Increased technological risk has changed the way which aircraft are
designed. More responsibility is placed on the subsystem manufacturers to provide
innovative integrated subsystem solutions.
2.6 Motivation Overview
Advances in electrical technologies have induced significant challenges to vehicle sys-
tems design. The conventional hydraulic and bleed architecture is being rejected
in favor of “more electric” architecture concepts. Large increases in the magnitude
and variability in power demands supporting flight and mission critical functions has
focused much attention on the fundamental aircraft systems architecture. Energy
optimization has lead the aerospace industry “to a stage where we are beginning to
rationalize and reintegrate things that we have spent many decades separating and
‘optimizing’ [91].” While much of the research in the more electric aircraft has been
focused on technological development, validation, and verification within a conven-
tional architecture, current trends look towards the development of new architecture
concepts.
The latter half of the twentieth century has seen a dramatic change in the way a
large aircraft manufacturer does business. Large aircraft manufacturers and equip-
ment providers are currently adopting new strategies for equipment design and in-
tegration. The trend towards increased outsourcing of design activities means that
entities external to the OEM are beginning to adopt the role of architect and inte-
grator of vehicle systems technologies.
Coupling the trend towards horizontal integration through design outsourcing for
the purpose of risk sharing and market access, with step changes in power required on
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military and commercial platforms, the aerospace industry is facing a new paradigm
for aircraft systems integration. Generation, distribution, and management of electri-
cal power are becoming a fundamental aspect of the aircraft concepts. Additionally,
sources external to the platform developers are becoming more responsible to provide
innovative solutions for the platform level design and integration of aircraft power
systems. Issues regarding the implementation of vehicle systems architectures must
be addressed early in the design process; during the platform concept definition and
selection phases.
Observation: The definition and validation of innovative power systems concepts




REQUIREMENTS DEFINITION FOR VEHICLE
SYSTEMS
Addressing electrical vehicle systems trades provides an advantageous perspective
during the conceptualization of aircraft platforms. However, it also means that elec-
trical systems requirements must be anticipated earlier in the design process to facil-
itate concurrent engineering. Revolutionary concept architectures induce new sets of
requirements previously not addressed during aircraft conceptual design. These new
requirements have the potential to act as show-stoppers for the platform concept.
While the second chapter addressed the business and technological environments
for vehicle systems design in the aerospace industry, this chapter looks at the difficulty
in “optimally” architecting the power systems. In order to determine this ‘optimality‘,
architecture models must be subject to accurate sets of requirements generated from
conditions which drive the attributes at the unit level.
With increases in electrical power demand and design freedom being deferred to
power systems developers, there is a greater need for the ability to explore archi-
tecture related solutions. The means for conception and decomposition, architecture
complexity, information management, and requirements sensitivity must be addressed
with the conceptualization of new architectures.
This chapter addresses two main challenges introduced by architecting power sys-
tems during conceptual design. The first stems from the traditional nature of air-
craft platform level conceptual design. High levels of abstraction and hierarchical
decompositions are difficult to reconcile with the a exploration of a highly flexible
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network structure associated with prower systems architectures. Inherent architec-
ture complexity and an intractable number of potential architecture solutions intro-
duce difficulty in architecture exploration and requirements allocation. As seen with
MOET and INVENT studies, once the architecture is fixed, complex analysis can
be performed and the systems can be optimized. However, during the conceptual
architecting of vehicle systems for revolutionary aircraft platforms, flexibility must
be provided during the allocation of requirements throughout the system.
The second challenge emerges in the identification architecture specific sizing crit-
ical requirements. While requirements are traditionally allocated in a top down man-
ner [210], requirements may be sensitive to architecture implementation. It is nec-
essary to explore how architecture requirements are sensitive to unit and platform
decisions in regards to power systems embodiment. Unit and platform level require-
ments must remain valid during the exploration of the highly flexible architecture
tradespace.
This chapter discusses how requirements emerge during the design of complex ve-
hicle systems. This is done by looking at the traditional aircraft conceptual design,
defining what is meant by architecture, and exploring architecture complexity. Addi-
tionally, this chapter addresses the objectives of this thesis: namely, development of a
systematic means for identifying architecture specific emergent requirements during
architecture exploratory design.
3.1 Aircraft Conceptual Design
Aircraft systems are typically characterized by large, multidisciplinary architectures.
The process of complex system design is made up of multiple steps, often concurrently
across multiple organizations. The traditional steps of the design process include pre-
design, conceptual, preliminary, and detail design.
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Conceptual design is concerned with the formulation of the design problem. Al-
though little to no hardware is produced, conceptual design is considered to be most
critical [305]. During this design phase decisions have a large impact on overall in-
curred cost through the reduction of design freedom during the latter design phases.
Early decisions impact future labor, materials, manufacturing required, as well as
product performance and the overall product life cycle. These early design phases
determines the ability of a company to introduce a viable product into the market
quickly [76].
Conceptual design is not intended to guarantee optimal system performance [210].
Within this design phase, a framework is developed wherein engineers, manufactur-
ers, and customers can operate comfortably and pursue a more detailed definition.
Conceptual design considers the overall understanding of the primary functions of
the system and investigates whether the requirements can be met in a viable man-
ner. The product of the conceptual design process is generally seen as one or more
possible high level solutions. The detail of these solutions depends on the maturity
of the basic technologies put into operation and the type of the design project [288].
Conceptual design deliverables typically take the form of computer or paper-based
descriptions, reports, and mathematical models [210].
This phase in product development generally includes three major steps: prob-
lem/project definition, alternative generation, and alternative selection [76, 288, 258].
Wheelwright and Clark visualize the process of design as a widemouth funnel depicted
in figure 7 and Moir and Seabridge illustrate this design process in figure 8. The wide
part of the funnel captures the magnitude of the product tradespace as driven by con-
cept studies. Drawing from the tacit knowledge from the design team, information
from previous projects, research and design studies, and help from suppliers, concept
studies are performed and alternatives are generated. A series of screens are used
to downselect concepts for further development. These screens denote a tradeoff and
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Figure 7: Wheelwright-Clark Product Development Process
Figure 8: Moir and Seabridge Conceptual Design Process
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selection process which evaluates and compares potential concept alternatives.
This process typically requires limitations of the design space based on assump-
tions on the part of the conceptual designers. Levis and Wagenhals write:
“The customer and the architect assume that these components will work
properly because they will be constructed and installed in accordance with
established codes and guidelines [293].”
It is difficult to capture all of the detail associated with an architecture considering
the limited design knowledge available during conceptual design. According to Lock-
heed design engineers, Bond and Ricci, with aircraft level conceptual design there is
no dedicated process for power systems architecture trades regarding electrical, envi-
ronment control, and other vehicle subsystems. Aircraft systems conceptual design
is occupied primarily with structures, weights, aeromechanics, and mission analysis
for a specific configuration of fuel, stores, engine, onboard systems [24]. This includes
the location of subsystems, units, structural members, and basic geometry and size.
At some point in conceptual design, when enough alternative designs have been
considered and compared, and the company feels confident with the potential designs
and are willing to invest more resources, a larger group of specialists are assigned to
the design to develop the concepts further [47].
Thus, aircraft systems are traditionally defined through an evolutionary process.
Faliero writes:
“Conventional aircraft systems on civil aircraft are a product of decades
of development by systems suppliers. Each system has become more com-
plex, as designers have striven to overcome interactions between equip-
ment by increasing the efficiency of each system [93].”
While much work has been done toward incremental improvement of individual
technologies and subsystem, there is natural resistance to solve the problem at the
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whole aircraft level [93]. In the current aircraft design paradigm of best practices and
axioms regarding the impact of high power electrical systems at the platform level do
not exist. Complex systems design does not pose contained and well-formed problems
[89] but ”messy, indeterminate situations [261].”
Michael Sinnett, chief engineer of systems development for the Boeing 787 Dream-
liner, spoke about the decision to change the cabin air pressurization method from
engine bled to electrically compressed. This single conceptual change to the aircraft
architecture imposed multiple dramatic changes to the predefined or assumed rela-
tionships within the system. Sinnett said:
“When we decided on electric pressurization, it lowered aircraft empty
weight 1,000-2,000 lb. and fuel burn was down several percent, but the
numbers got muddied as the 787 got integrated. It’s hard to say where
the weight has gone [78].”
The initial performance estimates did not take into account the multiple system
level changes which needed to occur within the architecture and appropriate strate-
gies to facilitate component integration. The avoidance of architecture exploration
and “the use of electrical power components where possible [44]” in conventional or
evolutionary architectures may yield incremental improvements to standard aircraft
platforms. However, given the trends for electrical power demand, electrical and
other power systems architectures are beginning to become central to total concept
feasibility.
3.2 Conceptual Architecting
Addressing the composition and structure of power systems architecture during the
conceptual design phase is difficult because of uncertainty in platform level require-
ments and a need to manage high levels of design freedom. The requirements for
power systems architectures are typically dictated from the platform level during
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preliminary and detail design. However, as power systems become more critical, re-
quirements are generated during power systems design which impacting the platform
level design. In order to explore the implications of electrical unit level technologies at
the platform level there must be a thorough understanding of the architecture design
space.
3.2.1 Architecture
Architecture is an important tool for systems design, concept trades and complexity
management. It is communicated as a set of abstract views or models constituting the
a blueprint for the design, development, and acquisition processes [293]. Architecting
is the process by which a solution space is defined to satisfy system requirements.
The International Organization for Standardization defines architecture design as the
process to “synthesize a solution that satisfies system requirements ... (and) explore
one or more implementation strategies at a level of detail consistent with the system’s
technical and commercial requirements and risks [145].”
Architecture is a fundamental, defining characteristic of every complex system
and has a large impact on its ultimate performance. Architecture design is crucial to
the success of a project because of its impact on the ability of designers to efficiently
and effectively develop new products [288]. As indicated by the POA [94] and initial
Lockheed studies [56], architectural configuration is integral to achieving maximum
benefit from electrical technologies.
Definitions of the term architecture vary depending on the perspective of the def-
inition source. In general architecture denotes entities and their underlying structure
whose combined attributes accomplish a task or sets of tasks. Crawley et. al. defined
system architecture as a description of elements within a system and the interactions
between those elements [53]. Other definitions portray system architecture with pri-
mary emphasis on structure and interaction. Maier and Sage describe architecture
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as groupings of components joined together in a way to fulfill some task that no
single element can fulfill individually, or the means by which proper communication
and interaction between elements within a system is achieved [198, 258]. Ulrich and
Eppinger place more emphasis on conceptualization and standards in architecture
design. They define architecture as:
“the scheme by which the functional elements of the product are arranged
into physical [element subsets] and by which the [element subsets] interact
[288].”
Additionally, the Department of Defense defines architecture in terms of “major
functional elements, interfaces, and design rules, pertaining as feasible to all simula-
tion applications, and providing a common framework within which specific system
architectures can be defined [60].” Similarly, The International Council of Systems
Engineering (INCOSE) defines architecture as a the unifying system structure in
terms of “elements, structure, interfaces, processes, constraints, and behaviors.”
For optimal implementation of electrical technologies, trades in the systems archi-
tecture must be performed. This involves the exploration of structural, operational,
functional, and technological solutions pursuant to increased product performance.
Each perspective provides information necessary to define the architecture and its
interaction with the environment [74].
Predefinition plays a major rolls in the use and development of complex systems
architectures. All products have a structure, fulfill functions, and in turn, are de-
fined by an underlying architecture [245]. However, varying levels of architecture
pre-definition cause architectural concepts to emerge during different portions of the
design process [288]. Architectures can come forward through dedicated architecture
definition exercises or can be altered and adapted from previous concepts. The means
by which this architecture definition takes place is generally determined by the ma-
turity of the technologies to be implemented and the level of definition to the project
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previous to conceptual design.
Ideally, the complex system would be decomposed to a “harmonious state“, in
which
“all elements are divided into unique modules and ... all intermodule
relationships are ... completely described in interface descriptions that
also fully describe the emergent system level characteristics [266].”
Traditional architecting processes are schemes for generalizing elements within a
system and their relationships. This is enabled through the delineation of standards
and interfaces. Functions are grouped together to form tightly linked “chunks“; a
chunk being a subset of system elements, or subsystem [266], which represent the
physical building blocks of the system [288]. These chunks are defined depending on
their roles or functions within the system, or due to physical or disciplinary similarity.
This decomposition assists in managing architectural complexity standardizing and
minimizing the interactions between subsystems. This is called clustering [122]. In
the definition of the subsets of system elements, system architects define where tight
physical relationships will occur. This allows the architect to determine the limit and
effect of a change within one subset on another. These subsystems are then laid out
physically to determine the rough geometric relationships in which interactions are
explored [288].
Most design practices assume a pre-existing architecture framework [6]. Redesign,
evolutionary design, and derivative design are all exercises which generally require
definition within a fixed architectural scheme. However, working within a fixed archi-
tecture imposes limitations on the performance of the system. Applying revolutionary
technologies to previously defined architectures can introduce complex interactions
which significantly change the predefined interfaces and relationships [6]. A breach of
the architecturally dictated interactions can have detrimental impacts on the ability
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of designers to predict the actual performance of the product. It follows that revolu-
tionary systems require creative and innovative methods for architecture definition.
In order to accurately represent the product, architecture models must capture
the relationships between the fundamental elements in a way which can describe the
combined attributes and resulting performance of the product. Furthermore, these
relationships should be described in a way which is not subject to the breaching of
constructs or assumptions with the introduction of new elements into the system.
The conceptual architecting of power systems introduces much complexity during the
early stages of the aircraft design process.
3.2.1.1 Object-Oriented Vehicle Systems Architecture
Increased emphasis of vehicle systems capabilities has lead many to invest in flexible
vehicle systems architecture modeling efforts. In order to explore the impact of archi-
tecture changes and avoid over-generalizations of system performance, object oriented
approaches to systems modeling provide improvements over historical regressions and
system generalizations. This is achieved by closing the semantic gap between model
and reality [147]. Systems level performance approximations provide little visibility
regarding the performance of a given unit or component in the fulfillment of specific
requirements. For object oriented design, a modeling object is mapped directly to an
object in reality following the level of abstraction adopted by the systems modeler.
While motivated by functional and operational requirements, most early devel-
opment exercises for the more electric aircraft have focused on the improvements
through the integration of advanced technologies in an existing platform. However,
‘more electric’, ‘all electric’, or ‘power/energy’ optimized concepts represented rev-
olutionary impacts to the aircraft systems architecture, necessitating implementing
new perspectives. Sinnett explained the change in perspective necessitated by the
7E7 systems design group. He said:
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“In the past systems have kind of come along for the ride. We’ve
never really made big functional improvements in systems over the past
forty years... Typically we’d approach the aircraft from an ATA chapter
perspective. But from a first-principles perspective we were able to set
aside all our more typical prejudices [294].”
The POA study also addressed the necessity for a functional perspective in the
exploration of architecture concepts. Lester Faleiro, research coordinator of Liebherr-
Aerospace, and project manager of the POA project wrote:
“So far, the industry has concentrated on producing potentially revo-
lutionary ideas by taking evolutionary steps. Things change if we begin
to look at the aircraft as a functional solution to a problem... Eventually,
various solutions, and combinations of solutions, that meet each of the
functions of the aircraft, can be found. The beauty of this approach is
that instead of providing a number of potential solutions to a problem,
engineers can be shown the ideal direction in which they have to take their
developments [91].”
A trend is emerging which breaks from the traditional method of defining systems
through partition hierarchies or aggregation and is beginning to address the need for
the modeling of architecture. Tools and models began to emerge which allowed for
flexibility in the embodiment of the vehicle systems architecture intended to assist in
early vehicle systems concept trades. Many examples or this trend to the integration
of vehicle systems modeling and trades
Examples of this trend include the Air force’s Integrated Vehicle Energy Technol-
ogy (INVENT) Power/Thermal Models, Airbus’ Aircraft System - Subsystem Inter-
relationship Model for Technology Evaluation, United Technology’s Integrated Total
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Aircraft Power Systems (ITAPS), DLR’s Virtual Iron Bird, the EU’s More Open Elec-
trical Technology multiobjective platform level architecture trades. These are just a
few of the numerous private and academic research efforts currently being pursued
around the world, each pursuing the capability to generate, validate, and explore
potential advanced electric systems architectures using integrated object modeling
techniques.
3.2.2 Combinametric Complexity
Problematic to the idea of an object-oriented exploration of the vehicle system archi-
tecture concepts is the shear magnitude of decisions which must be made to configure
an architecture concept. Each unit is characterized by its own complexity in terms
of its behavior and performance when placed in an operating environment and given
specific performance requirements. However, the environment in which a single unit
must operate must be derived from the attributes of the architecture as a whole.
As the fundamental architecture structure is made flexible during architecture explo-
ration, unit level requirements will necessarily change. Therefore, determining the
requirements at the unit level becomes sensitive to a combinametric design space.
Table 4: Notional Morphological Analysis for Platform Level Functional Fulfillment
Function Alternatives a
Propel More Electric Engine Conventional Engine 2
Control Yaw HA EHA EMA 3
Control Pitch HA EHA EMA 3
Control Roll HA EHA EMA 3
Actuate Landing Gear HA EHA EMA 3
Protect from Ice Pneumatic Electric 2
Environment Control Conventional Bleedless 2
a = number of single alternatives per function
Conducting vehicle system architecture trades also introduces a design space which
is combinametrically complex. The number and diversity of elements which can ul-
timately support the platform level functions represents a design space consistent of
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an intractable number of potential architecture solutions. Each one of these combi-
nations represents a distinct way to fulfill architecture tasks, exhibits an independent
set of physical and behavioral attributes, and may induce the need to address con-
figuration dependent functional or operational design decisions. Consider the simple
morphological decomposition representing solutions to platform level functions in ta-
ble 4. Here conventional and ‘more electric’ technology alternatives are listed for six
vehicle systems related platform level functions.
Table 5: Number of Potential Combinations of Solution Considering Redundancy
Number of Potential Solutions by Redundancy






































































a = number of single alternatives per function
n = level of redundancy
The number of potential combinations of solutions depends on the level of redun-
dancy for the technologies fulfilling each function. In table 5 we see the number of
potential solutions given the ability to select up to ‘n’ redundant elements to fulfill
the function. For no redundant selections there are a total of 648 combinations which
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can fulfill the six functions. Allowing up to dual or triple redundancy this total in-
creases to 8.20×105 and 9.50×107 respectively. If evaluation of each of the 9.50×107
concepts required 1 millisecond, it would take over 26 days to evaluate the set. This
the number of potential solutions can be reduced by limiting the architecture in terms
of redundancy, and technology compatibility. However, even with this simple table
the number of alternatives could be too large to handle.
Neglected in this simple analysis is the potential addition of new functions when
a physical element is selection. Each alternative induces new requirements on the
system. At a minimum, generation, distribution, transformation, storage, and pro-
tection equipment must be defined with adequate redundancy for each power type
required by the equipment selected to support platform level functions. Safety and
reliability functions will also be introduced with the selection of physical elements.
Assume these functions and their system definition alternatives are listed in table 6.
Assuming conventional technologies are selected to fulfill aircraft functions with
dual redundancy for control, propel, and environment control, specific functions are
introduced. Pneumatic and hydraulic distribution and generation become necessary.
Again, these functions must be fulfilled with adequate redundancy. As can be seen in
table 6, with this specific technology set, the number of potential solutions expands
dramatically. For the conventional architecture as defined above relationships between
elements provide combinations of potential flows of functions on the order of 1×1013.
This variability is increased by allowing the allocation of functions to vary for each
mission scenario.
Behavioral aspects also increase architecture dimensionality. The physical sizing
of each element will be subject to how the physical objects are being used during
each mission segment or operating scenario within the life cycle. Decisions must also
be made regarding how the equipment will be supported and when. Functions can
also be supported by any one or combination of elements during the various mission
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Table 6: Notional Morphological Analysis for Derived Functional Fulfillment as
Required by Functions from Table 4
Number of Solutions
Induced Function Alternatives Conventional More Electric
1. Distribute Electric Electrical Bus n1
2. Distribute Hydraulic Hydraulic System n2
3. Distribute Pneumatic Pneumatic System n3
4. Distribute Fuel Fuel Distribution n4 n4
5. Distribute Thermal Cooling Loop n5 n5
6. Generate Electric Generator n6
7. Generate Hydraulic Mechanical Pump Electrical Pump n7
8. Generate Pneumatic Electric Compressor n8
9. Store Electric Energy Storage n9
10. Store Pneumatic Air Tank n10





segments. This causes the design space grows even larger.
Furthermore, adequate reliability must be maintained during the mission. Deci-
sions on how to provide support for architecture equipment, allocate requirements
with mission scenarios, and ensure reliable performance greatly complicate task of
defining a conceptual power systems architecture. All of these decisions must be
made to determine the sizing critical requirements for each unit in the system. From
this simple example and its shortcomings, we see how managing perspectives is critical
to architecture design.
Whereas the traditional hierarchical breakdown of the aircraft design space allows
for the definition of unit level requirements by a ‘flow down’ from higher to lower
levels of abstraction [210], the varying structure and highly integrated nature of power
systems architecture trades necessitates alternative methods for traditional top down
requirements allocation. It is necessary to understand the effect that this complexity
has on the definition and application of requirements.
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Observation: Vehicle systems architecture trades greatly increase the combinamet-
ric complexity of the aircraft platform concept design space.
3.3 Requirements Definition
Requirements analysis precedes all definition of the product functions or physical at-
tributes. It is the means of generating a valid description of desired product attributes
or goals which are logically organized to guide product development. Requirements
analysis considers what needs to be done by a product and is not troubled with how
these are to be accomplished.
David Hays described discusses requirements as follows:
“It is important not to confuse requirements analysis with system design.
Analysis is concerned solely with what some call the problem space...
There is a common tendency for designers... to go into the effort with
preconceptions of what the solution space is going to look like, so they
seek out problems they already know how to solve [127].”
External influences driving the definition of requirements can be categorized into
coherent groupings. Moir and Seabridge discuss typical design drivers that are present
in the requirements analysis of an aircraft: safety, cost, environmental conditions, per-
formance, quality, human/Machine interface, structure, crew and passengers, stores
and cargo, functional performance, and standards and regulations [210].
These requirements drivers lead to the definition of expressed desirements regard-
ing the system. These desirements are categorized in terms of scope and application
to form requirements groups. The DoD recommends grouping these requirements
in a database which lumps these design drivers into project requirements, mission
requirements, customer specified requirements, and interface, environmental, and
non-functional requirements [75]. This constitutes what INCOSE terms a concept
of operations (CON OPS) [125], which gives a description of all product requirements
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and performance metrics. The CON OPS acts to define platform level functions
and sizing scenarios in terms of user and environment interfaces, missions, and con-
straints. It also may place limitations on the architecture embodiment and metrics
for alternative comparison.
In their document “Systems Engineering Fundamentals,” the Department of De-
fense’s Defense Systems Management College defines requirements in terms of three
distinct views: operational, functional, and physical [75]. Operations are responsible
for determining the magnitude, duration, and environment for platform requirements.
The functional view addresses what the system must do to fulfill carry out the oper-
ations, and the physical view focuses on specific means to fulfill the functions. Thus,
requirements originate from the operational view and are allocated to the physical
elements by means of functional relationships. During conceptual design, changes in
the mission necessarily induce changes in the physical attributes of the system [118].
An operation can be defined as “the tasks, actions, and activities to be performed...
to satisfy defined operational objectives” subject to “conditions, circumstances, and
influences” affecting performance [227]. These tasks, actions, and activities can be
generalized under the definition of a function [229, 282]. Thus, operations describe the
sequence and magnitude of concurrent or serial sustained and discrete functions which
must be fulfilled in support of objectives or users’ needs. Each specific combination of
requirements allocated to the architecture at a specific state and subject to a specific
operating environment represents an operational scenario.
Identifying appropriate functional requirements for a product begins with identi-
fying the environment in which it is to operate throughout its life cycle. This must
be done independently of the physical structure or implementation strategy of the
product and the relationships of this environment to the product itself. A holistic
view is necessary when eliciting requirements from the concept of operations. Rosson
and Carroll argue:
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“Requirements are often documented as individual features, specific
functions that must be implemented in order to make available the re-
quired overall system functionality. This approach entrains the creation
of voluminous specification documents couched at the level of individual
operations. This tends to create ... abstractions at a fairly low level with
respect to overall system functionality [255].”
Platform level requirements are often assumed independent of product architec-
ture. The means by which these requirements are fulfilled by the physical solutions
may change the way these requirements are deployed to the unit level. This follows the
typical flow down of requirements as discussed earlier. However, during architecture
definition do requirements flow up?
3.4 Emergent Requirements
The sensitivity of platform requirements to architecture changes is not a foreign con-
cept [204]. Some requirements have already been identified which emerged with the
implementation of electric technologies. These requirements have expanded the nec-
essary scope in systems evaluation and has motivated the introduction of specific new
architectures. The MOET and INVENT architectures have been introduced to ad-
dress the emergent requirements induced by new technology insertion. As discussed
in the motivation chapter, thermal and transient consideration began to emerge as
sizing critical requirements. While in previous architectures these requirements were
not sizing critical and typically not modeled or addressed in concept development,
these considerations have been included or augmented with studies in high power
electrical technology implementation.
As expressed by Casti:
“Complex processes display counter-intuitive, seemingly acausal be-
havior full of unpredictable surprises [42].”
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With complex vehicle systems, requirements “cannot be fully explained mechanis-
tically and functionally [107].” New requirements may emerge following architecture
decisions.
Flake described emergence as follows:
“[Emergence] refers to a property of a collection of simple subunits
that comes about through the interactions of the subunits... Usually, the
emergent behavior is unanticipated and cannot be directly deduced from
the lower-level behaviors. [104].”
Emergence is often held synonymous with subunits exhibiting individual knowl-
edge or consciousness. While these attributes may not hold for power systems ele-
ments themselves, requirements may emerge in an ontological sense. Some require-
ments do not exist and can not be predicted until product definition takes place.
Similar to emergent behavior, requirements may be emergent if they are unantici-
pated during the requirements definition process and are a product of the interaction
between architecture specification through the physical embodiment and system oper-
ations and behavior. In addition, conceptual design is an emergent complex process.
The elicitation of requirements assigns attributes of intentionality, foresight, purpose,
and morality in the definition of architectures.
Emergent requirements, defined here, are requirements which can not be enumer-
ated or quantified during the traditional requirements definition process, but which
are the result of complex behavioral relationships between units in specific architec-
ture implementations.
A distinction should be made between what is meant by an emergent requirement
in contrast to a derived or induced requirement. A derived or induced requirement
is a requirement which is not designated by a stakeholder but is identified during
requirements analysis process and is based on the designers understanding of the
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problem [123]. Derived requirements are often defined through a decomposition of
the explicitly specified requirements [188]. Similarly, emergent requirements are also
not explicitly defined by the stakeholder. However, these requirements may also not
be defined during requirements analysis, but emerges as a result of the operational
implimention of a physical architecture. Emergent requirements is similar to a con-
structed requirement, which is “an expression of domain knowledge [192],” but they
again differ in the fact that they emerge due to the specific aspects of the embodied
architecture interacting with the operational domain.
Unit level requirements are inherently emergent. The relationship between plat-
form level requirements and unit level requirements depend directly on the physical
definition of the architecture and complex behavioral relationships. Modularity in
systems modeling pursues the ability to capture changes in the interplay between
systems and captures requirements interactions. Techniques like functional induc-
tion, as will be discussed later, can handle variability in functional requirements as
they are deployed from system to system. However, for new technologies, combina-
tions of technologies, or new strategies for providing loads, other requirements areas
are effected which are critical for sizing at the unit and system level.
Research Question: What factors contribute to the operational/behavioral com-
plexity lead to emergent requirements in aircraft vehicle systems?
3.5 Thesis Objectives
Traditional means for concept development requires assumptions regarding architec-
ture embodiment to limit the architecture design space. Greater flexibility in the
design space means that assumptions regarding sizing critical scenarios and limiting
requirements may no longer hold. With the increased complexity introduced with
power systems conceptual architecting, requirements emerge which depend on the
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specific embodiment of the design space. If new requirements emerge with the intro-
duction of novel architectures, these must be identified in order to justify architecture
selection.
Conceptual tools and techniques are required which allow designers to explore
architecture concepts and simultaneously capture these emergent systems require-
ments to justify architecture selection. The objective of this thesis is to develop tools
and methods which assist the system architect in systematically identifying emergent
operational and reliability related architecture requirements while allowing for vari-
ability in architecture construction. This ability has the potential to aid the designers
during architecture definition and allow for more accurate prediction of power systems
architecture effectiveness.
Objective: Development of tools and techniques for systematic identification of ar-
chitecture specific emergent requirements during concept architecture validation.
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CHAPTER IV
SIZING CRITICAL EMERGENT REQUIREMENTS
New system level requirements are introduced following decisions about the struc-
tural or physical nature of the system. Allowing the requirements to be augmented
following design decisions is necessary for revolutionary concept architectures. Sizing
critical requirements emerge from operating scenarios not defined by the concept of
operations. However, these requirements depend on the specific architecture imple-
mentation of the solution. In order to size the system, unit level requirements must
be accurately predicted.
As discussed in the previous chapter, design perspectives play a large role in
defining revolutionary architectures. Multiple perspectives must also play into the
identification of emergent requirements. Drawing from research performed by Lis-
couët-Hanke, vehicle systems architecture complexity can be characterized in multiple
dimensions: technology dependence, spatial topology dependence, operating mode
dependence, safety and reliability dependence, and time dependence [190]. These
categories frame the dimensions explored in this chapter towards understanding the
emergence of sizing critical requirements.
The first two categories of complexity (technology dependence and spatial topol-
ogy dependence) refer to the dimensionality of physical architecture embodiment as
discussed in the third chapter. Variations in technologies, their relationships, and
their spatial integration represent variations in the architecture definition. Much
work has been done to understand and characterize technological dependence and its
potential impact potential to effect architecture performance. These efforts and ‘more
electric’ technology examples were discussed in the second chapter. Spatial topology
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Figure 9: Harel’s Magic Square of System Development
also plays an important role in the physical definition of the architecture.
While not addressed directly in this thesis, layout and packaging concerns are
of critical interest. Further information regarding these aspects of architecture de-
sign were addressed by Upton [289]. The physical embodiment, arrangement, and
attributes of these units are assigned and derived from from customer needs, opera-
tions, and safety/reliability considerations. However, the work presented in this thesis
focuses on the latter categories introduced for characterizing architecture complexity
which relate more directly to the behavioral space of the system. Primary focus is
given to operating mode and safety and reliability dependence.
Emergence is a product of the behavioral complexity of units and systems. Behav-
ioral requirements can be considered as orthogonal to the physical and implementation
design space. This is expressed by Harel’s “Magic Square of Systems Development”
displayed in figure 9. Arriving at some final system solutions requires progress in
both the behavioral and implemenational dimensions of design.
The first behavioral dimension of complexity introduced by Liscouët-Hanke is
time dependence. This chapter discusses time dependency in architecture modeling
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with two main areas of focus. First, the definition of energy related requirements
through integral of load demands. Second, the sizing critical nature of transient load,
necessitating dynamic analysis
The last two behavioral dimensions of complexity (operating mode dependence
and safety and reliability dependence) act to drive the requirements allocation to the
unit level. Additionally, the concept of requirements emergence necessitates require-
ments feedback from the unit level. This is considered in terms of operating mode
dependence and safety and reliability dependence. These two categories represent the
primary focus for this thesis.
In order to address emergent requirements in the form of operation mode and
reliability/safety dependence, it is necessary to benchmark against existing methods
for operations definition and reliability analysis. Following discussions of time depen-
dence, this chapter reviews tools and methods used in the identification and allocation
of sizing critical requirements.
Research Question: How does time dependence effect vehicle systems architecture
trades?
Research Question: With varying vehicle systems architecture, how do sizing crit-
ical operating modes vary?
Research Question: With varying vehicle systems architecture, how do safety/re-
liability requirements vary?
4.1 Time Dependence
Time dependence presents design challenges at multiple levels of abstraction dur-
ing product development. For the traditional high level aircraft platform conceptual
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designers, tasked with life cycle and mission analysis, time dependence may be consid-
ered on the order or minutes to decades. On the other extreme, unit level designers
must take a much finer time dependence perspective. To ensure adequate stabil-
ity and power quality power electronics and electric machine designers may consider
switching and response rates on the order milliseconds or smaller. The high level
time dependence perspective is insufficient for analysis at the unit level. Conversely
the unit level perspective is far too detailed for assessment of the architecture at the
platform level.
While a time scale adequate for mission analysis is also necessary for platform level
sizing, it is necessary to determine what time perspective should be taken during unit
and system level sizing. During early phases of power systems definition, models must
be able to predict component size, weight, and other attributes while allowing for
highly volatile physical relationships. Furthermore, changes in the way requirements
are allocated, and take transient behavior must be taken into account.
4.1.1 Unit Level Time Dependence
Sterman observes:
“Models rarely fail because we used the wrong regression technique or
because the model didn’t fit the historical data well enough. Models fail
because more basic questions about the suitability of the model to the
purpose weren’t asked, because a narrow boundary cut critical feedbacks,
because we kept the assumptions hidden from the clients, or because we
failed to include important stakeholders in the process [279].”
Not all modeling techniques are suitable for performing architecture trades. Box
observed, “All models are wrong, but some are useful [279].” Models differ in their
intended application with regard to the predictive capability towards the solutions of
a given problem [147]. Identifying emergent vehicle systems architecture requirements
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demand levels of modeling accuracy which provides confidence leading towards design
decisions. However, there is little use for highly accurate dynamic models during
conceptual design if they are not timely in both execution and construction. In order
to implement such models, designers must often prematurely limit the number of
degrees of freedom. There is a necessary tradeoff between efficiency and accuracy in
the exploration of a vast architecture design space [169].
This section introduces four levels of vehicle systems abstraction used for mod-
eling purposes: system level generalized modeling, steady-state modeling, reduced
order/lumped parameter modeling, and switching level dynamic modeling. Each of
these levels of abstraction include different levels of detail regarding the architecture
embodiment. Some perspectives have the potential to yield more accurate predictions
of systems behavior and requirements, but require larger computational resources and
extended development time.
4.1.1.1 Systems Level Generalization
Systems level abstractions of vehicle system attributes represent one extreme in mod-
eling system level performance and attributes, where time dependency is only exhib-
ited through potential mission level analysis. With these techniques, the designer
avoids the necessity to address unit relationships and specific architecture structures.
Well-established fields, like aerospace industry, benefit from a large historical
database of aircraft concepts. This wealth of information provides a statistical ref-
erence for predicting system level attributes and performance. Traditional weights
estimation techniques rely heavily on the historical database to predict system at-
tributes. While these statistical approximations are continually being updated with
new aircraft designs, published examples of statistical system weight approximation
methods are provided by Nicolai [224], Raymer [244], Roskam [253], and Torenbeek
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Figure 10: Comparison of General Dynamics and Torenbeek Equations for Fuel
System Weight Estimation for Airplanes with Self-sealing Tank from Roskam [253]
[285]. These weight approximations identify the attributes in terms of the gener-
ally adopted hierarchical decomposition of the aircraft. Generalizations are made for
each high level aircraft vehicle system. The attributes of structures, power plants,
and equipment systems are approximated in terms of known generic attributes of the
platform and mission. An example of such a regression is provided in figure 10. This
figure displays two exponential regressions predicting the weight of a fuel systems
based on fuel weight with self-sealing tanks.
The equations from figure 10 provides little information or representation of the
physical systems itself. The attributes of this system are determined solely in term
of fuel weight. While this statistical relationships may be valid for traditional sys-
tems concepts, revolutionary architectures require extrapolations from the historical
database and remove the predictive power of the historical reference. Raymer ex-
presses these limitation with historical weight estimation. He says:
“It should be understood that there are no ‘right’ answers in weights
estimation until the first aircraft flies... Needless to say, these equations
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are complicated, and it takes a lot of time to apply them successfully.
Mistakes are easy... [244]“
Novel architecture configurations and the introduction of advanced technologies
undermine the accuracy and applicability of historical weight based regressions. De-
signing outside the traditional design space, as with the more electric aircraft, re-
quires the use of “fudge factors [244]” which extrapolate from the existing databases.
These fudge factors are qualitative estimates of the benefits or detriments to system
attributes or performance based on engineering tacit knowledge, heuristics, and en-
gineering reasoning [160, 245]. Performing power systems trades with this process of
modeling may cause significant errors stemming from misunderstanding of assump-
tions made in regards to the regression itself due to the limited knowledge of the
design team.
While these methods tend to fall short in accurately predicting vehicle systems
attributes for novel concepts, they are often used during conceptual design due to their
high level of abstraction and speed of execution. Assumed impacts from architecture
trades and technology insertion can be easily represented as technological impact
factors and be quickly augmented for architecture trades. Varying the technology
impact factors presents little computational challenge for the statistical regressions.
These tools allow conceptual designers to quickly generate platform level performance
estimates and promotes optimization and robust design at the platform level [166].
4.1.1.2 Steady-State Modeling
Integrated, validatable, architecture specific models are required for conceptual ar-
chitecting trades. NASA Glenn Research Center discussed new modeling necessities
in 2003:
“[T]here is a need for more accurate models and validation of those
models, especially at the systems level... Most of these tools exist in some
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form, but the integration into a single, coherent systems model is not
trivial. A dynamic model that investigates startup, takeoff, and other
mission transients would also be valuable for such a system [106].”
The object oriented modeling approach implemented by most current vehicle sys-
tems integrators enables flexibility in the architecture design space. However, the
question still remains regarding the level of time dependence necessary for unit mod-
eling unit during conceptual architecting.
Kuhn describes three levels of electrical systems modeling which vary in detail
and execution time. These levels can be described as architecture level steady state
models, state space averaging/lumped parameter models, and switching level models
[179].
This first level of abstraction typically involves algebraic balancing of power with
no dynamic analysis. Time based relationships are not captured between components
during steady-state analysis. However, many of the unit level requirements can be
inferred from steady state analysis. While dynamic performance requirements have
significant impact on the size and performance of power systems components, no-
tional constructions of the transient signal may be communicated between devices
through the specification of expected ramp rates and peak loads for given durations.
These simplified abstractions of transient requirements coupled with a large time step
mission analysis are termed “quasi-steady-state” models.
The advantage to steady state power balance relationships is their simplicity to
specify and to execute in a model. Steady state models often exhibit execution
times multiple orders of magnitude faster than switching level dynamic models [179].
The perspective taken during architecture level modeling of power systems allows the
systems modelers to perform high level architectural trades and determine general unit
level requirements. These concept level solutions provide justification for architecture
decisions and select potential architectures for more detailed analysis. Naturally,
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additional fidelity would be required during later phases of design refinement.
4.1.1.3 Dynamic Modeling
“Quasi-steady state” models can illicit many of the necessary sizing critical power
requirements. However, considerations like voltage and current fluctuations, tem-
perature variations, and control considerations require an understanding of system
stability [87]. Dynamic models are required for each analysis.
Common techniques for dynamic analysis of aircraft power systems center around
linearization, state space averaging, and evaluation for small disturbances [86, 62].
Complex dynamic systems can be represented by systems of first order linear dif-
ferential equations to approximate the transient responses to perturbations around
equilibrium conditions. An early process for system linearization and state space
averaging of switching devices is developed by Middlebrook and Cuk [208].
Simplification techniques also apply transformations which allow the analysis of
alternating current signals to be represented in terms of a time invariant or syn-
chronously rotating reference frame (e.g. Park’s Transformation [116, 173]). This
allows sinusoidal signals to be treated as time invariant linearizations which are pre-
cisely accurate under constant speed and load conditions. Additional estimation
techniques exist for lumped parameter representations of other switching level con-
siderations (e.g. ripple) [174].
Lumped parameter or state-space averaging evaluations are often sufficient for
systems level modeling. As expressed by Kuhn, “Switching transients from power
electronic devices do not normally have a significant influence on systems stability
[179].” While this may be true for traditional power electronics loads, evaluations of
high power actuators have indicated stability issues which can only be identified at the
switching level. Linear time invariant systems evaluations of Routh-Hurwitz stability
criterion, Nyquist criterion, and Eigen value and µ analysis, coupled with tools root
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locus and Bode plots provide the ability to determine most small disturbance stability.
These state space averaged models are much more difficult to create and exe-
cute than architecture level power systems models. Differential equations must be
generated, equilibrium points must be identified, linearizations must be generated.
This must then be executed for all relevant operating conditions. Techniques for
time averaging and linearization are heuristic in nature and are subject to sources
of error. Stability can’t be ensured with linearized systems representations. Actual
waveforms, high frequencies, control issues, and response to large scale disturbances
present problems which must be addressed using more accurate systems simulations.
Inherent trades between the development and simulation time versus accuracy
must be addressed for architecture time dependence consideration. To enable faster
evaluation of dynamic systems models pursuant to architecture development, the
INVENT studies determined that state averaged systems models are sufficient for
platform level performance simulations. The higher accuracy available from more
detailed higher order models is forsaken in deference to the requirement for faster
simulation time. Lower order models are used for platform level system analysis and
higher order models are used for validation. As observed by Kuhn:
“Despite the highest level of model accuracy, the main drawback of
[time varying nonlinear] modeling is the need for vast computational re-
sources and time [178].”
Additionally, both switching level and state averaged systems models are typically
intended for system analysis. Applying these tools during the design process would
necessitate iterative processes of system definitions, redefinitions, and model execu-
tions. This process may be feasible for architecture level models with steady state
relationships. However, for dynamic systems, tremendous amounts of effort may be
necessary to simply construct the model and ensure convergence. Large cycle times
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are necessary for even slight system modifications, let alone dramatic architectural
alterations.
4.1.1.4 Surrogate Modeling
Nielsen writes, “In most projects, if the only available choice was that between noth-
ing and perfection, nothing would win [225].” Detailed transient analysis is desired
to validate vehicle systems concepts. However, it is unavailable during concept archi-
tecture trades. This is due to problems in modeling efficiency and flexibility. While
“perfection” is unattainable, a third option is available; a “systematic approach to
improving the usability of the user interfaces by applying a set of proven methods
[225].” Alternative power systems modeling techniques can assist in gaining partial
benefits through compromise between low accurate steady state architecture models
and computation heavy dynamic systems modeling. This increasing the usability of
steady-state and state averaged dynamic modeling.
The Aircraft Systems Validation Rig or “Copper Bird,” developed during the
Power Optimized Aircraft research effort in Europe provided capability to validate
system performance through lab test of a half aircraft [102]. This rig provided more
accurate information than available through dynamic systems modeling. However,
tests of the validation rig are very expensive and time consuming. Characterizing
component performance in the validation rig for the range of potential load pro-
files was infeasible. In 2008, a joint research effort between Hispano-Suiza and the
Aerospace Systems Design Lab and Georgia Tech released results and methodologies
towards parametric models of generated data extracted from the Copper Bird [233].
Surrogate models which characterized the transient performance of the generators and
electric power units were created. Dynamic power loads and network configurations
were provided as inputs to these unit models and electrical responses were gathered.
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The data gathered included steady state parameters as well as transient signal char-
acteristics (ripple amplitude, voltage fluctuations, distortion spectrum). While these
surrogate models did not generate the time dependent waveform structure, paramet-
ric assessment of dynamic performance was available. The dynamic performance of
these units were accurately predicted using neural-network regressions.
Ensuring stability of the power system at the system level requires system level
dynamic modeling. However, steady-state surrogates generated from dynamic models
can provide local assurance of adequate unit level performance. Providing industrial
standards require dynamic analysis [179]. However, similar to regressions fit to the
Copper Bird components, surrogate models generated from the transient responses of
dynamic models can provide some information regarding local stability, and maintain
computational efficiency.
Surrogates of power systems components may benefit from the implementation of
industrial standards. Partial assurance of systems stability can be enforced through
the adoption of industrial standards like MIL-STD-704F for electrical systems per-
formance [73]. These standards provide combined guidance towards system stability,
power quality, and performance by way of constraints and conditions on dynamic
responses. Enforcing local compliance with industrial standards through sizing con-
straints can assist the surrogate modeling of unit level components.
Observation: Power system transient requirements are emergent.
4.1.1.5 Time Dependence Observations/Conclusions
Time dependence adds to systems modeling complexity by requiring the identifica-
tion of total mission energy requirements and time dependent system and unit level
requirements. Traditional mission definition and systems level dynamic modeling
address time dependence at different levels of abstraction.
The observations from this chapter can be characterized in figure 11. This figure
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Figure 11: Tradeoff Between Predictive Capability, Model Flexibility, and Modeling
Difficulty for Vehicle Systems Modeling Methods
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notionally characterizes the types of modeling by their predictive capability, modeling
flexibility, and modeling difficulty. Surrogate modeling attempts to achieve greater
predictive capability while maintaining the flexibility of a steady state systems model.
Dynamic analysis is necessary to verify the fulfillment of all MIL-STD or other reg-
ulations. It is also necessary to amend platform requirements. During the conceptual
design phase, with a multitude of potential architectural concepts, dynamic analysis
are difficult to set up and execute for a highly flexible design space. Additionally,
dynamic models are not typically intended to predict device size for exploration of
high level architecture structure. Models are needed during early architecture devel-
opment whose constructs and convergence are not endangered by major upheavals in
product structure, and whose execution can be accomplished in a timely fashion.
Non time-domain modeling is insufficient for predicting detailed system attributes
and requirements. “Quasi-steady state” models do not provide sufficient information
regarding system level stability in regards to dynamic performance. Generalized
transient considerations communicated by fixed values they can be used to assist in
justifying the high level power systems architecture concept.
4.2 Operating Mode Dependence
Functional and physical perspectives are not sufficient to completely define architec-
ture specifications. A complete set of design requirements are not guaranteed by
simply completing functional specification [194]. Functions must be linked to the
fulfillment of some higher level operational need.
An operating mode can be defined as the implementation and behavioral state
of the system which governs performance and functionality in a given environment.
With a varying architecture structure, sizing critical operating scenarios will force
requirements to be deployed differently for different architecture concepts. Some
scenarios which posed little problem with existing architectures may drive unit or
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platform level requirements. Additionally, new functions may be introduced during
a sizing critical scenario. A systematic means for identifying off-nominal sizing cases
is necessary when exploring and justifying the pursuit of novel architecture concepts.
The traditional source for platform level systems operating requirements stem from
the aircraft mission. In the previous section, the platform level energy requirements
were discussed. Specific mission phases present potentially active constraints which
drive the necessary physical attributes of the aircraft. Sizing critical scenarios gener-
ate active constraints on the attributes of the system. They represent the conditions
which introduce the maximum demand in terms of load or energy requirements.
This section explores means for defining operating scenarios during aircraft con-
ceptual design. Scenario based design techniques which have been adopted in model
based systems engineering [MBSE] are discussed. The applicability of scenario based
design tools to the identification of architecture specific emergent requirements during
exploratory design is also considered.
Sizing critical requirements are often derived from off nominal operational consid-
erations. Tools and theories like fault tolerance, contingency planning, failure man-
agement, and performance degradation techniques are traditionally used to configure
or analyze the operating mode dependence of complex systems.
4.2.1 Scenario Based Design
Scenario based design is a “set of perspectives and approaches” integrated to provide
an “object-oriented model of the user’s task domain [40]” and addresses the means
for identifying system operating modes. These tools were initially intended to assist
the computer systems engineering community in generating requirements [113], de-
termining behavior and functions, and defining the concepts towards their fulfillment
[180]. Additionally, scenarios based design techniques provide means for description,
test, and validation of interfaces during design and implementation [295].
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Kuutti describes a scenario as a sequence of acts [181], activity in narrative form
[220], or situations or episodes with temporal elements [304]. Scenarios represent
instances of use or intentional use of the system.
Potts has said:
“In the broad sense, a scenario is simply a proposed specific use of
the system. More specifically, a scenario is a description of one or more
end-to-end transactions involving the required system and its environment
[234].”
Similarly, Kahn describes scenarios as follows:
“A scenario results from an attempt to describe in more or less detail
some hypothetical sequence of events ... the scenario is an aid to the
imagination [159].”
A scenario is characterized by an initial and final state connected by transitional
actions, events, and other concurrent scenarios [9]. Uses, behaviors, user interactions,
and environment conditions are all needed to define scenarios [180].
Go identifies four areas of application for scenario based design techniques. These
include strategic planning, human-computer interaction (HCI), requirements engi-
neering, and object-oriented analysis/design [113]. Table 7 outlines the uses of sce-
narios in these fields.
Different tools and perspectives are required with each of these four scenario based
design communities. Determining the sizing critical operating scenarios which con-
strain the attributes of vehicle systems tends to focus more on the latter perspectives
of scenario based design: requirements engineering and object-oriented analysis/de-
sign. The next sections discuss the perspectives taken with these scenario based
design tools. Review of the fields of scenario based strategic planning and HCI are
discussed in appendix A.
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Table 7: Uses for Scenarios in Various Fields [113]
Field of Application Scenario Based Design Uses
Strategic Planning Envisioning uncertain future environment
Providing communication tool
Organizational learning
Sharing a mental model among stakeholders
Human-Computer Interaction Analyzing user tasks
Envisioning future work
Mock up and prototyping
Evaluating the constructed system
Deriving learning materials
Developing design rationale
Requirements Engineering Eliciting user requirements
Deriving specifications
Analyzing the current system usage
Describing the current system usage
Constructing test cases
Object-Oriented Analysis Modeling objects, data structures, and class hierarchy
Analyzing problem domain
Providing a model of real-world objects
Scenario based requirements engineering presents systematic means for uncovering
requirements similar to the process of mission analysis. Scenario based object-oriented
analysis and design uses scenarios to apply requirements to a system in terms of
functional structure.
Many scenario exploration tools and processes exist which attempt to encapsulate
the users’ requirements. Creative applications are needed in different development
circumstances [194]. Many tools have been developed in order to manage scenarios
for specific projects, but “no generally accepted tools exist [295].” Hsia states:
“Although much work has been done to apply [scenarios], there is still
no systematic and formal methodology to automatically identify, generate,
analyze, and verify the scenarios of a software system [139].”
Typical tools revolve around generating scenarios, using them effectively, and
building complete operating scenario representations [194]. While tools specific to
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strategic planning and human computer interactions are useful in other fields, the
tools discussed in the next two subsections focus on the elicitation of requirements
and the organization of a system in terms of fulfilling those requirements.
4.2.1.1 Requirements Engineering
Requirements engineering benefits from a systems viewpoint, which causes scenario
based design to be more “concrete and process oriented [113].” Breaking from the tra-
ditional data flow model for deriving software requirements development, analyzing
scenarios provides a means of describe necessary system attributes and behavior as
directed by the user [139]. Requirements scenarios provide details regarding the spe-
cific uses of a system to produce technical specifications. Therefore, they necessarily
include representations of sequences of operations [182]. One early approach imple-
ments scenarios to infer requirements in a sort of conceptual “prototyping” process.
Hooper and Hsai write:
“In prototyping by use of scenarios, one does not necessarily model
the system or any component thereof directly, but rather represents the
performance of the system for selected sequences of events [136].”
Methods for scenario based requirements elicitation take many different perspec-
tives. All provide logical approach to the analysis and description of system opera-
tions, function, and behavior. Nuseibeh and Easterbrook state:
“Since RE [requirements engineering] must span the gap between the
informal world of stakeholder needs, and the formal world of software
behavior, the key question over the use of formal methods is not whether
to formalize, but when to formalize [226].”
Formalization of requirements definition requires some assumed structure to the
requirements definition and architecting process. While the tools discussed in this
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section provide formal approaches to requirements description, the perspective taken
by these tools may or may not be applicable to the definition of requirements at the
unit level.
Five tools and approaches are discussed here in terms of their applicability to
the definition of emergent operational requirements. These are inquiry-based cycle
models (IBCM), questions-options-criteria (QOC) methods, claims analysis, formal
scenario analysis (FSA), and task analysis and modeling. The review of these tools
is recorded in appendix B.
The aerospace engineering community takes a healthy scenario view in terms of
mission and constraint analysis. Mission scenarios are critical to the definition of
both load and energy requirements. There is a direct correlations between aircraft
mission analysis and computer systems scenario based design techniques. Both are
used in describing and constructing use cases which specify systems requirements
during system architecture development [113].
4.2.1.2 Object-Oriented Analysis/Design
Scenario Based Object-Oriented Analysis/Design intends to create a “world model”
by defining “objects, data structures, and model class hierarchy” [113]. As discussed
in chapter three, an object oriented approach towards systems modeling has been
adopted by many systems integration efforts.
Object-Oriented scenario based tools focus on the interrelationships between the
system, system elements, and the environment. These tools may be used to define
system level functions which are necessary in the accomplishment of some goal or
requirement. They may also work towards understanding or defining specific rela-
tionships between system elements which do or must exist in the fulfillment of some
system level objective. These methods define users, system elements, and the en-
vironment in terms of objects and different to explore how these objects interrelate
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operationally. The attributes and performance of specific objects do not come into
play. Jacobson argues:
“We therefore do not think the very first model of a complex system
should be a object model. Instead, it should be a model that describes the
system, its environment, and how it and its environment are related. In
other words, it should describe the system as it appears from the outside;
that is, a black-box view [146].”
Sufficient understanding of the requirements and potential relationships which
exist between these “black-boxes” is necessary to construct appropriate operations
models. These use-cases represent scenario classes which drive the system devel-
opment and verification. Jacobson writes in regard to the use of scenarios during
object-oriented systems engineering:
“The analysis process produces two models. From the requirement
specification, a requirements model is creased in which we specify all the
functionality of the system. This is mainly done by use-cases in the use-
case model which is a part of the requirement model ... The requirements
model also forms the basis of another model created by the analysis pro-
cess, namely the analysis model. The analysis model is the basis of the
system’s structure [147].”
The specificity to which these models must be defined affects its applicability and
flexibility to concept trades. According to Robertson, the goal for an object-oriented
project is to “identify a set of classes and objects, specify their interrelations, and
define their behaviors and responsibilities in such a way that they support a variety
of activities within an application domain [248].” However, the degree to which the
architecture must be predefined limits the ability of these tools to instantiate an
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architecture while automatically identifying the sizing critical requirements associated
with operations.
Developing use cases requires an understanding of objects and interactions with
states, and transitions. The Object Management Group (OMG) see model based sys-
tems engineering in two domains: structural and behavioral. OMG’s Unified Mod-
eling Language (UML) expresses structure in terms of depends on classes, objects,
component, packaging, and structures. Additionally it captures operational aspects
in terms or behavior with activity, interactions, use case, and state Machine diagrams.
Thus as Go states with respect to OOA/D:
“Object-oriented analysis/design models an application domain. Its
view is that of a system model [113].”
The tools and processes pursuant to scenario based OOA/D focus on the defini-
tion of objects which represent the system elements and users. Five tools (use-case
diagrams, state and transition diagrams, interaction diagrams, activity diagrams, a
responsibility driven approach, and automated modeling support) are discussed in
this section. Tool overviews are given in appendix C.
4.2.1.3 Scenario Based Tools Evaluation
During the early stages of vehicle systems architecture definition and trades it is im-
portant for system architects to generate requirements which justify the selection of a
specific technology or configuration over another. Similar to the trades regarding the
level of accuracy of time dependent models, systems architects must determine what
information regarding the interrelationships between systems elements is necessary for
initial trades. Modeling operating modes in terms of logic level interactions between
units or components is not feasible during large scale platform trades. On the other
hand, the traditional mission profile may not be sufficient in generating requirements
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which elicit the fundamental capabilities required at the unit level. Proper perspec-
tives must be maintained during the exploratory design of aircraft vehicle systems.
These perspectives and modeling needs are discussed in terms of the classifications
provided by the Cooperative Requirements Engineering With Scenarios (CREWS).
The Basic Research Action, under the European Commission’s 4th Framework Pro-
gramme and Rolland et. al. propose this CREWS framework for scenario tools
classification. In their paper, A Proposal for a Scenario Classification Framework,
they characterize scenario approaches in four categories: form, contents, purpose,
and life cycle [251]. This characterization is shown in table 8. For the exploration
of requirements which emerge from complex aircraft power systems, a scenario based
tool would have attributes as indicated in this table.
Table 8: CREWS Scenario Classification Categories [251]
Form View: Descriptions and Presentations
Notations Formal* Semi-formal Informal
Interactivity Static Animated Interactive*
Contents View: Kind of Information Captured
Abstraction Concrete* Abstract Mixed
Context System Functionality* Enterprise
Argumentation Issues* Positions* Arguments Decisions
Coverage:
Functional Structure* Function* Behavior*
Intentional Goal Dependence* Problem* Responsibility* Cause*
Non-Functional Constraints* Capability* Flexibility* Portability
Purpose View: Capturing System Requirements
RE Process Role Descriptive Exploratory* Explanatory
Life Cycle View: Scenario Capturing and Augmentation
Lifespan Transient Persistent*
Capture From Scratch* Reuse*
Augmentation Integration* Refinement* Expansion* Deletion*
(* indicates necessary attribute for identification emergent scenarios of vehicle systems)
Form View: Using scenario based design techniques to determine operational re-
quirements which emerge due to architecture changes requires a feedback between
73
operations definition and physical architecture definition. This presents difficulty
when managing the assumptions adopted during scenario based design. The form of
the tool must be formal and interactive. While illustrative, semi-formal and informal
representations of scenarios, like textual descriptions, storyboards, and videos [195],
are insufficient to support the flexibility necessary during the architecture trades pro-
cess. For scenarios to emerge and expand depending on architecture decisions, a
scenario tool must be interactive following specific structural guidelines.
Contents View: The contents of the scenarios must be concrete in accordance with
requirements engineering scenarios. Scenario tools must also take a system function-
ality view as opposed to an enterprise view. With regards to argumentation, infor-
mation regarding issues (“descriptions of problems or conflicts”) and positions (“de-
scriptions of alternative solutions to a problem”) would be necessary [251]. However,
definition decisions regarding the selection of a positions would fall into conceptual
architecture definitino and not be derived by the scenario tool.
Due to the nature of architecture complexity as discussed in chapter three, all
functional and intentional coverage issues must be included in order to identify emer-
gent requirements. This includes coverage of non-functional issues. This requires that
constraints be managed for architecture sizing, adequate capability be ensured by the
designers during architecture definition, and flexibility be provided in order to allow
for architecture trades.
Purpose/Life Cycle Views: Determining emergent requirements during concep-
tual architecting necessitates an exploratory role for scenario based design. Informa-
tion regarding new operational requirements must be provided by individual units,
combinations of units, or specific relationships. This information must be readily
available and programmable so as to automatically instantiate legitimate operational
requirements during the physical definition and sizing of a specific architecture.
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In exploring architecture trades, requirements emerge, are augmented, and disap-
pear depending on changes to the system definition. Therefore, to support flexibility
the scenarios must support all augmentation and capturing techniques. They must
also be persistent because they drive requirements definition. Insight must be made
available when emergent sizing critical scenarios are carried through to latter design
stages.
Table 9: Evaluation of Scenario Based Design Tools for the Identification of Emer-



























































IBCM − − − + + + + −
QOC − − − + + +
CA − + + − + −
FSA + + + + − + + + +
TA&TM + + + − + + +
OOA&D Tools
Use-cases Diagrams + + + − − + +
Interaction Diagrams + + + − − + +
Activity Diagrams + + + − + + +
State Transition Diagrams + + + + − + + +
Responsibility-Driven Approach − + + + + + −
Each of the tools/approaches discussed in this section are evaluated in table 9 with
respect to the operational dependence of the vehicle systems architecture as addressed
during conceptual architecting. In classifying and comparing these tools using the
CREWS classifications it was observed that many of the tools used for requirements
engineering are insufficient due to informal notations and limited reconfigurability.
Scenario based, object-oriented tools exhibit a more formal and interactive notation
beneficial to an adapting architecture. However, the context of these tools focused
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more on interactive exchanges primarily in the form of information. Ultimately, it
was observed that formal scenario analysis, activity diagrams, and state transition di-
agrams are the most appropriate tools for expressing functional requirements towards
concept architecture trades.
Through this qualitative assessment, it was additionally apparent that the tools
reviewed lacked the ability to provide sufficient “coverage” in defining the emergence
of requirements. Coverage includes the functional (structure, function, behavior) and
intentional (goal dependence, problem, responsibility, cause) scope. It also includes
additional non-functional aspects (constraints, capability, flexibility, and portability)
[251].
Most methods and tools provide various levels of insight into structure, function,
and behavior. They also exhibit different degrees to which flexibility, capability,
and constraints are handled. However, all tools were limited in their management
of intentional coverage issues. Indeed, intentional coverage is not often included in
scenario based design. Rolland states:
“Intentional models are seldom included in scenario approaches... They
are, so to speak, implicitly underlying the interfaces between the re-
engineering company and its environment [251].”
There is no guarantee that the sizing critical operating scenario or use-case will
be identified using traditional scenario-based design tools. With these tools, the
user must specify specific cases during operations description. While object oriented
scenario tools provide a more formal means for expressing operating modes, they are
insufficient in their ability to capture deviations from nominal operations. Problems,
causes, and responsibility are all attributes of the architecture which must be managed
to understand emergent operational requirements.
The object oriented structure of operation mode requirement modeling tools pro-
hibits easy exploration of off-nominal cases as necessitated by specific architecture
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characteristics. When off-nominal scenarios must be identified the interactive, formal,
and object oriented nature of these tools limit portability and flexibility when intro-
ducing new implementations. Furthermore, all aspects of functional and intentional
coverage interact in development of these new scenarios. Informal and unstructured
methods have adequate flexibility to explore exceptions originating by physical losses.
However, these tools often require long iteration cycles to consider each off-nominal
case and lack portability.
The “what if” approaches for strategic planning and requirements engineering is
not currently integrated with formal and flexible structural relationships provided by
scenario based object-oriented analysis/design tools. Allenby observes with respect
to the Unified Modeling Language (UML):
“It is worth noting that there is little guidance available within the
UML standard or accompanying guidance material for the systematic
identification of either ‘alternative paths’ or ‘exceptional courses’ of events
in scenario or use-case descriptions. Under these circumstances, the prac-
titioner is left with little assurance of sufficient coverage. An impediment
to adoption of a use-case approach in safety critical systems is the current
lack of systematic method for identification of these alternative paths in
association with failure condition [7].”
While UML is only one means for expressing the implementation and behav-
ioral space of a system, Allenby generalizes his critique to include all use-case driven
approaches in considering off-nominal operating conditions. The use of traditional
scenario based methods for specifying the operations impact of off-nominal sizing
cases proves insufficient. While these tools may remain the backbone to operations
definition, alternative methods are used during the conceptual design phase which
attempt to capture the emergent operational requirements.
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4.2.2 Traditional Aircraft Operating Mode Identification
The aircraft mission is the primary source for requirements which drive aircraft sizing.
This mission is caste as a group of sequential operations which must be fulfilled by the
platform. Each phase/operation presents unique load and thrust requirements which
may potentially drive platform level attributes. Additionally, the total sequence of
operations determine the total energy requirements which govern the size of the plat-
form. This sequence of operations produce time dependent requirements for aircraft
sizing.
There exists a multitude of standard mission types for military and commercial
aircraft. Each mission presents a unique set of requirements which must be fulfilled by
the platform. The description of the mission can become very detailed in the level at
which operations are specified. However, during conceptual design, mission analysis is
typically performed at a high level. For example, a combat aircraft HI-HI-HI mission
consists of 7 phases: warm up/takeoff/acceleration, climb, cruise out, combat, cruise
back, descent, and reserve. This view of the mission does not constrain the physical
means of fulfilling the operation, thus allowing for architecture flexibility. Table 10
displays pictorial overviews of alternative missions for the AV-8B Harrier II. While
these mission can be performed by this specific platform, the Harrier is primarily
designed around a Close Air Support missions. The CAS mission was therefore used
as the primary source system requirements and drives the attributes of this platform.
In addition to the multiple mission phases, more information is necessary to de-
clare the platform requirements. Information regarding the means of takeoff may be
necessary. Examples of potential takeoff requirements include standard runways, deck
launch, vertical takeoff, short fields, or undeveloped airstrips. Platform requirements
vary widely due to specific maneuvers or conditions. In the example of the Harrier,
vertical takeoff requirements dominate the performance capability of the platform.
The attributes of each platform are determined by the fulfillment of the power,
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thermal, and energy requirements generated from the primary missions. Mission op-
erations impose specific performance demands through the magnitude boundary func-
tion requirements. These requirements in turn size a portion of contributing vehicle
systems. The sequence and sum of all mission operations also impose requirements
on the architecture.
Traditional ‘sizing’ is occupied primarily with determining the takeoff gross weight
of the aircraft by constraining platform scaling parameters and predicting the takeoff
gross weight of the aircraft (WTO) for a given mission. Mattingly’s constraint analysis
derives loading requirements through a force balance on the aircraft. This force









as displayed in equation 1
[201]. The required thrust capability (a) is expressed as a function of thrust lapse
(α) and the installed thrust at sea level (TSL) and is constrained by the aerodynamic





























Manipulation of this sizing equation for each mission operation yields a constraint
which limits the relationship between thrust to weight and wing loading. Thus, the
first consideration for platform level sizing is the magnitude of the load requirements
for a given scenario. These sizing critical sizing scenarios limit the design space and
drive the physical attributes at the platform level. A carpet plot for a notional aircraft
from Mattingly is seen in figure 12.
After completing the constraint analysis, the takeoff gross weight of the aircraft
must be determined to obtain the size requirements of the platform. This is done
through mission analysis. The attributes of all energy storage devices depend on the
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Figure 12: The Compete Preliminary Air-to-Air Fighter Constraint Diagram from
Mattingly [201]
bulk of energy they must store to provide for future operations. Historical information
[244], as well as tools like the Breguet range equations and max endurance equations
[8] are used to estimate the fuel burn required to fulfill each portion of the mission.
Mission sizing is inherently iterative. Mission analysis is an process of estimating
the takeoff gross weight following systems weight approximations, estimating the fuel
burn for each portion of the mission, determining the block fuel, and iterating. This
fuel weight is in turn used to augment the magnitude of the functional requirements
on platform and vehicle systems (span, wing area, structures, control forces, etc). To
determine energy storage requirements, load requirements for all segments must be
applied in terms of the size and weight of the platform (e.g. β, or weight lapse for
traditional constraint analysis). Once total fuel burn, weight lapses, and takeoff gross
weight are obtained, the thrust requirements and physical dimensions are determined.
This process for platform level sizing provides the ability to estimate platform
level performance. However, it gives little guidance as to how load requirements
are allocated to the vehicle systems level. Additionally, models to determine the
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attributes of the vehicle systems are not as easily obtained as the attributes estimated
with Mattingly’s equation. Additional information must be provided which deploy
time sensitive requirements to the unit level. Vehicle systems attributes in turn impact
the volumetric, weight, reliability, and power demand of vehicle systems. This would
potentially require an integrated means for augmenting the drag polar, thrust lapse,
weight lapse, and systems weights due to changes in vehicle systems concept.
4.2.2.1 Traditional Off-Design Systems Sizing
Traditional aircraft design operates within a comfort zone which typically deviates
only slightly from previously designed architecture concepts. This allows conceptual
designers to be secure in assumptions made regarding the impact of a given system
failure. Systems architects are fairly certain when each system is active and neces-
sary during the mission and potential contingencies which must be introduced given
systems failures.
Working within the historical database allows the critical sizing scenarios to be
dictated from previous experience. Traditional tools for expressing platform level mis-
sion requirements (CON OPS, Scenario Tools) can manage the typical sizing cases
in a straight-forward manner. Typical mission sizing accounts for additional energy
requirements during off-nominal operating conditions by means of the inclusion of
a reserve mission segment. Other standard sizing scenarios like ETOPS (Extended-
Range Twin-Engine Operations) [85, 100] or engine out on take-off are traditionally
driving cases for the commercial two engine aircraft and have the tendency to drive
unit level attributes. These cases present new mission phases and additional per-
formance constraints. Corresponding alterations to the coefficients in Mattingly’s
constraint equation can be easily imposed in platform sizing.
During the conceptual design phase, sizing critical failure cases are often identi-
fied by inspection and inference. A more complete and detailed analysis takes place
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(a) Required power per generator for (b) Systems power contribution to the
different operation modes sizing scenario (engine failure)
Figure 13: Liscouët-Hanke Bleedless Architecture Electric Power System Generator
Contributing Power Requirements from Technical Loads (TL), Environment Control
System (ECS), Commercial Control System (CCS), and Wing Ice Protection System
(WIPS) [190]
later in the design process to ensure that an already defined architecture can meet
reliability requirements and maintain maximum operational capability. Initially, how-
ever, rough estimates of unit reliability, symmetry, and necessary redundancy allow
designers to assume which failure modes will be sizing critical. The selection of sizing
critical cases correspond to losses of units or combinations of units which support the
largest or most critical loads. Hence, typically adopted failure modes include engine
and generator failures as illustrated in the results of the work by Liscouët-Hanke as
illustrated in figure 13.
What is evident in figure 13 is the large increase in power requirements which are
introduced by system failures. The peak power demand per generator increased by
approximately 15% between the normal operations and engine or generator failure
cases.
However, problematic to the exploration of a new architecture design space is
the predefinition of performance degradation strategies applied during failure states.
Increases in power requirements at the unit level are defined subject to specific prede-
fined degradation profiles. The load degradations which yield the results illustrated
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in 13 and are given table 11. Failures, and their subsequent effect on system operat-
ing modes impact the sizing of each element within the architecture. The behavioral
impact of a specific failure is indeed manifest through the functional loss incurred by
physical failures. In the cases addressed in table 11, reduction in behavioral require-
ments during degraded operating modes are dependent on the architecture concept.
With an unknown or flexible architecture, specific physical failure cases do not
have discrete predefined effects on the change in magnitude of functional or opera-
tional requirements. When losses occur, the maximum available performance would
be desired from the remaining systems so as to minimize deviation from the normal
operating mode, and prevent further damage and cost. While these strategies are
tacitly predefined, optimal strategies are necessarily emergent due to complex inter-
actions between components. If the architecture is augmented, performance degra-
dation strategies must be augmented accordingly.
Table 11: Liscouët-Hanke Operating Mode Degradations [190]
Load Shedding Scenario
Considered Operation Modes Normal 1 Gen Failure 1 Eng Failure
Technical Loads (TL) No Load Shedding
Commercial Control System No Load Shedding 50% Load
Wing Ice Protection System Anti-Ice Only De-Ice if Available
Environment Control System Normal Normal Minimum Airflow
Architecture Number of Generators
Conventional 2 1 1
Bleedless 4 3 2
The demand side reduction of requirements must reflect the minimum loss to the
platform concept. The platform level functional loss incurred through the loss of a unit
or group of units depends on the total embodiment of the architecture. Predefined
assignments of contingency requirements are effective with traditional and evolving
architecture concepts. However, the development of large quantities of revolutionary
architectures requires more exploratory approaches to the identification of off-nominal
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sizing cases. With revolutionary technologies and architectures, the criticality and
behavioral effect of specific unit or combination of units should not be prematurely
assumed.
Observation: Off-nominal operating modes have the potential to present significant
and architecture specific increases to unit level requirements.
Observation: Load shedding and performance degradation strategies are tradition-
ally either predefined or tacitly identified during concept definition.
4.2.3 Load Shedding and Performance Degradation
Unlike other complex systems, a loss of some aircraft level functions, even temporar-
ily, may lead to loss of aircraft and life. The aircraft mission can not simply reboot,
restart, or undergo immediate maintenance. The introduction of off-nominal operat-
ing modes during aircraft performance is based on the concept of demand response.
With reductions in the load providing capability through failure, the system must
recover by reducing demand to a range which can be provided by the remaining in-
tact systems. Naturally, by conservation of energy, the total power available must
exceed total power required. Hsu et. al. write:
“For the steady-state operation of a power system, the total input mechanical
power of all generators has to be equal to the sum of total connected loads and
system loss [140].”
New systems architectures necessitate new strategies for load shedding, which in
turn generate new sizing critical requirements. Catastrophic failures may result from
neglecting the identification of appropriate load shedding schemes as illustrated by the
1992 China Steel Corporation plant failures. It was discovered that a plant blackout
stemmed from an inadequate load shedding scheme following system modification and
expansions [140]. Enumerating new operating modes due to failure cases in a flexible
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architecting environment necessitates the an understanding of the functional losses
incurred by physical failure.
For systems of systems like supply chains (e.g.- dairy products or consumer goods)
or power networks (e.g - electrical or natural gas distribution), demand response
involves the de-incentivizing at peak demand times through pricing and other controls.
However, for a monolithic system like an aircraft platform load management systems
demand response takes the form of load shedding.
The modern commercial aircraft uses an electric load management system (ELMS)
to manage power for system faults [211]. With reductions in power available, the
ELMS is tasked with shedding loads which are determined “non-essential [191].” The
order and sequence of load shedding is determined based on the criticality of the
service provided and the amount of power necessary to provide the service.
This concept of load shedding applies to more than just electrical power loads.
Every function performed by aircraft systems can be made subject to a form of
“function shedding.” Unit systems must be categorized by how their loss impacts
the fulfillment of platform requirements.
In an atmosphere of architecture variability, accurate identification of the specific
failure mode which drives unit and architecture level sizing proves difficult due to
the increased size of the design space. Each architecture may exhibit a unique set of
sizing critical operating scenarios introduced by unique failure states. Additionally,
the effect of a unit level failure is a design decision.
The capacity of each generator is not just a functions of the total power con-
sumption. Each generator is sized depending on the peak power required from the
other systems, the capacity of all generators, the reliability of every generator, and
the allowable behavioral outcomes of failures in terms of necessitated reliability and
desired availability. Acceptable losses incurred with the failure of a unit or group of
units are constrained by safety and reliability requirements. Within this constrained
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operating space, the architect has the freedom to explore design options which may
reduce cost in terms of operational benefits (e.g. availability) or performance and
capability improvements (e.g. reduction in fuel burn).
With a flexible architecture design space, off-nominal sizing cases pose difficulties
due to emergence. Operating scenarios introduced in response to failures place new
requirements on the platform which drive the thrust and performance capability of the
remaining undamaged engine and systems. Deviations to the mission also effect the
energy requirements from the fuel tanks and secondary power systems and require the
introduction of new functions. Off-nominal operational requirements placed on the
vehicle systems with degraded capabilities often present size, weight, and capability
driving constraints at the unit level.
In order to provide a reduction in the load requirements as necessitate by loss in
capability, the augmented operating space designates new structural and behavioral
requirements. Alterations to the physical state of the system, including failure states,
may introduces new operating modes of the system. Depending on the magnitude
of function loss and the reliability of the remaining system state, changes to mission
may also occur. These new modes may range from continuing the mission unaltered,
continuing under reduced requirements, reducing mission scope, aborting mission, or
some undesirable loss.
Observation: Traditional scenario based methods prove insufficient for specifying
the operations impact of off-nominal sizing cases.
Research Question: How can emergent load shedding and performance degrada-




The attributes of high-assurance systems, like aircraft vehicle systems, are driven by
the need to be reliable, available, safe, secure, and timely [306]. Much of the weight
and cost for aircraft systems would not be necessary with lax reliability requirements.
However, the result from such reduced requirements would yield unacceptable conse-
quences. In highly integrated systems operating in environment with a high cost of
failure, much care must be taken to ensure the appropriate system performance.
Reliability is an attribute of the architecture as a whole and is sensitive to the
relationship that all individual units have with platform level functions. These rela-
tionships are determined by the system architecture. With traditional aircraft systems
design, reliability requirements could be hierarchically allocated from platform to sys-
tems, from systems to subsystems, and so forth. Once the systems was defined, it is
assessed as to its safety and reliability merits. Therefore, safety and reliability consid-
erations are often considered after an architecture is designed. These considerations
act as metrics or filters for adopting a concept architecture.
Reliability considerations play a major role in determining both contingency sce-
nario identification and the allocation of power requirements to the unit level through
redundancy considerations. The previous section addressed the necessity to introduce
additional operating modes in the behavioral space when the physical system is in a
certain physical state. The techniques reviewed focused on the structuring of opera-
tional requirements. However, in contrast to scenario based design techniques, safety
and reliability design tools rely on generalizations regarding the impact of system
losses. This section considers the means for generating quantitative requirements on
physical systems to avoid the need to specify all behavioral states. The techniques
discussed in this section address means for expressing the fitness of an architecture
concept with respect to given behavioral requirements.
Reliability requirements are derived by estimating the consequences of failures
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Figure 14: Low, Medium, and High Risk in Terms of Hazard and Probability of
Occurrence
and depend directly on the relationships between unit level functions and platform
level behavior. This section looks at reliability in terms function and unit criticality.
It then looks at means for assessing unit level reliability performance.
4.3.1 Safety and Reliability
Safety and reliability requirements originate from the necessity to ensure that specific
levels of hazards to not occur. Safety is defined as “freedom from unacceptable risk
[145].” Designing for safety requires that requirements capture considerations for
potential risks and their avoidance during the product life cycle.
Risk, as defined by ARP 4754, is “the frequency (probability) of an occurrence and
the associated level of hazard [272].” This is illustrated in figure 14. The risk associ-
ated with the loss of a given system function or element is a product of an operational
understanding of the system. In order to designate safety related requirements at the
unit level, systems engineers must understand risk associated with unit/functional
loss.
Because designing for safety entails ensuring freedom from an unacceptable prob-
ability of hazards, safety requirements (constraints) are primarily communicated in
in terms of reliability. Reliability is defined as:
“The probability that an item will perform a required function, under
stated conditions, for a stated period of time. Reliability is therefore the
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extension of quality into the time domain and may be paraphrased as ‘the
probability of non-failure in a given period’ [270].”
Applying conditional probability, reliability R (t) over a given time step dt is
mathematically represented in terms of the failure rate (λ (t)) and probability density
function (f (t)).
λ (t) dt = f (t) dt
R (t) (2)
Manipulation and integration yields a direct relationship between reliability and
failure rate.








The failure rate may take various forms depending on the nature of the component.
For preliminary reliability analysis and illustration, the failure rate is often assumed
constant, reducing the reliability equation to:
R (t) = e−λt (4)
Alternative distributions may also be used in determining the component reliabil-
ity. The Weibull distribution represents reliability in terms of two parameters: the
scale parameter, η, and the shape parameter, β. Component reliability for a Weibull
distribution is given as:





Table 12, represents the mathematical relationship between the probability of
failure from time on the interval (0, t] (F (t)), the failure probability density function
(f (t)), the reliability (survivor) function (R (t)), and the failure rate (λ (t)).
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Table 12: Probability Relationships for Failure and Reliability [243]
F (t) f (t) R (t) λ (t)
F (t) = -
∫ t
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These equations for reliability are fundamental in determining adequate system
safety. When risk limitations are allocated to the functionality of individual com-
ponents, this criticality requirement acts as a constraint on unit reliability. Unit
criticality relates to the stringency of reliability requirements governing the perfor-
mance of a task or operation.
FAR, SAE, DOD and other safety and reliability standards relate severity of a
failure to some loss of ability to perform a basic function [272, 273, 95, 72]. MIL-
STD-882D defines the term ‘safety critical’ as:
“A term applied to any condition, event, operation, process, or item
whose proper recognition, control, performance, or tolerance is essential
to safe system operation and support (e.g., safety critical function, safety
critical path, or safety critical component) [72].”
Therefore, the more critical a unit is to platform level performance, the more
stringent the reliability requirements.
Designers must take steps to provide adequate reliability by requiring increases
in unit reliability, by ensuring safe execution of requirements in the presence of unit
failure by way of redundancy, recovery [187], or by manipulating the operational
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Figure 15: Adapted from EMMA’s [European Airport Movement Management by
A-SMGCS (Advanced - Surface Movement, Guidance and Control systems)] Hazard
Impact Assessed at the Boundary of Scope [231]
outcome of a failure. As seen in figure 15, a failure at the unit level only propagates to
the change platform behavior when subsequent mitigation strategies are not applied or
are unsuccessful. With new architecture design, systems architects must be aware of
potential mitigation strategies at the unit, platform, and operational levels. Applying
historical failure context to revolutionary architectures may place limits on these levels
which do not allow for optimal integration of advanced technologies.
This concept is similarly illustrated by the FAA in their System Safety Handbook
with figure 16. An adverse event does not occur due to the existence of hazards alone.
Unsafe conditions of the system (failures, faults, anomalies, or malfunctions) must be
coupled with less than adequate (LTA) controls for result mitigation.
Design for safety must manage multiple perspectives. Requirements engineers
must first identify the hazards associated to the loss of platform level function during
mission operations. Criticality must be allocated to the unit level during conceptual
architecting by including decisions which ensuring safe operations. Finally, the ar-
chitecture must be sized to ensure adequate reliability. The implementation of this
process during exploratory design requires that long iteration cycles be avoided which
are typically associated with safety assessment projects. This section discusses the
framework for expressing criticality requirements, traditional means for allocating and
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Figure 16: Relationship Between Contributory Hazards & Adverse Effects [96]
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assessing systems in terms of these expressed requirements, and potential methods
for flexibly addressing safety for complex architectures.
Observation: Safety and reliability requirements are expressed as probability con-
straints on the behavioral space at the platform level.
Research Question: How are safety and reliability requirements determined and
allocated to individual units?
4.3.2 Aircraft Level Criticality Requirements
In 1988 the FAA released Advisory Circular 25.1309-1A which states:
“Many systems, equipment, and their installations have been success-
fully evaluated ... without using structured means for safety assessment.
However, in recent years there has been an increase in the degree of system
complexity and integration, and in the number of safety-critical functions
performed by systems [95].”
As the complexity of the system increases and safety-critical functionalities be-
come more integrated, more advanced techniques for structuring safety assessments
become necessary. With the help of other documents, such as SAE ARP4754 [272]
and ARP4761 [273], commercial industry practices were established to address safety
and reliability concerns. The main goals of the tools and methods outlined in these
documents are to ensure that an aircraft architecture can reliably operate without
adverse effect on fundamental critical operations.
In order to understand the criticality of a given element within the system the
designer must understand the result of the failure from that unit. The measure of its
criticality is determined by the severity in which it adversely affects the platform’s
ability to ensure safe execution of a given operation. AC-25.1309 states:
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“Failure conditions adversely affecting non-essential functions would be
minor, failure conditions adversely affecting essential functions would be
major, and failure conditions adversely affecting critical functions would
be catastrophic [95].”
To ensure safe operations, standards have been defined which limit the probability
that an unfavorable result would occur. Failure results are characterized by a limiting
probability that said result will occur. The FAA represents these probabilities in table
13.
Table 13: AC 25:1309-1A Failure Classifications [95]
Failure Classification Description Probability Condition
Minor Probable p > 1× 10−5
Major Improbable 1× 10−5 > p < 1× 10−9
Catastrophic Extremely Improbable p < 1× 10−9
p = probability of failure
SAE adopts a slightly different format and introduces another criticality category
‘Hazardous/Severe’ as seen in table 14.
Table 14: SAE ARP4754 Failure Classifications [272]
Failure Classification Probability Condition
Minor None
Major p < 1× 10−5
Hazardous/Sever p < 1× 10−7
Catastrophic p < 1× 10−9
In MIL-STC-882D the DOD defines mishap criticality in 4 categories as seem in
table 15. Although no probability measure for the failure is indicated in this military
standard, it does recommend that “... the qualitative mishap probability may be
derived from research, analysis, and evaluation of historical safety data from similar
systems [72].”
Additional safety objectives, like fail safe, impose additional constraints of systems
embodiment. Fail safe requirements state that the loss of a single unit or connection
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Table 15: MIL-STD-882D Mishap Categories [72]
Description Category Environment, Safety, and Health Result Criteria
Catastrophic I Could result in death, permanent total disability, loss
exceeding $1M, or irreversible severe environmental
damage that violates law or regulation.
Critical II Could result in permanent partial disability, injuries or
occupational illness that may result in hospitalization of
at least three personnel, loss exceeding $200K but less
than $1M, or reversible environmental damage causing
a violation of law or regulation.
Marginal III Could result in injury or occupational illness resulting in
one or more lost work days(s), loss exceeding $10K but
less than $200K, or mitigatable environmental damage
without violation of law or regulation where restoration
activities can be accomplished.
Negligible IV Could result in injury or illness not resulting in a lost
work day, loss exceeding $2K but less than $10K, or
minimal environmental damage not violating law or reg-
ulation.
must be assumed during flight regardless of probability. Thus, every single point
failure represents a necessary sizing scenario. Failure combinations must also be
assumed unless the occurrence is extremely improbable.
These categorizations of criticality are the starting point for the allocation of criti-
cality requirements to vehicle systems. Design for safety includes allocating reliability,
identify the instigators of off-nominal modes, appropriately determining required ca-
pacity requirements with redundancy, and configuring the shedding of loads. This
process begins the an understanding of the criticality of platform level functions. The
rest of this section explores conventionally means for allocating these criticality re-
quirements during the early design stages, as well as tools and methods for system
safety and reliability assessment.
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4.3.3 Allocation of Safety and Reliability Requirements
Safety and reliability assessment processes are typically applied in concert with tra-
ditional hierarchical system development processes. A generic guideline for safety
assessment and design is provided in SAE Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP)
4754 shown in figure 17 [272].
According to ARP-4754, there are 3 levels of abstraction which safety and relia-
bility design must consider: aircraft platform, systems, and hardware level. Safety
assessment begins with the development of safety requirements through functional
hazard assessment (FHA) following the definition of aircraft level requirements. This
is followed by traditional system decomposition and functional allocation. This pro-
cess generates a platform level architecture decomposition. These generic systems
groups then undergo a system level functional hazard assessment. The structure of
the systems in turn determine the safety requirements at the unit level.
Functional allocation and system level FHA are performed concurrently, each
contributing to the development of systems architecture. This is then followed by
preliminary system safety analysis (PSSA). During PSSA quantitative tools (fault
trees, reliability block diagrams, state based models) are used to verify that safety
requirements are being met by the systems architecture. Requirements generated
during PSSA and the resulting architecture definition allocates requirements to the
unit level. Once these elements are integrated, a system safety analysis takes place
in which the fulfillment of safety and reliability requirements are verified before un-
dergoing certification.
Functional hazard assessments and each layer of system safety assessment are
supported by the analysis of common cause failures. These types of failures present
more stringent safety and reliability requirement due to concurrent unit or system
failures originating from the same root cause. While these considerations are crucial
to design for safety and reliability, they are not directly explored in this thesis.
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Figure 17: SAE ARP 4754 Safety Assessment Process Model [272]
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Figure 18: System Safety Analysis During the Design Process [61]
The process in figure 17 is a recommended practice and most practical imple-
mentations share similar tools and processes for determining safety and reliability
requirements, allocating these requirements through architecture definition, and ver-
ifying that the requirements are fulfilled. An alternative conceptualization of design
for safety is seen in figure 18. Along the top of this is the process for product develop-
ment from conceptual design to delivery and support. Concurrent with this process,
safety analysis takes place. This image, introduced by John Dalton, Technical Fellow
Airplane Safety Engineering at Boeing Commercial, indicates that during concept
development and early preliminary design is when preliminary system safety analysis
takes place. This process includes functional hazard analysis, fault tree analysis, and
common cause analysis [61].
Again, in figure 18, it is observed that the traditional allocation of reliability
requirements to the system level follows the hierarchical decomposition of an aircraft
architecture. At each level of the hierarchy a more refined system safety analysis
takes place at lower levels of abstraction. Once these processes are complete further
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decomposition occurs with additional detail.
Traditional processes for safety engineering suffer from the difficulty to manage
large amounts of information regarding system definition, safety requirements, and
certification.
Kritzinger writes:
“The hope is often that the weight (quite literally) of such evidence
will be accepted as an overwhelming demonstration that the system has
been adequately proven. But as systems become more complex and soft-
ware intensive, assessment of the completeness and consistency of such
information becomes more difficult. What is needed is a far more rigor-
ous approach to safety, which provides logical arguments with supporting
evidence and has clearly defined objectives, strategies, assumptions, and
justifications [176].”
While this statement is in reference to the means from proving compliance to
safety requirements, this difficulty also exists for integrating safety and reliability re-
quirements into the definition of the system. This is magnified in an environment
which allows adaptations to the systems fundamental architecture. As power sys-
tems become more central to the platform concept and the need for rapid alternative
architecture concept exploration increases. Alternative processes are introduced for
system architecting which break from the traditional hierarchical decomposition and
functional hazard identification.
Flexible design perspective tools and processes become necessary for the applica-
tion of safety and reliability requirements which may adapt with varying architecture
embodiments. The field of safety and reliability is inundated with tools, methods,
and approaches have been developed for defining, deploying, assessing fulfillment of
safety and reliability requirements. From reviews gathered by Kritzinger there ex-
ists over 160 published generic or discipline specific tools, methods, and techniques
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for addressing system safety [177]. Neglecting specific best practices, specific tools
and software specified for very specific applications, table 16 summarizes the types of
methods and generic tools used in designing for safety.
Table 16: Overview of Non-Discipline Specific Tools, Methods, and Techniques List
Supplied by Kritzinger [177]
Design Math. Eval.
Focus of Reviewed Practice Methods Tools Tools Crit.
Hazard Analysis 7* 5*
System Evaluation 11 6* 4 1
Common Cause Analysis 3 1
Operations 5
System Structuring 1 6
Incident Evaluation 9 2
Human Factors 15 3 9
Decision Analysis & Methods 7 3
Fault Management & Mitigation 5 1 1
Product Test 3
*Primary scope
Having already addressed the operational perspective and applying a system struc-
turing based on functional induction, this section reviews mean for mathematically
manipulated and augmenting the allocation of criticality criteria with changes in ar-
chitecture. These tools need to be integrated and augmented to allow the designers
to automatize capture of information regarding physical and behavioral reliability
trades. Referring to these processes in figure 17 and figure 18, assuring system safety
is a process of determining the impact of specific system losses and then ensuring that
adequate probability that success with be assured.
Table 17 outlines traditional reliability tools which were evaluated towards their
ability to identify off-nominal performance requirements. Focusing on preliminary
system safety analysis tools implemented early in the design process further limits
the state of the art review for common tools used during concept development and
trades.
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Table 17: Means for Reliability Allocation and Analysis
Conceptual De-
sign Needs Alternatives


























A hazard is defined as “any condition, event, or circumstance, which could induce an
accident, a potentially unsafe condition, a situation which has the potential to lead
to harm [186].” Once the platform level functions are understood and structured,
and the operational context is defined, the designer now has enough information to
begin assessing the safety and reliability implication of the system. Hazard analysis is
intended not to evaluate a system for its effectiveness in fulfilling safety requirements
but to identify specific hazards that impose reliability requirements.
Hazard analysis can be either inductive or deductive in form. Inductive reasoning
is bottom-up and typically works from a known potential cause of failure and traces
it to the predicted outcome. Deductive analysis is top-down and begins with specific
hazardous conditions and explores failures which must take place for such an outcome
to occur. Both perspectives are necessary in the design process.
Like many tools and methods applied during early conceptual design stages tra-
ditional tools suffer from an inappropriate perspective. During concept development,
and in an environment where the physical structure of the system is unknown and
flexible, the hazard impact of specific physical device failures on the system as a whole
is also non-static. In such an environment, specific events at the technology level have
an unknown impact on system performance and behavior.
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HAZOP
Hazard and operability studies (HAZOP) is a structured means for examining an
existing well-defined process or operation through exposing potential hazards [103]
which originated from the design of petrochemical plants in the mid 1960’s and ex-
tended into the domain of software development. The original focus for HAZOP was
the characterization of the flow of material throughout a chemical plant. Once normal
operations are identified, deviations from this ideal point are characterized by a series
of guidewords as outlined in table 18.
Table 18: Descriptions of Deviation Guide Words for HAZOP [168]
Guide Word Deviation
NONE No forward flow when there should be - ie, no flow or reverse flow
MORE OF
More of any relevant physical property than there should be - eg, higher
flow (rate or quantity), higher temperature, higher pressure, higher vis-
cosity, etc
LESS OF Less of any relevant physical property than there should be - eg, lowerflow (rate or quantity), lower temperature, lower pressure, etc
PART OF Composition of system different from what is should be - eg, change inratio of components, component mission, etc
MORE THAN
More components present in the system than there should be - eg, ex-
tra phase present (vapor, solid), impurities (air, water, acids, corrosion
products), etc
OTHER THAN
What else can happen apart from normal operations - eg, start-up, shut-
down, uprating, low rate running, alternative operation mode, failure of
plant services, maintenance, catalyst change, etc
A subsequent method based on HAZOP, Software Hazard Analysis and Resolution
in Design (SHARD), augments these guidewords for applicability to software devel-
opments. These alternative guide words are characterized by flow type. Service flow
deviations are characterized by omission and commission. Timing flow error types
are early and late. And finally, value errors are subtle and coarse [103].
Once normal operations are identified and appropriate flows have been defined,
deviations of each type are explored in terms of possible causes, consequences, and
action required. These actions consist of deviation operations with potential new
assets required. The result is a “word picture” of what should be happening in the
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presence of deviations [54] and usually takes a tabular form.
For flexible architectures, HAZOP, like most safety design processes, suffers from
lack of general applicability and adaptability. When considering a new design, HA-
ZOP is intended to be performed by a large team. In the example of a chemical plant
design, this team is recommended to consist of a at least six members: a project
or design engineer, a process engineer, a commissioning manager, a control system
design engineer, a research chemist, and an independent team leader [168]. Each
major item within the system typically demands 1.5 to 3 hours of consideration, thus
requiring weeks of evaluation from a relatively large team for a concept system [168].
HAZOP is not intended as a redesign exercise but a means for defining the appro-
priate operation envelope for a system [54]. Adaptations in the architecture may po-
tentially negate the required actions and introduce new consequences. Thus, HAZOP
is limited by its ability to quickly and accurately respond to alternative configurations.
SWIFT
Developed as an alternative to HAZOP, the structured what-if technique (SWIFT)
takes a higher level perspective to inductive analysis. While HAZOP addresses de-
viations on a “item by item, procedure-by-procedure” basis for the complete system.
SWIFT focuses on the top level perspective of the system [197]. It benefits by its flex-
ibility and general applicability. These is no generally accepted means for “what-if”
questioning. However, a general decomposition is displayed in figure 19.
Previous knowledge informing the team engaging in the SWIFT process could
include previous hazards or incidents, known issues, regulations, etc. Macguire sug-
gests organizing questions in specific categories. These categories include material
problems, external influences, operating errors and other human factors, analytical
or sampling errors, equipment or instrumentation malfunction, process upsets of un-
specific origin, utility failures, integrity failure or loss of containment, emergency
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Figure 19: Process for Structure What-If Techniques [197]
operations, and environmental release [197].
‘What if’ questions are not intended to predict formal future scenarios but to
bound the operating space of the system and explore potential future changes. The
advantage to SWIFT over HAZOP is a free form structure and non-distinct wording
for hazard discussion. However, this advantage becomes an issue when attempting to
systematically allocate hazard related requirements to a flexible structure.
Root Cause Analysis
Causal analysis, widely applied during incident evaluation, tries to determine the
why behind the what and how of a failure by defining the root causes [252]. As stated
in the Department of Energy’s Order 5000.3A:
“The basic reason for investigating and reporting the causes of oc-
currences is to enable the identification of corrective actions adequate to
prevent recurrence and thereby protect the health and safety of the public,
the workers, and the environment [71].”
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The US Department of Energy identifies six application specific methods used
in the field of cause analysis: event and cause factor analysis, change analysis, bar-
rier analysis, management oversight and risk tree (MORT) analysis, human perfor-
mance evaluation (HPE), and Kepner-Tregoe problem solving and decision making
[71]. Since the focus of this work is on the conceptual architecting of a flexible phys-
ical, the scope reduces to the tools reviewed in table 19.
Table 19: Root Cause Identification Methods as Reviewed by the DOE [71]
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area of cause, not
specific cause.
If this process fails
to identify problem
areas, seek addi-
tional help or use
cause-and-effect
analysis.
In addition to limitations incurred due to a post-failure incident evaluation per-
spective taken with all of these methods, each individual method suffers from its
flexibility and scope. For example, barrier analysis primarily addresses all procedu-
ral and physical safeguards “barriers” which were breached in order for a failure to
occur. These safeguards are imposed at the system level and are products of unit
and system level attributes, environment interfaces, human interactions, and other
system considerations. It is inherently analytical and detailed in view and structure;
focusing on very specific breaches of existing barriers. The information may introduce
new requirements regarding additional physical or procedural safeguards to be added
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to a system. However, it does not assign actionable quantitative requirements to the
unit level. Instead, it focuses on the development of procedural and administrative
changes to an existing process.
Events and causal factor analysis focuses on specific sequences of interactions with
a defined systems which introduced the failure. This single failure event and human
error perspective gives this analysis process the informal title of “walk-through” anal-
ysis. Causal factor charting does provide a general tool used in cause consequence
analysis. This tool provides formal logical structure to tracking the effect of a failure
in the form of a cause and effect chart. This diagram is essentially a state transition
diagram. Each action relates to the preceding action or state. The sequence of actions
end in a failure state. In figure 20, Rooney includes questions regarding the details
of each state. Once this sequence of events is clear, the root causes can be identified
in order to be rectified [252].
While causal analysis does identify critical factors which drive requirements, the
traditional perspective is tactical in nature. Once the physical system is in place and
procedures for operations have been outlined, these tools act to remedy deviations
from the procedural requirements. When an event or incident occurs, a team is formed
to manage the problem, identify its cause, and implement corrections to prevent it
from happening again (e.g. Ford 8-D method [193]).
This tactical perspective limits the direct benefit to the conceptual architecting
design process. During concept development previous causal analysis do assist in
mitigating potential incidents by introducing additional required functions and unit
and platform level performance standards which reduce the likelihood for root causes
to occur. However, structuring the architecture following functional induction assists
in managing when these additional functions must be applied.
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Figure 20: Notional Causal Chart for a Fire from Rooney [252]
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Figure 21: Expanded Risk Bow-Tie [284]
Bow-Tie Analysis
The risk bow-tie, seen in figure 21, displays the causal relationship between poten-
tial causes (threats), hazardous events, and potential consequences with respect to
control and recovery measures. While hazard analysis takes place on the right portion
of the bow-tie, this perspective of risk mitigation highlights the failure condition as
the connection between two areas of safety and reliability: avoidance of a hazardous
event, and mitigation of detrimental consequences. This separation of the behav-
ioral and implementation space is advantageous in addressing a flexible architecture
environment. Careful definition of the right side of the bow-tie can be established
independent of the physical implementation.
Hammer et. al. define three distinct steps in performing safety assessment using
the bow-tie model: operational hazard identification, operational hazard assessment,
and allocate safety objectives and requirements [117]. This expansion of the bow-
tie model is seen in figure 22. The first two steps are synonymous with traditional
platform level functional hazard assessment. Assigning the left portion of the bow-tie
to implementation space and the right portion to the behavioral space, Hammer et.al.
term these internal and external mitigation means (IMM, EMM).
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Figure 22: Operational Safety Assessment Process Overview from Hammer et. al.
[117]
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External mitigation means are accomplished through functional hazard assess-
ment (FHA). FHA is a complimentary approach to HAZOP. Both processes focus
on identification of potential hazards. However, FHA attempts to remain abstract,
avoiding the necessity to characterize all types of functional lapses [7]. The number of
guidewords is reduced from six or more to three: loss of function, too much function,
and incorrect operation of function.
ARP 4754 presents Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) as a preliminary system
safety assessment tools to predict and explore functional failure and their impact
of system compliance and performance [272]. FHA is a systematic technique for
exploring and classifying functional importance, potential failure modes, and the
criticality of their impact for system operations. The inputs to this process therefore
include a description of the system under study, a specific operating environment,
regulatory frameworks, and standards [186]. The goal of FHA is the identification of
risk associated with each functional failure and responding with appropriate reliability
requirements.
ARP 4761 decomposes the process of functional hazard assessment in 5 main steps.
First, the functions of the system must be identified to the desired level of abstraction.
Next, specific failure conditions associated with these functions are identified. The
effect of each failure condition is determined and classified at the platform level. This
finally results in a requirements allocation regarding the specific failure condition
[273]. As indicated in figure 18, the FHA process may be repeated many times at
subsequent lower levels of abstraction following the traditional structure for systems
hierarchical decomposition.
Functional hazard assessment takes external mitigation procedures into account.
Inappropriate fulfillment of a platform level function is assessed regarding its im-
pact on operational effects. These failure modes are specific to each mission phase
and environment condition and each operational hazard (a.k.a. functional failure) is
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assigned a criticality measure based on the criticality measures introduced earlier.
Like HAZOP, FHA typically takes a tabular form. Figure 23 displays a conven-
tional functional hazard analysis worksheet developed by Ericson [90]. To characterize
a functional failure this worksheet lists the type of function loss with associated haz-
ard number, the effect on the platform behavior, potential causal factors, the initial
mishap risk index (IMRI), any recommended actions, the final mishap risk index
(FMRI), any applicable comments and its assessment status. The initial and final
mishap risk index refer to the risk associated with the failure as categorized by MIL-
STD-882D [72].
While functional hazard analysis, pictured in figure 23 analysis techniques to de-
termine the probability of a given functional failure, functional hazard assessment
addresses only the effect of the failure and not the probability that the functional
failure will occur. Traditional FHA recording formats only include information re-
garding the functions, the failure conditions, the flight phase, the effect of failure, the
class of failure, and verification [300].
A benefit to FHA as described and implemented in the bow-tie model is its focus
on the fulfillment of functions, not on the performance of specific architecture im-
plementations. Maintaining independence between the operational requirements in
terms of hazards and allocating physical failurs to function in terms of fault tolerance
in a given architecture allows for the systems architecture to be flexible. It also assists
in the definition of system operating modes during hazard conditions. With infor-
mation provided through functional induction, namely the relationship between unit
level and platform level functionality, and generic criticality associated with the loss
of platform level functions, load shedding strategies may be tailored to the specific
architecture.
One shortcoming often encountered with functional hazard assessment and other
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Figure 23: Functional Hazard Analysis Worksheet from Ericson [90]
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hazard analysis techniques is perspective. FHA often occurs in multiple stages fol-
lowing traditional systems decomposition. In order to perform FHA at the lower
level there must be a consensus as to the traditional functional decomposition, the
interfaces between functions, and interfaces with the environment. With a flexible
architecture structure composed following functional induction this is not often guar-
anteed. The columns in figure 23 indicating causal factors and recommended actions
are architecture specific. A conceptual architecture perspective denies the capability
to identify cause and internal mitigation means in a generic fashion.
Temporal information is also not adequately supplied tabular FHA. Sustained
function loss has much more potential to incur hazardous effects than temporary
lapses in capability. Additionally, as with HAZOP, SWIFT, and other hazard assess-
ment techniques, FHA is developed and collated in tabular form. This leads to a
discrete allocation of functional hazard results. Depending on the redundancy in the
system and the means for load shedding, the percentage of the function loss is an
analog relationship.
Observation: Traditional methods for hazard identification assign static or discrete
hazard value to the loss or excess of a given function.
Observation: The traditional approach to hazard assessment generalize expected
result of failure, avoiding exploration of the scenario tree.
4.3.4 System Safety Assessments
Architecting for system safety is a question of providing adequate fault tolerance. To
ensure that a system reliable performs its functions, designers must have two options.
The first is to prevent any fault from occurring, and the second is allowing faults to
occur, but limiting their severity [187]. According to Yen:
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“Fault tolerance focuses on how to exploit spatial and temporal redun-
dancies to deal with failures [306].”
Ensuring that adequate reliability has been provided through a specific design
turns attention to the left side of bow-tie in figure 21, once the hazards associated
with specific functional failures have been defined, the implications of these hazards
must be allocated to the unit level. This typically takes the form of constraints on
the necessary reliability of each unit or group of units. Qualitative and quantitative
assessment techniques are necessary when a system may exhibit failure conditions
exceeding the minor categorization, when the system is complex [95].
Preliminary system safety analysis (PSSA) as defined in ARP 4761 is proposed
as a set of tools and practices to validate that the architecture can meet safety re-
quirements, and establishing new safety related requirements. Each unit must be
characterized by a development assurance level (DAL). This measure classifies the
most severe impact of the unit failure [273]. Additionally, PSSA is tasked with iden-
tifying emergent safety requirements. This includes managing architecture specific
component interactions and the identification of critical failure modes for new designs
[65]. This must take place in an environment in which the architecture is non-static.
While PSSA occurs early in the design process, Dawkins highlights flexibility issues
with PSSA. He writes:
“To meet its (PSSA’s) objectives we want to do PSSA early and thus
influence the design, but we will then be faced with the cost of updating
PSSA at each design change. Conversely, by waiting until the design is
“stable” we will save money in PSSA, but lose the ability to influence the
design cheaply [65].”
In order to determine sizing critical effects of safety and reliability requirements
during conceptual architecting, flexible system safety assessment tools are preferable
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generated simultaneously architecture implementation object models. Rausand and
Høyland introduce four concept level tools for quantitative systems safety analysis
of non-repairable, temporally independent component failures: fault tree analysis,
Bayesian belief networks, event tree analysis, and reliability block diagrams [243].
The primary focus of tools and methods discussed in this section is on fault trees
and reliability block diagrams. Both event trees and Bayesian belief networks are
useful in system evaluation. However, these tools require a detailed understanding
of inferred component and unit relationships which may not be available during con-
ceptual architecting. Event trees focus on safety mitigation procedures and functions
and very specific instigating events which occur in a configured system. These are
similar to scenario trees as discussed earlier. Bayesian belief networks use conditional
probability to determine the probability of specific technical failures with relationship
to human and organizational factors. While more flexible than the fault tree, due to
its non-binary representation, it is more similar to a cause and effect analysis with
quantitative outputs [243].
Analogous to object oriented behavioral modeling discussed in the previous sec-
tion, fault trees and reliability block diagrams are discussed here in terms of their
underlying structure. These reliability models can take a form similar to object ori-
ented activity diagrams or state transition diagrams.
4.3.4.1 Function/Action Based Assessment Tools
The fault tree and reliability block diagrams are recommended processes for qualita-
tively assessing the ability of a system to fulfill safety requirements. Advisory Circular
25.1309 describe as follows:
“(Fault trees and reliability block diagrams) are structured, deductive,
top down analyses which are used to identify the conditions, failures, and
events that would cause each defined failure condition. They are graphical
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methods of identifying the logical relationship between each particular
failure condition and the primary element or component failures, other
events, or combinations thereof what can cause it [95].”
The fault tree and reliability block diagram take opposite perspectives in assessing
system reliability from a failure and success perspective, respectively. The reliability
block diagram graphically represents units and functional relationships whose proba-
bility of working contribute to the overall probability of success for a given function.
On the other hand, the fault tree graphically relates fault events whose probability
of occurrence contribute to the probability occurrence of a top level failure event.
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
Fault tree analysis is a widely accepted method for system safety assessment. The
perspective taken is one of what and how a system experiences failure. Originat-
ing with the development and evaluation of the Minuteman Launch Control System
in the 60’s by Bell Labs, FTA and was recognized by Boeing as an advantageous
tool to system safety assessment. Since that time, FTA has been widely adopted in
many industries, primarily in high risk fields including nuclear power, chemical, and
aerospace. The fault tree is an object model which takes a top down perspective to
architecture evaluation which calculates the probability of occurrence of some unde-
sirable top level event. Each top level event is contingent upon basic events which
form the necessary and sufficient conditions. These then allow the top level event to
occur.
The top down expansion of the top level error is facilitated by logical gates and
events. Logic gates and event types are reviewed in tables 20 and 21. Each event
type is characterized by its probability of occurrence. ‘AND’ and ‘OR’ logic gates use
union and intersection probability calculations to determine the probability of each
intermediate event. Applying these calculates allows for the probability of the top
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Table 20: Fault Tree Logic from Andrews and Moss [10]
Logic Gates
Type Symbol Causal Relation
AND gate Output event occurs if all input eventsoccur simultaneously.
OR gate Output event occurs if at least one ofthe input events occurs.
k-out-of-n (voting gate) Output event occurs if k-out-of-n inputevents occur.
Exclusive OR gate Output event occurs if one, but notboth, of the two input events occurs.
Inhibit gate Input produces output when the inputevent and the conditional event occur.
Priority AND gate Output event occurs if all input eventsoccur in the order from left to right.
NOT gate Output event occurs if the input eventdoes not.
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Table 21: Fault Event Objects from Andrews and Moss [10]
Events
Type Symbol Description
Intermediate event Event incurred dependent on gate logic
Basic event Component Failure characterized byfailure rate or probability
Undeveloped event Externally caused failure characterizedby failure rate or probability
Conditional event Attached to an intermediate event es-tablishing conditions on gate logic
House event Events with fixed probability (0 or 1)
Transfer Connects branches used elsewhere inthe tree.
level event to be calculated.
FTA benefits from a simple structure which generates quantitative evaluation of
system reliability. It is widely accepted and easily implemented. However, the FTA is
an analysis tool which is typically generated requiring a robust understanding of the
system. Additionally, its object oriented structure can be a benefit or a detriment.
With complex systems, the ‘and’ and ‘or’ structure of fault tree composition present
a vast hierarchical structure which can be difficult to reconcile with the functional
relationships between units.
Reliability Block Diagram (RBD)
The reliability block diagram (RBD) is a more functional and dependence driven
approach to visualizing and assessing system reliability. Taking a success based ap-
proach, the reliability block diagram is implemented to determine the probability of
being able to perform a given top level function. Avoiding complex logic structures,
the RBD visualizes the system in a functional or dependency diagram. The tradi-
tional reliability block diagram presents the reliability of the system as a function of
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(a) Blocks in Series
(b) Blocks in Parallel
Figure 24: Series and Parallel Components in Reliability Block Diagram
the reliability of individual systems aligned in series and parallel. Assuming element
failures are independent, reliability of blocks in series and parallel as depicted in fig-
ures 24 are calculated in the by the following equations [270]. Blocks in series are
equivalent to a fault tree intermediate event driven by an ‘OR’ gate and blocks in
parallel are equivalent to a fault tree intermediate event driven by an ‘AND’ gates.
Series :Rsys = RA ∩RB ∩RC . . . = RA ·RB ·RC . . . (6)
Parallel :Rsys = RA ∪RB ∪RC . . . = 1− (1−RA)(1−RB)(1−RC) . . . (7)
The reliability of the individual units and the structure of the system contribute
to overall reliability of fulfilling the function. Formulating system structuring using
the reliability block diagram assists in considering the effect of redundancy in system
composition. Redundancy entails providing multiple means of performing required
functions. This is represented as parallel tracks in the reliability block diagram.
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Active, warm, or standby redundancy are all intended to increase overall system
reliability with varying failure rates [20].
Another form of redundancy takes the form of load sharing. Load sharing re-
quires that multiple elements be available to fulfill architecture reliability require-
ments. Combinations of elements must be identified which can fulfill functional
requirement. For independent parallel systems with identical components the reli-









·Ri · (1−R)n−i (8)
The appropriate combination of elements organized in fulfillment of the function
must be identified for a continuous range of probabilities. The process of identifying
‘minimal path sets,’ the traditional parallelizing during load shedding scenarios, and
logical operators regarding necessary capacity are applied in this process.
Handling the load sharing problem can be viewed as a restructuring of the reli-
ability block diagram by replacing the ‘n’ parallel components with parallel paths,
each including a different series of ‘n’ units. This is similar to the concept of identi-
fying a minimal path set. A minimal path set is the minimum number of elements
which must be active so as to support system functionality and restructures a com-
plex reliability block diagram so as to create a strictly parallel relationships. This
process is illustrated in figure 25. Identification of these minimal path sets simplifies
the calculation of the reliability requirements.
Parallelizing the load sharing relationship requires previous knowledge regarding
the number of necessary elements to fulfill requirements by assuming that a given
‘n’ blocks can provide functionality with a static reliability. Each combination of ‘n’
blocks provides an independent parallel path as displayed in figure 26.
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(a) Minimal Path Sets for Notional Reliability Block Diagram
(b) Parallel Minimal Paths
Figure 25: Conversion of Complex Graph to Minimal Path Sets
(a) Fault Tree Load Sharing El-
ement
(b) Reliability Block Diagram
Load Sharing Element
(c) Parallelized Load Sharing
Figure 26: Load Sharing Reliability Structuring
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Performing PSSA with the reliability block diagram produces a quantitative re-
liability assessment of the architecture. This value is used to verify that safety re-
quirements can be fulfilled. An advantage of the RBD is its form. The RBD takes a
similar form to a dependency diagram. Parallel and serial paths more visible correlate
with the physical interrelationships between system elements. This visualization re-
lates more directly to the dependency structure used during functional induction. In
highlighting necessary extension to PSSA while addressing analog functional hazard
requirements reliability block diagrams will be used for illustration purposes.
Observation: Traditional PSSA are limited by assumptions regarding the failure
states of units and functions.
4.4 Emergent Requirements Overview
Multiple sources of emergent requirements were identified and discussed in this chap-
ter. The first section of this chapter addressed time dependency in architecture sizing.
Time dependency was first discussed in the context of traditional constraint and mis-
sion analysis. This is necessary for determining power and energy requirements at
the platform level. To capture and identify sizing critical scenarios and operations, a
more detailed and flexible means for mission definition.
Next, time dependency in the context of vehicle systems modeling was addressed.
While all modeling techniques may provide information necessary for the engineering
of the vehicle systems, not all are applicable during architecture conceptualization
and trades. This section provides justification for the modeling strategy implemented
in the research plan. The level of time dependency of a vehicle system model depends
on the design phase in which it is implemented.
Traditional statistical methods for predicting systems weight and other attributes
during conceptual definition was discussed. This is followed by a review of modeling
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efforts towards increased predictive capability and insight obtained through object-
oriented systems modeling and transient analysis. Finally, steady state surrogates
were introduced as a means to increase model fidelity without incurring the compu-
tational cost of dynamic analysis.
The second section of the chapter explored the means for identifying emergent
requirements in terms of operating mode dependency. In order to accurately size the
power systems architecture, models must be subject to the appropriate conditions
which generate the most stringent performance requirements. Model based systems
engineering techniques characterized by scenario based design are reviewed. Failure
considerations oftentimes dominate the sizing requirements for a high assurant sys-
tem. Off-nominal cases introduce the concepts of load-shedding in the power system,
and performance degradation.
The final section of this chapter looks at the dimension of safety and reliability
dependence. Fault tolerance and other methods for requirements identification oper-
ate within the framework of reliability analysis. These considerations must interact
with the operational perspective in identifying potential sizing critical requirements.
Therefore, this section reviews applicable tools and theories for addressing reliability,
criticality, safety, and risk during concept development and assessment.
The complexity of an vehicle systems architecture design space does not exclusively
stem from the complexity of physical attributes. While requirements concerning
the nominal operations can be defined independent of physical implementation, unit
level requirements must be made sensitive to behavioral attributes specific to the
architecture. A complete exploration of all potential sizing scenarios is necessary to
generate unit level load profiles. Time, operating mode, and safety and reliability
related requirements must be specified to accurately size architecture units. These
three domains intersect in the generation of requirements through off-nominal sizing
case consideration as depicted in figure 27.
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Figure 27: Interacting Dependence Domains
In order to understand the specific requirements for equipment in a given architec-
ture there must be a fundamental understanding of the functions of that equipment
with relation to operations and their associated criticality. The criticality associated
with a given piece of equipment is only discernible in the context of the specific ar-
chitecture in which it is operating, including its functional and physical relationships
with other components. The system operational criticality imposes reliability require-
ments on each grouping of elements dedicated to the fulfillment of a given function in
the architecture. The units utilized to fulfill a given function, must provide adequate
reliability based on the criticality of each provided function.
Due to their sizing critical nature, a flexible means for the identification of archi-
tecture specific unit level behavioral requirements is necessary during early conceptual
design. This includes understanding and defining the operational implications of unit
failures. Systematizing the identification of off-nominal sizing considerations is nec-
essary.
Many tools exist which support the formulation of operating modes and relia-
bility requirements. However, limitations exist which limit there ability to interface
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in formulating architecture specific behavior related requirements. Traditional con-
straint and mission analysis formalizes the means for determining power and energy
requirements. However, it presents a limited number cases which can pose sizing
critical requirements on unit performance in terms of hard ccapability constraints.
Scenario based design tools provide a means for exploring the behavioral space of the
system. However, they face challenges when addressing the combinametric nature
of off-nominal scenario exploration. Safety requirements and assessment tools pro-
vide quantitative assessment of system performance. They state reliability in terms
of fixed metrics, treat failure in terms of discrete “on or off” states, and provide
limited information regarding the implications of proportional function loss. These
limitations hinder the ability of these tools to assess and optimize the probability
and impact of partial system level failures for specific architecture concepts. In order
to systematize the identification and allocation of architecture specific sizing critical
behavioral requirements, tools must be introduce which systematically identify the
impact of off-nominal operational requirements.
Objective: Provide systematic risk and reliability based means for the identification





The exploratory design of vehicle systems architectures requires the identification of
sizing critical requirements for revolutionary architectures. As was discussed in the
previous chapter failure scenarios pose more stringent unit level performance require-
ments than those derived from nominal operations. Standard performance degra-
dation heuristics give estimations of unit level requirements but are insufficient for
predicting requirements for revolutionary vehicle systems concepts. Addressing design
for safety requires that operational mitigation strategies are in place, the probability
of proportional functional losses are known, and the consequences of these failures are
understood. This chapter proposes extensions to the standard safety and reliability
tools as a means for exploring the operational impact of unit level functional failures
at higher fidelity in order to identify emergent off-nominal requirements.
The ability to appropriately identify beneficial degradations of platform level func-
tions during failure states allows better prediction of unit level requirements. How-
ever, when vehicle systems attributes and alternative architectures are introduced,
the operational effects of unit level failures are ambiguous. Determining the probabil-
ity of an given operational consequence necessitates adaptively relating the reliability
of all system units to the partial or complete fulfillment of platform level functions.
If physical units support multiple loads, the effect of a unit level loss may be felt
as a reduction of capability among one or multiple platform level functions. Load
shedding involves the reduction in platform level capability by selective reductions in
functional capabilities to minimize operational losses.
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Hypothesis 1: Optimizing load shedding strategies yields more accurate predictions
of unit level requirements than heuristically defined performance degradation during
the exploratory design of revolutionary vehicle systems architectures.
The identification of load shedding strategies during the exploratory design trades
requires a systematic means for identifying and assigning these minimum effects to
unit level failures in a manner unique to each architecture concepts. This chapter
focuses on formulating this optimization schemes which will leverage operational and
physical means for ensuring architecture reliability. Specifically, this chapter explores
expansions to the traditional functional hazard assessment in generating an analog
hazard function relationship.
The aerospace recommended practices and bow-tie model, as discussed in the
previous chapter (traditional functional hazard assessment (FHA) and preliminary
system safety analysis (PSSA)), provide the framework for identifying off-nominal
requirements in this thesis. However, In order to minimize the severity of operational
effects, meet the hazard probability constraints, and reduce overdesign for safety, the
designer must provide more information regarding which functional loads are more or
less critical. Traditional safety and reliability tools are therefore extended to capture
the effect of proportional function losses. This requires a continuous extension of the
traditional FHA process and an analog assessment of system safety.
Continuous FHA explores the severity of operational consequences (hazards) in
terms of the magnitude of the system level functional losses. This yields a reliability
constraint which is continuous in terms of loss percentage. Additionally, system
safety must be explored in an analog fashion. Assessing system safety in terms of
this continuous hazard constraint requires that the operational effect of unit level
failures must also be identified in terms of the magnitude of losses which they impose.
The methods discussed in this chapter (continuous FHA, load shedding optimization,
and analog SSA) constitute a process defined for the systematic identification of
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Figure 28: SONOMA (Systematic Off-NOMinal Requirements Analysis)
emergent off-nominal requirements. This process is entitled SONOMA (Systematic
Off-NOMinal Requirements Analysis) and is illustrated in figure 28.
As seen in this figure, this process involves the continuous definition of the func-
tion loss vs. hazard relationship, the optimization of capability allocation for unit
level failures, and an analog assessment of system risk. This requirements assess-
ment process identifies off-nominal considerations which inform the optimization and
augmentation of the vehicle systems architecture concepts during exploratory design.
The methods introduced in this chapter facilitate the identification of these require-
ments architecture specific emergent requirements. The tools and methods posed
were developed and applied primarily for independent unit level failures. Extending
this method to address common cause failures is a matter for future investigation.
5.1 Continuous Functional Hazard Assessment
The means to define an appropriate constraint function limiting the allowable prob-
ability of function loss and an objective function is discussd in this section. This
function is minimized in order to facilitate load shedding. Continuous FHA is based
around the hazard analysis methods discussed in the previous chapter. It was ob-
served in the last chapter:
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Observation: Traditional methods for hazard identification assign static or discrete
hazard value to the loss or excess of a given function.
Extensions to traditional discrete hazard assessment methods are addressed with
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Assumptions regarding the relationship between function loss and
hazard severity employed during traditional Functional Hazard Assessment bias ar-
chitecture design and lead to inaccurate estimation of unit level requirements.
The approach to characterizing hazard effect as an analog relationship with plat-
form level function loss can be compared to the Taguchi loss function’s approach to
quality control and robust design as introduced in 1978. Taguchi expressed quality
as a loss to society in terms of costs incurred through production and consumption
[254]. Breaking from the traditional discrete method for applying specification limits,
Taguchi introduced a continuous relationship (quadratic function) between deviation
from target and loss. Breyfogle defines this function as follows:
“The loss function describes the loss that occurs when a process does not produce
a product that meets a target value. Loss is minimized when there is ‘no variability’
and the ‘best’ response is achiever in all areas of the product design [29].”
This is mathematically expressed as follows:
L = k(y −m)2
In this relationship L is the loss, m is the target value, y is the independent
variable, and k is the cost factor. Tuguchi’s idea behind quality was targeted towards
to minimizing the loss. This change in perspective is illustrated in figure 29.
While Taguchi’s intent was to minimize loss in the form of cost, the intent of
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(a) Traditional Loss Function for Given
Manufacturing Limits
(b) Taguchi Loss Function for Given Target
and Manufacturing Limits
Figure 29: Perspective Change from Traditional to Taguchi Quality Control
hazard analysis is to minimize loss by avoiding unwanted operational effects due to
component, unit, or functional failure. Similar to the difficulties encountered with
the traditional quality control loss function, discrete or stepwise representations of
hazard level do not provide adequate information to weigh the impact of a unit level
failure with respect to the desired target. Graphically interpreting the traditional
criteria posed by functional hazard assessment resembles the charts in figure 30.
Safety and reliability requirements are sizing critical. As was illustrated in the
previous section, off-nominal sizing cases drive the unit level requirements. Safety
requirements drive the reaction to off-nominal operating modes by governing the
demand side management, the architecture specific load shedding strategies, and the
trades between internal and external mitigation means.
Traditional functional hazard assessment (FHA) is applied in a tabular fashion.
Discrete functional failure states are evaluated as to the level of severity for which
they may be responsible. These discrete setting give a loss hazard relationship as
seen in figure 30a. A more detailed FHA may provide information regarding loss
in terms of proportional loss. However, because of its tabular implementation, the
hazard function becomes a set of discrete steps (figure 30a).
In order to know which loads to shed in addressing off-nominal sizing cases, one
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(a) Discrete Hazards Levels with Functional
Failure
(b) Stratified Hazard Levels with Functional
Failure
Figure 30: Notional Representation of Functional Hazard Assessment Result
must determine the criticality of the functions which demand the loads. These crit-
icality measures are architecture specific; depending on the relationship between the
unit and platform level functions. In order to generate requirements which are safety
and reliability dependent during the consideration of a new architecture, and in an
environment in which the architecture will be augmented during conceptual trades,
these considerations must be addressed in a formal and automated manner. This
requires the designer to know at what point one function becomes more critical than
another.
Three changes to the manner in which functional hazards are introduced to im-
prove its flexibility in the identification of emergent operating mode requirements.
An initial improvement to FHA is the application of an analog representation
of the hazard levels in terms of the loss or excess of some function. The degree to
which a function is lost impacts the operational effect. Superimposing this hazard
function on the notional graphs in figure 31 is shown in figure 30. While a continuous
relationship between functional failure and hazard effect is not necessary or applicable,
constructing the hazard effect as a function of % function loss or gain provides a more
systematic means for determining load shedding strategies driven by specific unit level
failures during conceptual architecting.
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Level dLoss/Hazar
Function Excess LossFunction %100
(a) Notional Continuous Hazard Relationship with Functional Failure
Level dLoss/Hazar
Function Excess LossFunction %100
(b) Notional Stratified Continuous Hazard Relationships with Functional
Failure
Figure 31: Notional Representation of Functional Hazard Assessment Result
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For various architecture configurations a unit could be supporting multiple plat-
form level functions to various degrees. With a loss in unit capability and depending
on the levels of redundancy used, some proportion of the vehicle system’s ability to
perform platform level functions may be lost. Depending on the magnitude of the loss
and the criticality of the platform functions, load shedding and performance degra-
dation can be systematically identified through minimizing the hazard impact of a
given unit loss through loss of one function above another. This would simply be
done by minimizing the loss (or hazard) in the presence of a given failure.
The second improvement to the standard FHA is the inclusion of temporal con-
siderations in the characterization of a failure. The length of time during which a
function has failed impacts the operational significance of a functional failure. Thus,
the operational effect of functional failure will be expressed in terms of % function
loss and failure duration. This concept is illustrated in figure 32. The surface repre-
sents the variability of hazard level with the magnitude of functional failure and the
duration of the failure. At zero failure duration there is no effect. However, as the
duration and magnitude of the failure increases, the hazard level necessarily increases.
A hazard function must be defined for each function at each mission phase.
This safety and reliability tradespace highlights the available design recourse to
minimize operational hazard. Consider failure cases A and B in figure 33, where
these specific failures breech the probability limits associated with the hazards at a
given function loss. Point A represents a notional failure scenario. In this situation
a unit level failure introduces a percent loss in platform level function for a given
time. Taking a design perspective; in order to reduce the operational implications
of the failure, the designer may increase the functional reliability, increase the speed
of functional restoration, or alter the contours through operational effect mitigation.
Assuming a fixed hazard/function/duration relationship leaves two options, increase
functional reliability or decrease repair time.
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Figure 32: Notional Relationship Between Hazard Level, Function Failure, and
Fault Duration
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Figure 33: Hazard Effect Mitigation for Notional Physical System (A) and Control
(B) Failure
Point B represents a notional control failure. Here capability exists to fulfill ade-
quate functionality, however, a control failure has introduced an excess of functionality
(e.g. too much thrust). In this circumstance, recourses include an increase in con-
trol reliability, or an increased speed of restoration to original functionality. A third
option also exists through augmentation of the function/hazard relationship.
If the assumption is made that the operational space (hazard effect function) is
independent of architecture definition, the three means to ensure appropriate relia-
bility for a function loss must be defined in order to accurately size the architecture.
The challenge presented by addressing reliability in this fashion is identifying when
system reliability breaches hazard constraints during each flight phase and when the
architecture may be overdesigned in terms of reliability.
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Lastly, the potential dimension of reliability requirements configuration may re-
quire considering combinations of platform level functional failures during the func-
tional hazard assessment. As electrical power begins to support more of the platform
level functions, loss in load capacity will impact the fulfillment of multiple platform
functions simultaneously. The architect must be aware of the implication of concur-
rent platform level functional failures. While the majority of the work done in this
thesis assumes independent criticality of platform level functions. The formulation of
the hazard function may be expanded to include combined functional failures.
Continuous representations of top down operational criticality requirements al-
lows for more insightful architecture trades regarding load shedding and performance
degradation than traditional fixed reliability requirement measures during conceptual
architecting. The function/hazard relationship must be expressed in a form which
allows for considerations of load shedding, fault tolerance, and mission analysis. This
relationship takes the form indicated in equations 9 and 10. At any point in the
mission (time t) the level of hazard incurred is a function of the available system level
capability (X).
Hazard (t) = h [{X}, τ, {Op (t)}] (9)
{Op (t)} = 〈alt (t) ,M (t) , dist (t) , · · · 〉 (10)
This hazard function is also calculated in terms of the duration of the failure
(τ). There are multiple means by which the designer can ensure that the appropriate
functional reliability is achieved. Fault tolerance is applied preventatively through
the configuration of an architecture with “spatial and temporal redundancy” ([306]).
Temporal redundancy takes the form of replication or repair. Replication is a sequen-
tial performance of some action and can achieve higher reliability in the performance
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of discrete tasks. Repair, on the other hand, is the restoration of some original capa-
bility. Total loss of thrust for a ∆t = 30 seconds is much different than a total loss of
thrust for ∆t = 10 minutes. Allowing for engine restart can reduce hazard severity
by reducing duration. With the inclusion of temporal redundancy for increased reli-
ability, new architecture specific functions and operations must be introduced which
enable functional restoration.
Finally, the hazard must be made sensitive to operating conditions (Op (t)). These
operating conditions are time variant as the platform progresses throughout the mis-
sion. For example, the operational effect of a loss in thrust for 30 seconds is much
more hazardous during low altitude flight and takeoff than for higher altitude oper-
ations. A loss of thrust yielding marginal excess power is minor during high altitude
cruise, but may prove catastrophic during low altitude obstacle clearance or takeoff.
Research Question: How does taking an continuous approach to functional haz-
ard identification impact the means by which these requirements are allocated to the
unit level?
5.1.1 Functional Hazard Relationships Definition
The hazard function relationships can be defined heuristically by the architect, fol-
lowing prescribed limitations dictated by certification requirements, or be derived
from constraint analysis. Heuristic definition is applied for rough conceptual studies
conducted with limited information regarding actual system implementation. This
takes a form similar to traditional FHA by requiring the manipulation of surface plots
instead of the discrete hazard assignments.
Necessary performance requirements and hazard responses are often dictated based
on historic aircraft performance data. Certification requirements can provide direct
















% of Total Thrust Available
Figure 34: Reduction in Rate of Climb Requirements for loss of engine in FAR 25
[69]
constructing hazard function relationships requires extensive decomposition and re-
formulation of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) and other design certification
standards ([69]).
An example stating requirements through generalized operational impacts is cited
by de Tenorio [69]. With figure 34 he graphically displays information scattered
between multiple sections of FAR 25 certifications requirements regarding the impact
of rate of climb requirements due to engine loss during takeoff and landing.
FAR 25 specifies the minimum reduction of climb rate incurred with a loss of
engine. Loss of propulsion functionality induces a reduction in the rate of climb oper-
ational requirement. This is necessitated by constraints imposed by operations within
commercial aerospace. FAR 25 regulations state these changes in the behavioral at-
tributes due to functional failure at specific mission points at discrete percent loss
values. Additionally, while thorough, the FAR 25 regulations are not presented in
a directly usable fashion. Developing the figure 34 representation of climb gradient
limits for thrust loss during takeoff and approach required reference to twelve FAR
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25 sections. While FAR provides minimum requirements, additional capability may
provide enhanced availability or performance.
Physical analysis assists the assignment of failure by linking functional fulfillment
to fundamental requirements. Constraint analysis is often used to identify the bounds
on the solution space for the system. Each operation which the system performs
introduces a constraint which limits the design space. For aircraft design, constraint
analysis acts to limit the thrust to weight ratio (TSL/WTO) and wing loading (WTO/S)
often in the form of motion equations or energy relationships ([201],[219]). While
system attributes are set so as to operate within the constraints, hazard analysis can
be accomplished by exposing hazards incurred from breeching the defined constraints





























Consider the form of Mattingly’s aircraft motion relationship in given previously
by equation 1. The hazard associated with a loss of thrust becomes a question of the
allowable reduction of system capabilities (velocity (V), altitude (h), maneuverability
(n and Ps)) at each initial flight phase. This constraint relaxation due to system level
failure requires that the each requirement must no longer be perceived as hard limit
(“go, no-go”), but rather as a limit with accompanied assurance of fulfillment. This
assurance takes the form of a function loss probability limit.
Relaxation of a high altitude maneuver constraint is depicted in Figure 35 for a
twin engine, 15 pax, commercial aircraft with a wing loading of 76lbf/ft2 and max
TSL/WTO of 2.2. The aircraft drag polar was characterized by K1 = 0.085 ,K2 = 0,
CD0 = 0.02. For this plot the weight lapse is assumed to be 0.8 and the thrust lapse is
allowed to vary with altitude and Mach number. The design point for this aircraft is
indicated as A. Applying constraint analysis provides a visual tool for identifying the
effect of a functional failure. With a loss of thrust the point begins to drop towards
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Figure 35: Effect on performance constraint given a loss of thrust
B and the aircraft no longer can sustain some requirements. This is seen as a breech
of operational constraints.
Figure 35 indicates how hazards can be mitigated by augmenting flight perfor-
mance. As the thrust available diminishes the system begins to lose capability. This
may initially entail a loss of specific excess power and maneuverability (reductions in
Ps and n) or require a change in velocity. Ultimately, the criticality associated with
a loss of thrust relates to the aircrafts ability to reach a suitable landing site and
safely approach it. Performance limits corresponding to the maximum range for a
given thrust available are displayed on the chart. The magnitude of thrust loss yields
decreases in range. Additionally, with a total loss of thrust the minimum descent rate
is also fixed.
The function/hazard curve for thrust loss as prescribed by the analysis above
yields hazards with various degrees of severity depending on altitude, Mach number,
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A B
Figure 36: Thrust loss hazard relationship as informed by analysis results seen in
Figure 35
desired maneuverability, and distance from landing field. Figure 36 shows a monoton-
ically increasing hazard with magnitude of thrust loss. In this figure, the horizontal
axis represents the magnitude of a thrust loss failure. The vertical axis represents
the operational hazard. Catastrophic hazards are indicated by red coloration, critical
hazards by orange, major hazards by yellow, and so forth.
As thrust begins to reduce the maneuverability it is no longer negligible. Addition-
ally, if the distance to a landing field requires more thrust than available the hazard
becomes catastrophic. Non-catastrophic performance losses must also be character-
ized by their associated hazard. As displayed in the figure, failures which require mis-
sion augmentation are deemed marginal and transition to catastrophic as the thrust
capability for max available distance is approached. The rigidity of the performance
constraint can be enforced through the magnitude of the associated hazard.
This hazard function is defined only in terms of cruise and maneuverability oper-
ations. Other thrust hazard limits must be derived for other applicable constraints
(i.e. taxi,landing, takeoff, stop on ground). Expressing the hazard function as a
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direct relationship to platform operations requires a more systematic means for ex-
ploring the effect of functional loss. These relationships are critical to load shedding
optimization.
Further formulation of function hazard relationships will be discussed in the next
chapter while considering the platform capabilities of a medium/long range business
jet.
5.2 PSSA Continuous Expansion
Presenting reliability requirements in terms of % function failure and failure dura-
tion presents challenges in the implementation of traditional system safety analysis
tools. These challenges stem from reliability requirements which are no longer being
expressed as a static metric. Traditional quantitative reliability tools determine re-
liability as a single reliability metric (system reliability as a function of time) which
is compared to a contstant reliability objective. Fault trees and reliability block
diagrams operate under the assumption that components operate in two states: func-
tional, and failed [243] as observed in the previous chapter.
Observation: Traditional PSSA are limited by assumptions regarding the failure
states of units and functions.
The exploration of load shedding schemes necessitates that unit and system re-
liability be determined in terms of function loss and failure duration. The question
changes from “How reliable is the system?” to “How reliable is the system at pro-
viding a specific load, under specific conditions?” Therefore, unit and intermediate
reliability must be defined in with respect to the magnitude of the failure.
5.2.1 Proportional Function Loss
The two failure state representation (functioning or failed) of an failure events does not
adequately express the probability of a proportional functional loss. This is primarily
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evident when multiple unit share responsibility for the provision of functionality. the
probability of failure increases with increased magnitude of load for these load sharing
relationships. Determining the reduction of reliability with increasing load requires
an augmented form to traditional load sharing calculations.
Limitations are imposed due to the fact that load-sharing is often provided by
dissimilar components or systems. These components may vary in potential load ca-
pacity and reliability. In order to consider continuous representation of reliability ob-
jectives among units with varying embodiment, traditional tools must be augmented
to provide information verifying that reliability targets are met for a non-constant
reliability requirement. For a conceptual architecture which can potentially utilize
dissimilar means for the fulfillment of a single function, one cannot assume indepen-
dent and identical parallel units for load sharing.
When load sharing can be provided by dissimilar components with various func-
tional capacities, the problem can be restructured as illustrated in figure 37. Ini-








parallel paths. Restructuring three parallel load sharing
components which provide a function at magnitude Fmag creates multiple parallel
paths each active when the capacity of the contributing blocks meets or exceeds the
functional requirement [242].
Determining the reliability for load sharing between multiple components through
parallelizing and checks is illustrated through the example of the reliability of three
notional units providing the same function: providing steady state electrical power.
Assume no functional restoration available on these units (fault duration >> 0). The
reliability to load relationship for each of these elements is shown in figure 38. Assume
element U1 has a 3 kW load capacity with a reliability of 80% (given in blue), element
U2 can support 5 kW with at 90% reliability (given in green), and element U3 can






(a) 3 Parallel Load Sharing Units Required to Fulfill






1 3 31+≤ capFmag
2 3 32+≤ capFmag
1 2 3 321 ++≤ capFmag
21+≤ capFmag
(b) Reformulated RBD for 3 Parallel Load Sharing Units
Figure 37: Reposing Load Sharing Reliability Block Diagram
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Figure 38: Notional Reliability Curves for Load Sharing Elements
Figure 39: Load Sharing Reliability of the Functional Group A,B,C with Reliabilities
as Illustrated in Figure 38
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For kW loads requirements less than 3 kW any individual element or combination
of elements are capable of fulfilling the requirement. Thus, the reliability for loads
under 3 kW can be provided by any combination of elements. Above a 3 kW load
requirement and below 5 kW all combination of elements besides U1 can provide
the necessary capability. Between 5 and 6 kW U1 and U2 alone are insufficient.
Thus, the load sharing reliability reduces until the limit load of 14 kW. Loads over
14 kW can no longer be supplied by this combination of systems. The new reliability
relationship for the functional group U1,U2,U3 is illustrated in figure 39.
Assigning continuous safety requirements to the fulfillment of functions imposes
a constraint on the probability of a given loss of functional capacity. Assuming
this relationship is given by the inverse exponential function as displayed in figure
40 it can be seen in figure 41 that the unit group (U1,U2,U3) does not provide
sufficient reliability throughout the range of reliability requirements. The reliability
requirement given in red exceeds the system capability shown in blue in this figure.
The ability to a minimum capability under rare failure conditions is constrained more
stringently than the large load requirements under standard operation. The larger
the loss of functional capability, the more stringent the failure incurred. While these
three parallel systems exhibit adequate reliability for large load requirements, they
fail to fulfill the more critical lower load levels with sufficient reliability.
In order to meet reliability and capability requirements, the attributes of the
function group must be augmented. Using the constraint graph given in figure 41
the system architect gains insight as to which failure combinations contribute most
to constraint violation and in what manner this violation can be remedied.
Consider the graph in figure 42. The fulfillment of functional requirements can
be represented by points 1 through 7. Each of these points (xi, yi) is subject to the
constraints yi ≤ HMaxLimit (xi), where H (x) is the value of the constraint at point
x. Meeting the constraints can be achieved by moving the points in either the x
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Figure 40: Notional Function Loss Criticality Curve
Figure 41: Comparison of Functional Group Reliability from Figure 38 Compared



































Figure 42: Continuous Reliability Assessment/Optimization
or y directions. Sufficient reliability can be achieved by augmenting the capacity of
the elements, increasing the reliability of each unit, including additional redundancy,
or reducing failure duration through functional repair. A change in the y direction
(∆yi) is achieved by increasing unit reliability. A change in the x direction (∆xi)
is achieved by increasing the capability of the redundant units. For example, point
2 can be moved in y by increasing the reliability of units B or C. It can also be
moved in x by increasing the capability of the only other redundant unit A (unit a
not belonging to the set contributing to the failure (〈B,C〉)).
System design/optimization takes the form displayed in equation 12. Here, Cap
represents the capabilities of system units, η and β represents Weibull parameters
for the unit hazard functions, and MTTR represents the maintenance schedule.
The points can not be translated in this space independently of each other. The
x positions are functions of the capabilities of all of components fulfilling similar
functions. The y positions are functions of the failure probabilities of all contributing
failure combinations.
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 s.t.: yi −HLim(xi) ≤ 0
Where: xi = fxi (Cap) and yi = fyi (η, β,MTTR)
(12)
In the case described here adding capacity does not effect the reliability of low
functional loads (point 1). Insufficient reliability for the system at x = 0 must be
remedied through increases in reliability. This can be achieved by increasing unit
reliability through design or dispatch or by augmenting the architecture through the
inclusion of additional redundant units). Extending safety and reliability methods in
this fashion yields additional design insight towards optimal fault tolerant solutions.
5.2.2 System Level Implementation
Formulating load shedding optimization requires a detailed understanding of how
functional requirements flow throughout a system. Every point in the architecture
where multiple loads are placed on a single unit or group of units necessitates load
prioritization. When generating concept architectures these points must be system-
atically identified with sufficient information to format function/hazard relationships
for upstream systems in terms of unique shedding strategies.
Function/hazard information must be made available at all points in the archi-
tecture where these shedding decisions must be made. Additionally, all unit level
continuous functional/reliability requirements must be traceable to the support of
platform level functions and operations in light of optimal performance degradation
strategies.
Complex unit interactions and highly interdependent structures of aircraft vehi-
cle systems architectures pose difficulties in the traditional hierarchical flow-down
150
of functional and reliability requirements. Therefore, a systematic means for the
management of architecture relationships in the communication of requirements is
necessary.
Functional dependency relationships communicate requirements from the plat-
form to each individual unit or groups of units. The system can be represented by a
directed graph which depicts the communication of functional requirements between
subsystems or components. These directed graphs use edges to communicate require-
ments upstream from the system boundary (load, hazard) and capability downstream
for the system nodes (capacity, reliability).
{X}i+1 = f ([A]×min ({X}i,{K}) ,{Op}) (13)
The adjacency matrix for this complex graph, [A], propagates capabilities between
system units from the upstream to the downstream unit. System capabilities are
iteratively determined by equation 13. In this relationship, {X} represents all input
and output capabilities seen by unit edges, the function f ({X},{Op}) captures
all relationships between the capability provided to each unit and its downstream
capability during the operational state {Op}. Figure 43 illustrates the formulation
of the capability propagation. The {X} vector and [A] matrix are sized by the number
of upstream and downstream interrelationships. The output capabilities of unit b and
c are calculated by the f function in terms of the upstream capability relationships.
∑
i=1n,i 6=j
aij = 1 , ∀j ∈ {C} (14)
Additionally, {K} represents limitations placed on the unit capabilities by failure
conditions, unit design limits, or external constraints. Energy balances introduced
by the constraints in equation 1 are maintained by the adjacency matrix as shown
in equation 14. Each column associated with the downstream relationships from



















































































































Figure 43: Formatting Propagation of Capabilities
corresponding to the downstream output from physical elements are also set equal to
unity in order to retain information generated by querying unit sizing models.
Optimizing the response to a given failure state (capacity limit {K} and operating
state {Op}) is achieved by varying the proportional loading on each shedding column
({C}) in [A] and shedding proportions for each node with multiple downstream
outputs. The associated operational hazard is determined in terms of the capabilities
in the capability matrix {X}n which interact with the system boundaries and the
operational state {Op}.
Load shedding optimization takes the form of equation 15.








αi,j = 1 , ∀ i ∈ {C}
αi,j ≥ 0 , ∀ i, j
(15)
5.3 Architecture Definition
In order to determine the optimal allocation of failures for a concept, the architecture
must be structured following equations 13.
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{X}i+1 = f ([A]×min ({X}i,{K}) ,{Op}) (15)
A mapping of all functional relationships between systems must be defined ([A]),
and appropriate transfer functions (f ({X}, {Op})) must be organized and updated
as the architecture is augmented and redefined.
Systematic load shedding optimization and off-nominal performance analysis re-
quire architecture concepts to be expressed in a manner which efficiently expresses the
functional interdependencies of the architecture. When performing exploratory archi-
tecture design, the aggregation and composition of the architecture must be allowed
to change. However, the customer requirements are the same regardless of the prod-
uct architecture. A functional perspective provides a consistent platform whereon the
designer can define architecture alternatives. While the traditional conceptualization
of architecture relies on systems generalization, clustering, and functional allocation,
structuring the process following a functional perspective avoids many constraining
assumptions regarding systems structure and unit responsibilities.
The Energy Optimized Aircraft and Aircraft Equipment Systems Program Com-
mittee from the America Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics was formed to
support research towards novel approaches to integrating aircraft equipment systems.
This support led to the development of a robust functional perspective and process
for organizing architecture formulation of trades called functional induction [203].
This process of facilitates adaptive architecture definition and enables the concurrent
definition of concept architecture, sizing model generation, and the formulating of the
load shedding optimization process. Toolsets based on this process were developed
at the Aerospace Systems Design Lab (ASDL) and Georgia tech.
Functional Induction is a means to facilitate the process of architecture design
and allows for flexible structuring of the design solution [67]. Functions are used as
the means of defining and communicating requirements by addressing what system
elements are “supposed to do.” Typically, functions are described as a minimum of two
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specific characteristics: action and magnitude. In addressing load shedding and safety
and reliability requirements, the attributes are expanded in include reliability. Thus,
to completely specify functional requirements the capacity must be characterized by
a given magnitude at a desired security.
Functional Induction provides conceptual structure to the architecture and frames
the means for architecture assessments, including safety and reliability calculations.
This method for concurrent concept and model definition tracks the functional de-
pendency between units or systems through the systematic definition of functional
relationships. Functional induction defines two distinct types of functions: boundary,
and induced. The boundary functions are platform level functions which relate the
platform to its operating environment (‘inter’ functions). This type of function is in-
dependent to architecture embodiment. Induced functions describe the relationships
between system components (‘intra’ functions). Mavris et. al. illustrate functional
induction with the notional flashlight example shown in figures 44 [203]. While the
function to provide light remains fixed at the product level, choices regarding the
means of providing that light induce additional functions within the architecture.
As these elements are designated to fulfill functional requirements unit models are
instantiated which determine the magnitude of induced functional requirements and
unit level attributes.
In a given architecture, there may be many distribution, transformation, or source
elements which can fulfill given functional requirements or loads. The source used may
vary with mission segment or operation. In order to define the sizing requirements for
the architecture units, these complex functional relationships must be defined. Tools
were developed to managing the relationships between function, physical element,
and structure. The primary tool developed for functional induction is called the
Architecture Design Environment (ADEN).
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(a) Boundary and Induced Functions
(b) Instantiated Model Relationships Following Functional Induction
Figure 44: Notional Flashlight Functional Induction Example [203]
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Figure 45: Types and Requirements Relationships for Systems Architectures
The process of ‘functional induction’ addresses the inadequacy of traditional sys-
tems design tools like the morphological and design structure matrix due to com-
plexity introduced by allowing the architecture to vary. It allows the design space to
augment as decisions are made for the fulfillment of architecture functions. The plat-
form level environment introduces architecturally independent functions to the vehicle
systems. Acting across system boundaries terms these functions ‘boundary functions.’
As instances of physical elements are introduced to fulfill known defined functions,
new function are introduced. These ‘induced functions’ depend on the specific im-
plementations of functional requirements. Each physical elements is characterized
in terms of the functions they fulfill and the functions they induce. The process of
architecture definition using functional induction includes iterative introductions of
functions and definition of physical fulfillment.
In the development of functional induction, four distinct groupings of elements
were identified to facilitated decomposition and definition: distribution elements,
transformation or conversion elements, source elements, and storage elements. These
physical elements are characterized by the functions they perform. Load elements and
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introduce functional requirements on other system units [271]. Figure 45 illustrates
these elements and the functional requirements flow between them by means of a
design structure matrix.
Distribution elements fulfill the function of providing energy, information, mate-
rial, etc. in the support of some load. The distribution element in turn places a load
requirements of the same energy, information, material, etc. on a load provider. The
load providers are sources, or transformation/conversion elements. Transformation
and conversion elements fulfill some load requirements while inducing requirements
for loads of a different type. Sources are the ultimate suppliers of energy, informa-
tion, material, etc. to support the platform level loads. These sources can be internal
or external to the system (e.g. ram air is external source, fuel tank is an internal
source). One element which complicates architecture definition is a storage element.
A storage may act as a load or a source depending on what is necessary to support
platform level functions during the mission. The charge/discharge scheduling of the
storage elements necessitates introducing iterative methods for handling time in the
sizing.
Additional information may also be required at the unit level concerning the at-
tributes of the system as driven by the functional requirements. These attributes
may include any information which is necessary to evaluate overall platform level ef-
fectiveness. Typical attributes which are desired are weight, volume, and cost. Other
attributes, like heat generated and such, may be managed as induced functional re-
lationships, or may be tracked as metrics depending on the architecting scope of the
system.
A functional perspective and the use of functional induction provide an impor-
tant framework for this thesis. Tacit knowledge, engineering judgment, independent
assessment of the various architecture dimensions, and baseline architectures greatly
reduce design freedom. Understanding the complexity of the design space and the
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way design decisions impact the reduction of that space highlights the impact of de-
sign decisions on the variability of the architecture solution. Functional induction also
provides the functional framework whereby criticality requirements can be allocated.
Functional induction is facilitated by the integration of morphological analysis and
the design structure matrix. Managing the information necessary to integrate archi-
tecture conceptualization and model generation is achieved through the Architecture
Design Environment. This tool is used to automatically instantiate architecture mod-
els following conceptual architecture definitions. For more information regarding the
ADEN toolset and functional induction, see previous publications [12, 11, 67, 68].
This toolset is the framework by which architecture concepts are defined and analysis
models are created for this thesis.
5.3.1 System Level Example
Consider a notional system which provides for the completion of two system level
functions as depicted in Figure 46. For this system, two system level functions are
provided: provision of 28V DC power (F1) and the provision of 120V AC power (F2).
The 21× 21 adjacency matrix for this simple graph is displayed in Figure 47 a. This
matrix represents the communication of capabilities from one unit to another. The
design limits for all unit capabilities is given with the {K} array shown in Figure
47 b. The initial values in the matrix {X}0 are zeros except for X (19), X (20), and
X (21). These values are set to equal the corresponding capability limit: K (19),
{K} (20), and K (21) respectively.
The transfer function (f) is given by a series of transfer functions for each node
as displayed in equation 16. For this notional example problem the transfer function
takes the form of simple efficiency relationships where all efficiencies (ηi) equal to 90%.
The capabilities transfered through the system boundarys, X (1) and X (2), are in
turn used to determine the level of hazard incurred with system losses, (H ({X},{Op})).
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 1  0  0  0  0  000  0  0  0  0  000  0  0  0  0  0  0 
 0  1  0  0  0  000  0  0  0  0  000  0  0  0  0  0  0 
 0  0  1  0  0  000  0  0  0  0  000  0  0  0  0  0  0 
 1  1  1  0  0  000  0  0  0  0  000  0  0  0  0  0  0 
 0  0  0  1  0  000  0  0  0  0  000  0  0  0  0  0  0 
 0  0  0  0  0  100  0  0  0  0  000  0  0  0  0  0  0 
 0  0  0  0  0  100  0  0  0  0  000  0  0  0  0  0  0 
 0  0  0  0  0  02,2α0  0  0  0  0  000  0  0  0  0  0  0 
 0  0  0  0  0  000  1  0  0  0  000  0  0  0  0  0  0 
 0  0  0  0  0  02,1α0  0  0  0  0  000  0  0  0  0  0  0 
 0  0  0  0  0  000  0  0  1  0  000  0  0  0  0  0  0 
 0  0  0  0  0  000  1  0  0  0  000  0  0  0  0  0  0 
 0  0  0  0  0  000  0  0  0  0  100  0  0  0  0  0  0 
 0  0  0  0  0  000  0  0  0  0  100  0  0  0  0  0  0 
 0  0  0  0  0  000  0  0  0  0  01,2α0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
 0  0  0  0  0  000  0  0  0  0  000  1  0  0  0  0  0 
 0  0  0  0  0  000  0  0  1  0  000  1  0  0  0  0  0 
 0  0  0  0  0  000  0  0  0  0  000  0  1  0  0  0  0 
 0  0  0  0  0  000  0  0  0  0  000  0  0  0  1  0  0 
 0  0  0  0  0  000  0  0  0  0  01,1α0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
 0  0  0  0  0  000  0  0  0  0  000  0  0  0  1  0  0 
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X(3) = f1(X(4),{Op}) = η1X(4)
X(6) = f2(X(7),{Op}) = η2X(7)
X(9) = f3(X(10),{Op}) = η3X(10)
X(11) = f4(X(12),{Op}) = η4X(12)
X(13) = f5(X(14),{Op}) = η5X(14)
X(16) = f6(X(17),{Op}) = η6X(17)

(16)
This simple graph includes two nodes at which load shedding decisions must be made
(node C1 and C2). The proportion of the load transfered upstream from these nodes
are regulated by the variables α1,1, α1,2, α2,1, and α2,2. Optimal load shedding is
achieved by determining the appropriate combinations of the α variable in order
to minimize the hazard. Different criticalities for the system level functions drive
different responses to unit failures.
Failures occurring on parallel paths within the system require intelligent shed-
ding of loads. Consider a failure of the unit at node 4 (120V DC to 28V Power
Converter Unit) whose maximum downstream capability equals 150kW DC power
(K (11)). Each proportional failure of this unit may yield a different optimal load
allocation. Under non failure conditions the load allocation [α1,1, α1,2, α2,1, α2,2] is
equal to [1, 0, 0.5, 0.5]. The optimal failure allocation is determined over the range
of capacity limits in K(11) from 0 to 150kW. The results of these optimizations are
shown in the results in Figure 48.
The hazard is expressed on the range [0, 1] with 0 indicating no operational impact
of functional loss and 1 indicating catastrophic results incurred. Depending on the
risk mitigation index [90] for these hazards the limiting probability corresponding to
values on this range may change. For this example it was assumed that a system
level loss of 28V DC electrical power is independent of the loss of 120V AC power.



























(b) Optimal Failure Allocation for Hazard Functions H2 (Equation 18)
Figure 48: Failure Allocation for Load Shedding Optimization with Failure of Node
4 of the System Graph in Figure 46
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independent. If these capabilities are not independent the objective function must
reflect their relationship. Additionally, the system of interest could be expanded to
capture the interactions between these capabilities.
The load shedding optimization was performed considering two objective func-
tions. These objective functions are displayed in equations 17 and 18. The hazard
associated with the loss of DC power was assumed to be proportional to percent loss
with an initial 100kW DC power capability [1−X (1) /100]. The first hazard function
(equation 17) assigns hazard values as the maximum percent loss of functionality. In
order to illustrate the change in optimal load shedding with variation in system level
hazards, the hazard associated with loss of AC power was increased in the second haz-
ard function (equation 18). The hazard associated with this loss of X(2) in equation
18 increases exponentially from 0 and 1. This notional relationship between hazard
and capability loss is intended only illustrate the variation in load shedding during
various operating states. More useful objective functions must be derived using the



















Evaluating the probability in which a system level loss will occur must take optimal
response to the failure into account. The optimal response determines the relationship
between the unit capability loss, the magnitude of system failure, and the associated
hazard.
Optimal reliability allocation favors one boundary function over another. Thus,
more critical boundary functions are provided with higher probability. Figure 48
indicates that optimal shedding prescribes the original allocation to be maintained
with Node 4 failures of less than approximately 40 kW. As the failure increases,
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functional dependency relies more on AC distribution and the AC to DC 28V power
converter. Depending on the magnitude of this failure, the efficiency of the units, and
the hazards associated with functional loss, the optimal allocation proportions are
ascertained. As illustrated in Figure 48(c), hazard function H2 places more emphasis
on the fulfillment of the function F2 (or X (2)) by driving increased α1,1 values.
5.3.1.1 Failure Cases
Determining this reliability requires the evaluation of each optimal failure response
for all statistically significant unit failures or unit combination failures. For larger
architectures the number of failure combinations increases exponentially. However,
the failure probabilities also decrease exponentially with the number of concurrent
failures. Assuming independent failures, combinations of probability orders of mag-
nitude smaller than the typical 1 × 10−9 probability limit for catastrophic failures
on aircraft platforms may be neglected. Additional simplifications to reliability eval-
uations are achieved by managing of common cause and cascading failures failures
through identification of functional dependencies.
The probability of a failure with a given magnitude is determined by finding the
union of all applicable failure combinations. The maximum number of concurrent
failures which are required for statistical significance (n) is given by equation 19,
assuming that catastrophic failures are limited by a probability of 1 × 10−9. In this








≤ 1× 10−10 (19)
If Pmax is greater the largest independent failure probability then for any failure
intersection then equation 20 applies.
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P (F1 ∩ . . . ∩ Fi) ≤ Pmaxi (20)
Additionally, because probabilities take on values from 0 to 1, the union of inde-
pendent probabilities is bounded by:
P (Fi ∪ Fj ∪ Fk) ≤ P (Fi) + P (Fj) + P (Fk) (21)
Combining equations 20 and 21, the probability of all cases including i concurrent
failures, Pi, is bounded by equation 22. Additionally, the overall probability of failure,
P , is bounded by equation 23, where n is the total number of independent failures
















With knowledge regarding the minimum significant probability required (1−9 for
catastrophic failures), the required value of n can be determined in equation 23.
This decreases the number of cases which must be run. However, to afford rapid
optimization of failure allocations, computational resources should be made available
for large architecture structures with complex hazard functions. More details into the
algorithm which identifies statistical significance is available in appendix D.
5.3.1.2 Analog PSSA
Table 22 displays the failure probabilities for all system nodes. All non-redundant el-
ements which operate under nominal conditions operate with a maximum probability
of failure of 1× 10−9. All other elements exhibit a maximum probability of failure of
1× 10−6.
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Table 22: Node Failure Probabilities for the Notional System in Figure 46










With these unit level probabilities and all failure combinations, the reliability
of this notional system is displayed as a function of the magnitude of functional
capability. This is shown in Figures 49 and 50.
As illustrated in Figure 49, the probability of failure for each individual system
level function depends on the associated hazard functions. With a hazard function
which favors losses to F2 above those to F1 (H1), F1 operates with higher reliability
for a larger range of capability loss. Conversely, H2 favors losses to F1 and drives
lower probabilities of loss for F2.
Although performance degradation is optimized, the system must still be evalu-
ated in relation to reliability constraints. The probability of failure occurrence must
not exceed the probability prescribed by failure classifications as outlined earlier. The
function/hazard relationships H1 and H2 both yield failure probabilities exceeding the
typical probability constraints (as per MIL-STD-882D, FAA-AC-1309, SAE-ARP-
4754) as indicated by the red dashed line in Figure 50. However, the most driving
reliability requirements do not necessarily act under the highest criticality classifi-
cations as seen in the figure for hazard function, H2. Depending on the stringency
of the hazard probability constraints (indicated by a shift in the red dotted line to
the yellow line), a marginal failure for the system operating under the second hazard
function would require design augmentation. With the constraint given by the yellow
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(a) Hazard Functions H1 (Equation 17)
(b) Hazard Functions H2 (Equation 18)
Figure 49: System Level Function Failure Probabilities with Optimal Shedding
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Figure 50: Hazard Probabilities with Optimal Shedding for Hazard Functions H1
(Equation 17) and H2 (Equation 18)
dotted line the catastrophic condition demands no redesign.
The notion that less hazardous conditions provide more sizing critical unit level
requirements is not surprising. Nominal operating states typically pose the largest
load requirements on the system as a whole. Depending on the allocation of these
loads, these nominal requirements direct proportional load requirements on redundant
systems. With the failure of redundant systems new requirements allocations must
be used in order to provide the maximum amount of capability possible. Considering
the complex structure of the system and optimal allocation of capabilities the mag-
nitude of unit level requirements is emergent. Changing the structure or composition
of the architecture concept changes this optimal allocation and changes the hazard
probability curve. For novel architecture concepts, the internal operating states in
which sizing critical reliability requirements emerge are unique.
Sizing critical requirements depend both on the shape of the failure vs probability
curve as obtained by optimal load shedding and analog PSSA and the criticality
vs probability constraint curve as determined by mission analysis and continuous
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FHA. When comparing system reliability to the probability limits as defined by the
hazard functions, it can be determined which failure combinations contribute most
significantly to inadequate insurance of performance for all proportional functional
fulfillment. This then can be used to inform augmentation to the system to meet
constraints or reduce overdesign. Additionally, this approach reduces the necessity to
rely on predefined rules of thumb regarding the impact of off-nominal operations on
unit level requirements.
5.4 Method Overview
Two hypotheses were introduced pursuant to the thesis objective of integrating the
identification of off-nominal operational requirements during architecture exploration.
Hypothesis 1: Optimizing load shedding strategies yields more accurate predictions
of unit level requirements than heuristically defined performance degradation during
the exploratory design of revolutionary vehicle systems architectures.
Pursuant to this goal, two needs were addressed. First, load shedding optimiza-
tion requires the development of an objective function which captures the operational
impact of platform level failure. Second, the relationship between these consequences
system level failures must be defined within a framework in which the optimal allo-
cation of failure consequences can be determined.
The objective function for load shedding optimization requires the adaptation of
traditional Functional Hazard Assessment. In order to perform trades between vari-
ous platform level failure allocations the relationship between hazard and functional
failure is expressed as a continuous function of capability loss. As discussed in this
chapter, this relationship can be defined anecdotally, or follow a physics based assess-
ment of platform level capability requirements. The benefit to this strategy of failure
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Figure 51: Process Used for Integrating Emergent Operational Requirements During
Architecture Design, SONOMA
Hypothesis 2: Assumptions regarding the relationship between function loss and
hazard severity employed during traditional Functional Hazard Assessment bias ar-
chitecture design and lead to inaccurate estimation of unit level requirements.
Capturing the effect of optimal load shedding on system architecture conceptual-
ization is achieved in four steps as illustrated in figure 51. Three original methods
are introduced to assist in off-nominal design:
1. Continuous FHA
Method 1: The severity of system level failures are expressed continuously in
terms of the magnitude of the functional failure.
Addressing system performance in this fashion provides is superior to the tradi-
tional two state representations. It informs optimal load shedding and enables
performance degradation analysis. Function/Hazard relationships are defined
generic to the platform level and must be defined in a continuous fashion. These
relationships maintain independence between overall functionality and the im-
plementation space. Generating these relationships can be achieved anecdotally
or by analytically assessing the effects of the failures.
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2. Architecture Definition
Functional induction and the Architecture Design Environment are used to
generate the matrices implemented during numeric load shedding optimization.
3. Optimal Load Shedding
Method 2: Optimal load shedding is to be performed for all statistically signifi-
cant unit failure cases to ensure adequate coverage of off-nominal requirements.
Optimal Load Shedding identifies the preferred operational responses to unit
failures in terms of function loss. Two approaches were explored which relate
the platform level hazards to systems. The first, an analytical formulation for
propagating criticality relationships, helps develop an understanding of how
criticality must be assigned throughout the system as discussed in appendix E.
This approach is limited in its applicability to larger, complex systems. The
second, a numeric optimization approach was adopted for further implemen-
tation. While the analytical approach focuses on the flow of criticality from
requirements to system, the numeric approach focuses on the flow of failure
from system to platform level requirement. This allows for the assessment of
any failure state which the system architect deems statistically significant. The
numerical approach is implemented for the hypothesis testing. This optimiza-
tion follows equation 15.









αi,j = 1 , ∀ i ∈ {C}
αi,j ≥ 0 , ∀ i, j
Where: {X}i+1 = f ([A]×min ({X}i,{K}) ,{Op})
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4. Analog PSSA
Method 3: The probability of systems failure is expressed in terms of the
magnitude of functional loss (% functional failure).
Analog PSSA highlights necessary trades between design capability and relia-
bility. Preferred solutions are identified following equation 12.





 s.t.: yi −HLim(xi) ≤ 0
Where: xi = fxi (Cap) and yi = fyi (η, β,MTTR)
Examples were given in this chapter which identify potential benefits available
with the implementation of this load shedding optimization approach. Visually in-
specting the continuous relationship between hazard and loss acts as a design tool
which highlights potential fault tolerant design solutions. While these results are
promising, further work will be presented in applying these tools to larger more rep-
resentative systems. Validating these hypothesis lays the framework towards auto-
matic definition and management of off-nominal operational requirements concurrent
to architecture exploratory design.
The next chapter illustrates the implementation the first steps of the method
illustrated in figure 51 for the aircraft vehicle systems architecture. The last step of
this method (Continuous preliminary system safety analysis) for the aircraft vehicle




Hypothesis 1: Optimizing load shedding strategies yields more accurate predictions
of unit level requirements than heuristically defined performance degradation during
the exploratory design of revolutionary vehicle systems architectures.
Hypothesis 2: Assumptions regarding the relationship between function loss and
hazard severity employed during traditional Functional Hazard Assessment bias ar-
chitecture design and lead to inaccurate estimation of unit level requirements.
Emergent requirements are a product of the combined behavioral impact of the
units in a complex system. In performing system safety assessment for complex sys-
tems concepts, these emergent attributes must be considered while identifying new
architecture specific safety and reliability requirements. The validity of assumptions
concerning the structure of the function loss/hazard relationship are evaluated in
terms of the architecture to which they are applied. In order to test these hypothesis
it must be shown that the design conclusions reached for asimilar architecture con-
cepts must differ significantly when applying assumptions regarding the application
of operational requirements.
These two hypotheses are centered around gaining fidelity in vehicle systems siz-
ing through changing the form of system level requirements and evaluating an archi-
tecture concept with respect to off nominal requirements. Hypothesis testing must
include load shedding optimization on differing architectures concepts under similar
platform level requirements. Additionally, it must be shown that increased accuracy
of the platform level function/hazard relationship adds value to the design process
by providing insight not otherwise available.
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Concept architectures for hypothesis validation took the form of object oriented
vehicle systems models for a short to medium range business jet. This platform was
selected due to its well understood mission level requirements and a limited functional
scope compared to military platforms. However, the vehicle systems architecture
remains complex and exhibits emergent requirements.
Load shedding optimization was performed with objective functions at various
degrees of fidelity. This was done to assess the impact that inaccurate representa-
tions of hazards have on architecture design. In order to consider the unique impact
of platform level requirements on architecture concepts, load shedding optimization
executed for two vehicle systems concepts: conventional and ‘more-electric’ vehicle
systems architectures.
This chapter discusses the process for testing of these two hypothesis. It outlines
the two architecture concepts to which load shedding optimization is applied and
introduces the platform level function/hazard requirements used for this optimization.
6.1 Hypothesis Testing
As illustrated in figure 52, the two hypotheses address different impacts of load shed-
ding optimization. The first hypothesis addresses the effect of implementing load
shedding for dissimilar architecture concepts. The second addresses the effect of in-
creasing the fidelity of the function/hazard relationship in terms of continuous func-
tional hazard assessment. In order to validate these hypotheses a minimum of three
load shedding optimization cases must be performed. One set of test cases addresses
the differences between optimal load shedding strategies between architecture con-
cepts. A second set of cases are then compared with additional cases evaluated with
higher fidelity FHA.
A total of eight load shedding optimization cases were performed in support of













Figure 52: Focus of the Two Hypothesis Regarding the Application of Load Shedding
Optimization
approximations were applied to the two vehicle systems architecture concepts. The
limiting cruise and a takeoff scenarios were applied to evaluate sizing critical system
performance. Variations in the structure and composition of the architecture were
applied to address Hypothesis 1 and varying degrees of fidelity of the hazard objective
function provide insight towards the claims of Hypothesis 2.
6.2 Hypothesis 1 Testing
There are three stages to the verification of Hypothesis 1. According to the hypothesis,
the sizing critical requirements and associated load shedding strategies generated
through the minimization of operational hazards will differ for alternate architecture
concepts. By defining two different architectures and optimizing their load shedding
strategies, sizing critical requirements and their associated load shedding scenarios
can be compared.
The first step in validating this hypothesis is the definition of the roles for which
the systems architecture is responsible. The hazards associated with loss of functional
capability are then characterized. These function/hazard relationships will act as
the objective functions for load shedding optimization. Hazards are minimized by
optimally allocating system capabilities. All statistically significant failure states
must be evaluated to assess system reliability.
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Comparative assessments are made for two vehicle systems concepts: a conven-
tional architecture and a ‘more-electric’ architecture. These alternative architectures
are initially defined and sized by the engine failure heuristics outlined in table 23.
Table 23: Architecture Sizing Shedding Heuristics
Load Load Percentage with One Engine Failure
Base Loads 85%
Actuation 50%
Windshield Ice Protection 60%
Wing Ice Protection 40%
ECS 50%
Load shedding optimization is performed for both concepts. The sizing critical
unit failure scenarios are compared. Differences in the load shedding strategies for
similar component failures will be discussed. Significant variation in both the shed-
ding strategy and unit level requirements will validate that load shedding optimization
enables a more accurate prediction of unit level requirements.
Hypothesis 1 is tested as follows:
1. Apply heuristic for system sizing
2. Optimize load shedding for the baseline aircraft
3. Optimize load shedding for the ‘more-electric’ aircraft
4. Compare preferred load shedding strategies for the different concepts and the
original heuristic
5. Perform Analog PSSA
6. Compare Analog PSSA results regarding the importance level of risk at the
system and functional level
Undesirable performance risk for these concepts will indicate whether the heuris-
tic applied for the sizing of these two architectures adequately captures requirements.
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Additionally, differences between the magnitude of this risk indicates an applies bias
in the application of the requirements. The validity of this hypothesis will be further
shown by comparing the system level functions which produce the highest perfor-
mance risk for each architecture concept.
6.3 Hypothesis 2 Testing
The second hypothesis addresses increased accuracy in requirements identification
using a higher fidelity function/hazard relationships. Similar to the validation of
hypothesis 1, this hypothesis will be addressed by comparing requirements generated
using traditional methods (FHA) to those generated by higher fidelity continuous
hazard analysis.
The same ‘more-electric’ architecture defined for hypothesis 1 validation will serve
as the test case for the validation of this second hypothesis. While the architecture














Figure 53: Comparative Baseline Hazard Relationships
A function/hazard relationship is applied for load shedding optimization which
mimics the information available following traditional FHA. This is illustrated with
the blue dashed line in figure 53. With little information qualifying the relationship
between loss and hazard, traditional FHA only indicates that hazard occurs with
failure. Therefore, small losses in functional capability yield large operational effects.
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The second function/hazard objective function defined for load shedding opti-
mization is illustrated with the green line in figure 53. This relationship assumes that
hazards are directly proportional to the percent loss of system functionality.
Finally, a higher fidelity functional hazard assessment (discussed later) will be per-
formed to define hazards which continuously vary with % loss in system functionality.
These non-linear hazard relationship reflect the actual operational hazards which oc-
cur following system level function losses. Continuous system safety assessment is
applied to the results of all load shedding optimizations.
Hypothesis 2 is tested as follows:
1. Apply heuristic for system sizing
2. Optimize baseline/”more-electric” aircraft architecture with discrete function/-
hazard relationship
3. Optimize baseline/”more-electric” aircraft architecture with higher fidelity func-
tion/hazard relationship
4. Perform Analog PSSA
5. Compare Analog PSSA results with varying function/hazard fidelity
Any significant overpredictions or underpredictions of system risk obtained by
implementing lower fidelity hazard characterizations indicates inadequacies in the
traditional function hazard definition tools. Additionally, changes in the perceived
risk associated with the fulfillment of the vehicle functions generates may place undue
emphasis on certain units which is not warranted. Variations in design bias indicate
validation of this hypothesis.
6.4 System of Interest
As discussed in chapter three, the design space for a vehicle systems architecture is
extremely vast. Even with a fixed set of technologies, architectures vary in terms of
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the level of redundancy applied and the structure of functional flow. It is not possible
to exhaustively explore the architecture design space. Indeed, the intent of this work
is not to provide evidence for the application of one specific aircraft vehicle systems
architecture concept over another. The goal of this thesis is to illustrate the benefits
achieved by applying the extensions to safety and reliability tools discussed in the
previous chapter. Assessing the benefits attained by applying the SONOMA process
for varying architecture concepts requires that the architectures to which it is applied
exhibit significant differences in structure and composition.
While many of the more electric studies have focused on large commercial applica-
tions or military platforms, the “More-Electric” concepts have made inroads to busi-
ness jets class aircraft [88]. The vehicle systems architecture of a mid-size, two-engine,
medium range business jet platform was selected for load shedding and continuous
system safety analysis. The business jet mission is much simpler than those required
from military platforms. However, these aircraft exhibiting similar subsystem func-
tional requirements structure as larger commercial class aircraft. While providing
similar functionalities at the platform level, the vehicle systems of business jets ex-
hibit less complexity than those for large scale commercial transports. This platform















Figure 54: Boundaries of the Business Jet Vehicle Systems Architecture
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Figure 54 shows the vehicle systems generalized in terms of the four primary
requirements they provide. They are primarily tasked with providing electrical power,
high temperature and potable pneumatic airflow, hydraulic flow, and thrust. The
inputs to this system of interest include ram air and fuel (cooling capability is another
potential input to the system). These vehicle systems capabilities are to the fulfillment
of platform level functions, including environmental control, ice protection, actuation,
avionics, and base aircraft loads.
6.4.1 Electric Technologies
Electrical technologies have impacted all aircraft systems and increased demand for
electric non-propulsive power. However, the ‘more electric aircraft’ architecture fo-
cuses primarily on ‘vehicle systems’ functions as listed in table 1. This section reviews
the specific technologies associated with the conventionally accepted ‘more electric
aircraft’ architecture concept. These technologies involve actuation, environment
control, ice protection technologies, engine auxiliaries, and electrical generation, dis-
tribution, and management systems. Assessing the benefits of ‘more electric aircraft’
must include some or all of these considerations in architecture optimization.
6.4.1.1 Actuation Technologies
There are two typical categories for actuation functions: flight control actuation and
utility actuation. Flight control actuation is tasked with maintaining appropriate
aircraft motion by creating yaw, pitch, and roll moments. Pilot control inputs drive
actuators, which deflect control surfaces and induce aerodynamic forces. Utility ac-
tuation is tasked with applying forces necessary to fulfill many other aircraft func-
tions. Landing gear extension and retraction, braking and steering systems, cargo
and weapons bay doors articulation, and thrust reversers are all included in utility
actuation.
Electro-hydrostatic actuators [EHA] and electro-mechanical actuators [EMA] are
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the primary actuation technologies considered for the more-electric aircraft. Both the
EHA and EMA eliminate the requirement to distribute hydraulic power. This has
the potential to decrease systems weight and volume as well as provide improvement
by eliminating maintenance issues concerning central hydraulic system. However,
these devices must be supplied by an uninterrupted high power electrical distribution
system.
In contrast to hydraulic actuators, EHA’s utilize a localized hydraulic force. These
actuators use a hydraulic piston to provide translational force. However, this piston
is not connected to a central hydraulic system as is the case for traditional hydraulic
actuators. Each actuator has an isolated supply of hydraulic fluid and its own pres-
sure/flow generating device. This pressure/flow device often takes the form of an
electrically driven fixed displacement hydraulic pump. Each EHA is also far more
complex than a simple hydraulic actuator. It not only requires its own built in power
transformation device, but it also becomes a source of thermal energy which must be
managed.
The EMA is made up of a mechanical gear and screw system which converts ro-
tational torque from an electric motor into a translational force. These actuators
can receive either AC or DC electrical power to drive their motors. Due to limita-
tions in force, response time, and jamming issues with EMA’s, their application in
aerospace systems was initially limited to non-flight critical utility actuation. How-
ever, advances in rare earth material for high power DC motors, solid state switching
devices, and lightweight controls have increased the viability of using EMA for flight
control applications [211]. With application of these technologies, failures can be po-
tentially reduced with penalties in complexity, cost, and weight. For these reasons the
EMA is typically not used for primary actuation. However, with technology advances,
performance may increase to the point of increased feasibility [28].
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6.4.1.2 Environment Control
The environment control system is tasked with providing a comfortable and safe
passenger environment under potentially dangerous conditions. This environment
manipulation includes elevating temperatures and pressures higher than those present
at cruise altitudes and removing ozone and other particulates from the incoming
airflow. Cabin pressure must be maintained at a minimum of 8000 ft pressure altitude
with temperatures ranging between 65 and 73 ◦F. Humidity is also managed in order
to prevent ice from forming in the pneumatic tubing and ducting, condensation from
occurring inside the cabin, and fungus and bacteria from growing within the cabin and
ECS systems. FAR regulations also stipulate that 0.55 lbs perminute of outside air
must be provided per passenger. These requirements are met by providing external
air and filtering and recirculating spent air back into the ECS system. As a result,
the aircraft has a completely new cabin full of air ever 2 to 3 minutes [48].
The ECS system is very complex. It is comprised of multiple physical elements,
each fulfilling individual functions of the system (mix, filter, cool, remove O3, etc). All
of these functions are generalized by the single function to condition air. Although
this function could be decomposed further, applying a higher level of abstraction
allows the architect to simply compare different types of environment control system
concepts; bleed, and bleedless.
In contrast to the conventional ECS, a ram compressed ECS system does not rely
on pneumatic power from the engine to drive the system. Air is received by ram ports
located in the belly faring of the aircraft and is compressed to much lower temperature
and pressure than that provided by the engine compressor. In so doing, the need for a
precooling is eliminated. The pressure and temperature is directly determined by the
electrically driven compressor. However, with lower operating temperatures, elements
tasked with ozone removal and heat exchange must adapt and generally grow in size.
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6.4.1.3 Ice Protection
Ice buildup can have detrimental and hazardous effects on aircraft performance. Icing
occurs at altitudes and conditions where there is enough moisture in the air and
temperatures are such that water begins to freeze on the skin of the aircraft. This
generally only occurs during low altitude maneuvers, when the amount of moisture
in the air can be problematic (e.g. takeoff, climb, descent, approach, holding, and
landing). Ice buildup on the lifting and control surfaces can lead to flight instability,
lack of control, and an inefficient production of lift. Systems must be used in the
aircraft which either prevent ice formation from occurring (anti-icing) or remove ice
when present on the aircraft skin (deicing).
Conventional ice protection devices on large scale commercial aircraft utilize the
high temperature air available in the pneumatic system to heat the leading edges of
the wings in order to protect the wing from icing. This heated air is directed along
the surface of the leading edge of the wing, providing thermal energy to melt the ice
or increase the temperature of the surface of the wing to prevent ice from forming.
After the thermal energy has been used, this air is discarded overboard, representing
a loss in thermal energy.
Pursuant to the removal of bleed systems, the ‘more electric’ aircraft utilizes
electrical energy to provide the functionality to protect from ice. Many ice protection
devices utilize electricity. Electro-impulsive, and electro-expulsive deicing elements
use electrical energy to provide a mechanical force which moves the wing surface,
breaking up accumulated ice [98]. Electrical anti-icing devices also exist which prevent
ice from forming on the wing. Electro-thermal device convert electrical energy into
heat which protects the critical lifting and control surfaces. Heaters do not require a
stable electrical signal. Therefore, variable frequency signals, which are more efficient
to generate, are often used to power electrical heating [211]. Eddy current devices
have also been proven able to provide ice protection [98].
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6.4.1.4 Electrical Systems Technologies
Multiple advances in electrical system technologies have contributed the capability
to handle increased power requirements. The thrust of these advances go towards
increasing capacity, reliability, and ‘ruggedness’ of electrical systems in supporting
multiple types of power while decreasing weight and volume. Much of the improve-
ment in electrical systems technologies can be attributed to advances in materials
(insulation, dialectic, magnetic material) and low level components (capacitors, and
inductors) [297].
The 90’s saw the development of high-power solid-state switching technologies
enabling Variable-Speed/Constant Frequency (VSCF) generation. However, with in-
creases in the magnitude and diversity of of flight critical electrical loads, current
trends are pointing towards the adopting 270 VDC as the primary electrical power
type. Conversion devices must then be used to support alternative electrical power
types [211]. Specific developments in the electrical systems technologies include high-
power shaft-mounted switched-reluctance starter generators, superconducting genera-
tors, fault protection/prediction systems, regenerative load management distribution
systems, solid state distribution switching, high current intelligent power controllers
and converters, and high power/energy density electrical storage technologies [44].
Additional considerations which have been raised following increases in electrical
power requirements involved the means for providing adequate thermal management.
Reductions in aircraft block fuel requirements, and increased thermal loads can po-
tentially render the fuel tank insufficient as the sole thermal sink. Advanced inerting
systems (e.g. OBIGGS), phase change materials, external air heat exchange, and in-
sulation technologies are currently being pursued as alternatives for the management
of heat produced by increases in electrical loads.
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6.4.2 Proof of Concept Architectures
As discussed in the hypothesis testing, two architecture concepts must be evaluated
and compared. The first vehicle systems architecture concept can be considered con-
ventional. Environment control and ice protection are performed through customer
bleed and control and utility actuation are supported by engine driven hydraulic
systems (this is illustrated in figure 55). For the conventional aircraft architecture
electrical power is used to support base aircraft loads (28V DC), and windshield ice
protection (120 VAC).
The ‘more-electric’ architecture eliminates hydraulic and high pressure/tempera-
ture pneumatic requirements entirely. Hydraulic actuation is replaced by electrical
actuation and ice protection is achieved through electric heating. While the cus-
tomer bleed requirements are eliminated from the engine, pneumatic requirements
are fulfilled by ram compression. Higher voltage (270V) electrical distribution and
generation is used to reduce current requirements. Vehicle systems are supported en-
tirely by electrical power generation. The ‘more-electric’ vehicle systems architecture
is illustrated in figure 56.
These architecture concepts reflect the fundamental changes to the vehicle sys-
tems architecture which occur for the ‘more-electric’ aircraft. Again, these concepts
represent two embodiments of this vast architecture design space. However, the differ-
ences in structure and composition are sufficient to address the claims made by both
hypotheses. Significant variations in the emergent off-nominal requirements observed
for these architecture concepts are observed in the next chapter.
In order to determine the available off-nominal capability of the system, the system
model is formulated by equation 13.
{X}i+1 = f ([A]×min ({X}i,{K}) ,{Op}) (15)
Both concept architectures must be represented in terms of the adjacency matrix
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Figure 55: Conventional Architecture Diagram
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Figure 56: “All-Electric” Architecture Diagram
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([A]) and unit capability transfer functions (f ({X}, {Op})). The transfer functions
for these two concept architectures are discussed in the following section and the
adjacency matrices for these concept architectures are given in appendix F.
Each architecture exhibits a unique set of design variables (αi,j) which assign ca-
pabilities during failure conditions. These represent the flow of functionality through
every point in the architecture in which a single functional source provides for multiple
downstream requirements. The number of decision points and potential functional
capability flows throughout the architecture depends on its structure and composi-
tion.
The conventional architecture has 47 allocation variables as listed in table 24. The
‘more-electric’ architecture has 52 allocation variables as listed in table 25. Load shed-
ding optimization in performed by identifying ideal combinations of these allocation
variables. The proportional values of these variables determines how functionality
flows throughout the systems.
6.5 Function/Hazard Relationships
The function/hazard relationships are the mechanism by which operational consider-
ations impose performance requirements on units within a system. Misrepresentation
of the function/hazard relationship leads to inappropriate allocation of failure. This
biases architecture evaluation by imposing false requirements.
To show the benefits of higher fidelity function/hazard relationships informing load
shedding, continuous functional hazard assessment is performed with three levels of
detail. These three resulting function/hazard relationships for both the conventional
and ‘more-electric’ architecture are depicted in table 26. Continuous system relia-
bility is then evaluated by optimizing the load shedding strategies for each of these






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































do not represent reality, they provide justification for the development of higher fi-
delity characterization of the consequences of loss. This process is repeated for both
architecture concepts.
The functional hazard relationships displayed in table 26 are abstractions of the
relationship between system level functionalities and the operational space of the
architecture. Loss of capability has a direct impact on the occurrence of undesirable
events.
All of these capability hazard relationships are defined so as to decrease monoton-
ically with system capability. As the magnitude of a loss in capability increases the
hazard will naturally increase in severity. Distinctions are not typically made regard-
ing gradations of failures within a specific class (e.g.- How major is a major failure?).
However, expressing these relationships continuously allows for the implementation
of gradient based optimization in the identification of optimal failure allocation.
The first function/hazard relationship used mimics the level of fidelity provided
by traditional FHA. FHA gives little information regarding the consequences of in-
termediate failure conditions. Assuming that no additional information is applied
than that provided by traditional FHA, this form of the hazard function could be
applied while considering optimal load shedding. No distinctions are made in terms
of loss magnitude. Low levels of loss are equivalent in consequence to total losses in
functionality. However, In order to use gradient based optimization methods a step
function is not implemented. A continuous relationship between hazard and loss is
applied which rises quickly and yields catastrophic failures for small functional losses.
It is unrealistic that such an objective function would be used for load shedding op-
timization. These pseudo-step objective functions act as a baseline by mimicking the
information available during traditional FHA.
The second function/hazard relationship applies a linear relationship between haz-
ard and loss. The magnitude of the hazard associated with total loss of functionality
190




0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1








0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1









0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1









0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1









0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1








0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1









0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1









0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1









as prescribed by FHA and is the same magnitude of hazard incurred with any failure
using the first hazard function described. This loss function makes the assumption
that the magnitude of the hazard is equivalent to the proportion of the loss incurred.
The third function/hazard relationship applies nonlinear relationships between
hazard and function loss. These non-linear relationship reflect degraded performance
available through the reduction of platform level capability (de-ice instead of anti-ice,
reduced control responsiveness, etc.).
The conventional and ‘more-electric’ architecture concepts associate different oper-
ational hazards with the provision of different functionalities. While the conventional
architecture fulfills system level functions by utilizing multiple power types (hydraulic,
AC electric, high pressure bleed) the ‘more-electric’ concept places more emphasis on
the 270VDC power. The hazard associated with the loss of each capability stems
from its support of the system’s fundamental capabilities.
The nonlinearity of the function/hazard relationships for system capabilities is
derived from these relationships. For the conventional architecture, each capabil-
ity maps to the loss of a single system level function. However, the ‘more-electric’
architecture allocates multiple system level functions to the capability of providing
270VDC power.
6.5.1 Thrust Loss Hazards
The non-linear function/hazard relationships displayed in table 26 were defined anec-
dotally. It is therefore necessary to illustrate how physical analysis can and should
be applied in defining the impact of capability loss. This is performed here for the
function to propel. In order to capture the effect of a loss of thrust the functional
loss must be mapped to the operational consequences. Hazards are then assigned
according to the operational impact of the functional loss.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the fundamental consequence of a loss of
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thrust on a commercial aircraft is the inability of reaching and landing at a suitable
landing location. Furthermore, thrust requirements are also derived by the aircraft’s
ability to perform maneuvers to avoid additional undesirable consequences. The
hazard associated with a loss in thrust is addressed in two separate analyses: mission
analysis and takeoff performance analysis. At any point during the flight, a loss in
thrust imposes undesirable limitation on aircraft range [85, 100, 240]. During takeoff,
sufficient thrust must provide the ability to safely clear a 35 ft obstacle with one
engine out or perform a safe abort given a limited takeoff distance [101, 97].
Mattingly’s equation provides the relationship between propulsion requirements
and aircraft attributes. Additionally, the engine model which will be discussed later
in this chapter is also used to estimate fuel flow rate for mission analysis.
6.5.1.1 Takeoff
The hazard associated with loss of thrust at takeoff is determined in terms of the
required take off field length (TOFL). This distance is determined by decomposing
the takeoff in four segments: ground roll (sg), rotation(sR), transition (sTR), and
climb (sCL). Ground roll distance (sg) is the displacement required to accelerate the
aircraft from rest to the safety speed (Vsafety). Rotation distance (sR) is the distance
required to increase the aircraft angle of attack for takeoff. Transition distance (sTR)
is the horizontal distance the aircraft travels while changing the flight path angle to
the climb angle. Finally, climb distance (sCL) is the horizontal distance the aircraft
travels while climbing to an altitude equal to the obstacle height (hobs).
These segments are characterized by two velocities (Vfail and Vsafety). Vfail is the
velocity at which the failure occurs and Vsafety is the velocity at which the takeoff
can be safely achieved with one engine operational. In the event that a loss of thrust
occurs before the decision speed (Vdec), the balanced field length (BFL) is calculated
in terms of the velocity at which the failure occurs (Vfail) and the distance required
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to stop once the failure occurs (sBR). If Vfail is greater than Vdec, the pilot must
continue with the takeoff.




Ground Roll: sg Rotation: sR Transition to
Climb







Figure 57: Takeoff Field Length and Balanced Field Length Compositions
The total displacement required is the maximum of the takeoff field length and





sg + sR + sTR + sCL
sVfail + sBR
 (24)
This formulation makes several assumptions. The first assumption is that the
thrust loss failure occurs instantaneously and Vfailure. The second assumption is that
any failure occurring before the decision speed yields a total takeoff distance equal to
the BFL.
Calculating each of these displacement values implements a form of Mattingly’s
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This equation can be reduced to equation 25 by eliminating dh/dt from the excess





























Substituting the definition of dynamic pressure (q = 12ρV





− µTO, equation 26 reduces to equations 27.







The final form of this displacement equation is achieved by integration.




























Substituting equation 28 into equation the TOFL expression in equation 24 and



















































Combining the logarithm terms yields equation 29 as the final expression for take
off ground roll where qF = 12ρV
2
failure, qS = 12ρV
2
safety, T0 is the initial thrust available,








T0 −WµTO − ζqFS
T0 −WµTO
)(
TF −WµTO − ζqSS
TF −WµTO − ζqFS
)]
(29)
It is assumed that rotation and transition each take approximately 3 seconds
and obstacle clearance distance is given by equation 30. Therefore, the total distance
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The Balanced Field Length (BFL) is calculated similarly and is used to determine
the decision speed. For a braking roll Mattingly’s equation is reduced to equation
32 by assuming zero reverse thrust and lumping all drag and resistance parameters










After substitution for dt, integration, and simplification similar to the derivation
of TOFL, the balanced field length is given by equation 33.
















Assuming a known maximum allowable BFL, numerically solving this equation
for qF yields an expression for the decision speed: the maximum speed at which at
which the takeoff can safely be aborted. Failures prior to the decision speed can be
operationally mitigated through abort. However, failures after this point may result
in TOFL overruns. The reason the decision speed was chosen as the critical failure
point is also due to the fact that partial thrust losses are less stringent the nearer the
aircraft velocity is to the safety speed. In order to assess the maximum operational
consequence of the loss of thrust during takeoff it is assumed that the failure occurs
directly after the decision speed.
Figure 58 gives the expected takeoff field length considering the decision speed
calculated from equations 33 and the TOFL determined with 31. This was calculated
















Figure 58: Take Off Field Length for Business Jet with Variation in Thrust Available
This graph reflects the the necessity to design the aircraft with adequate capability
to takeoff with one engine out. More specifically, this analysis shows that for any
TOFL available a 60% loss in thrust yields fieldlength overruns. With this knowledge
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in hand, the criticality of the function to produce thrust can be recast in terms of
the expected TOFL required. This analysis links the functional loss to its actual
operational impact, which is an inability to perform the take-off within the available
distance. This hazard is described as a function of the amount of field length overhead
which is available during the failue case ( ∆s = TOFLavailable − sTot). This hazard












Figure 59: Hazard Associated with the Required TOFL for a Business Jet During
Thrust Loss Conditions
The hazard associated with an runway overruns is discrete. It can be directly
asserted that negative ∆s values will yield catastrophic hazards. Additionally, very
large positive values of ∆s assign no hazard in performing the takeoff operation.
Assuming that the analysis performed to determine the required TOFL directly cap-
tures reality, and that the pilot has the ability to perform optimally during engine
failure conditions, the transition between zero hazard and catastrophic hazard would
be a step function (function 1 in figure 59). However, hazard characterizations are
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essentially probability constraints. The relationship between required TOFL and
available TOFL must account for the probability that a consequence will occur given
the expected performance available.
Overhead introduced between known operational consequences essentially acts as
a safety factor in allocation of requirements. The shape of this transition region is
affected by multiple sources of uncertainty. The first source of uncertainty is the
analysis itself. Variations in the aircraft attributes and the level of fidelity in which
the functional performance analysis was performed may prompt the inclusion of safety
factors in the formulation of this hazard relationship. Each assumption made in this
analysis can introduce variability in the definition of required TOFL which must be
reflected in the definition of this transition region (functions labeled 2 in figure 59).
The probability that external factors will aid in the occurrence of hazards must also
be included in the definition of this transition region. This can be defined heuristically
or anecdotally depending on the level of confidence the requirements engineer has in
the analysis performed. Further studies may be performed to describe this transition
region in greater fidelity (e.g. human factors analysis or uncertainty analysis).
6.5.1.2 Cruise
Much like the takeoff hazard analysis, loss of thrust during the cruise segment must be
linked to is operational effect. The operational effect of a loss in thrust is a reduction
in the ability to maintain desirable flight conditions. This leads to reductions in
the effective range of the aircraft. Therefore, the hazard associated with thrust loss
during cruise must be described in terms of the range available during thrust loss
(R) and the range required (Rreq). The range required is determined by considering
the design range, the portion of the mission already completed, and the distance
to alternate runways. The range available is determined by identifying the optimal
failure response in terms of flight path which maximizes range.
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The value which is used to characterize the operational impact of thrust loss is
Rreq
R
. If this value is larger than 1, the thrust loss scenario causes the aircraft to lose
the ability to reach a suitable landing site. For values less than 1, analysis shows that
the required range is available. However, depending on the level of confidence in the
analysis results, values of Rreq
R
close to 1 may be characterized as incurring hazards
also.




V (t) cos (θ (t)) dt ∼=
tfinal/∆t∑
i=1
Vi ∗ cos (θ (ti)) ∆t (34)
Determining the maximum range available (R) during thrust loss scenarios was
determined by optimizing the flight path of the aircraft for failures of various magni-
tudes. These failures may occur at different points in the flight envelope and under
varying customer load requirements. A design of experiments was used to character-
ize this thrust loss, range relationship. Space filling Latin hypercube and full factorial
sample points were used to develop a neural network of the relationship in equation
35. The variable β in this expression represents the amount of fuel remaining in the
aircraft
(







Engine1 [ThrustLoss, FuelCap, CustomerLoads]
Engine2 [ThrustLoss, FuelCap, CustomerLoads]
 (35)
In order to determine the maximum range for each point in the DOE, the required
velocity and climb angle (θ (t)) needed to be identified throughout the mission. The
definition of θ(t) and V (t) are discussed. Relevant variables for this study are indi-
cated in the free body diagram for this aircraft in figure 60.
The climb angle can vary continuously during the flight. Assuming small angle














Figure 60: Business Jet Free Body Diagram for Climbing Flight
θ (t) = min

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The first θ calculation (equations 36a) is varied by the optimization routine. Vari-
ables A, B, and C in this equation are the design variables accessed for range opti-
mization. This equation is used to calculate the aircraft trajectory throughout the
mission. A determines the vertical scaling, B determines the slope, and C determines
the time offset of the inverse exponential (s-function).
The second θ equation (36b) calculates the maximum climb rate available given
cruise velocity for optimal range. Derivation of this equation begins with the thrust







2SCD0 +W sin (θ) (37)




























In order to obtain feasible solutions to V 2, the value under the radical must be









The third equation (36c) calculates the limiting θ given the maximum allowable
cruising altitude. If an external max operating altitude is imposed by the operating
envelopes of other aircraft systems, the climb rate is limited so as to keep the altitude
under this limit.
This velocity for maximum range is calculated by equation 39.




sin (θ (t)) +
√
sin2 (θ (t)) + 12KCD0 (a)[
T (t)









The thrust limited aircraft velocity (equation 39b) is determined with equation
38.
Derivation of equation 39a (velocity for maximum range) begins with the equation
for time rate of change in aircraft weight, as seen in equation 40. This change in weight
is directly proportional to the thrust specific fuel consumption (TSFC).
dW
dt
= −TSFC (t)T (t) (40)
Assuming a steady rate of climb (load factor, n=1) and substituting the drag
coefficients
(
D = 12ρ(t)V (t)
2SCD
)






































= V cos (θ), the change in aircraft weight per displacement














































































This can be simplified to equation 39a.
[V (t)]2 = W (t) /S
ρ (t)CD0
[
sin (θ (t)) +
√
sin2 (θ (t)) + 12KCD0
]
With these equations in hand, maximum range was identified for all DOE points.
These results are displayed in figure 61 for an initial flight altitude of 35 kft, nominal
customer loads, and a maximum operating altitude of 50 kft.
This figure displays available range (R) in terms of the remaining fuel
(
β = W −Wempty
WTO −Wempty
)
and % thrust loss. As expected, the remaining range available decreases with less fuel
burn available. Additionally, large losses in thrust also reduce the remaining range.
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Figure 61: Aircraft Range with Variations in Thrust Loss and Fuel Consumed
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Figure 62: Range to Landing Field with Variations in Fuel Spent
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The required range also changes throughout the mission. The distance to a suit-
able landing field is illustrated in figure 62. While the US Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration provides does not require ETOPs certification of private jets, the Joint
Aviation Authority. The JAA has qualified private jets to ETOPS requirements of
120 to 180 minutes [240]. Under these certification requirements, a private business
jet must be able to reach an alternate landing site within the specified time. As
such, the divert distance used for this study as assumed to be 1000 nm. Assuming
this divert distance remains at a maximum throughout the duration of the mission,
the distance to a landing field length increases as the aircraft moves away from the
departure field and decreases as the aircraft approaches the destination field. The
maximum remaining range is given by the divert distance.
With range available and range required varying throughout the mission, thrust
loss criticality subsequently varies with β. Figures 63a and b illustrate the ability to
fulfill range requirements in terms of functional losses and remaining fuel. Figure 63a
shows range limitations in terms of thrust loss percent and figure 63b shows range
limitations in terms of percent fuel capability loss. For practically all values of β,
large thrust losses result catastrophic failures. For both functional losses, the most
stringent criticality requirements occur at β values of 13 .
The magnitude of the thrust hazard is determined by its impact on the loss of
available range. It can be safely assumed that values of Rreq
R
greater than 1 yield
catastrophic hazards. In this scenario, the minimal required range is greater that the
range attainable under the failure state. Values of Rreq
R
much less than 1 yield no




















































(b) Fuel Flow Losses
Figure 63: Range limitations due to Functional Failures
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6.6 System Models
In order to model the concept architecture, transfer functions were developed which
determine the available capability of a unit given the environment in which the unit
is operating and the functional capabilities made available to that unit by other
units in the system. In order to represent these architectures 25 transfer functions
were defined with various degrees of fidelity. The unit transfer functions used for
each concept architecture are outlined in table 27. The columns labeled conventional
and ‘more-electric’ in this table indicate the number of these units present in each
architecture.
Table 27: Unit Models (Capability Transfer Functions)





270 to 28V DC Transformer
HS 120V AC Generator
HS 270V DC Generator
HS 28V DC Generator



















































The fidelity of the transfer functions for each of the units within the architec-
ture depends on the amount of knowledge available during architecture trades. As
discussed in chapter three, surrogate models of system elements provide sufficient fi-
delity during conceptual trades. The following sections discuss the models developed
for these load shedding optimization studies.
6.6.1 Electrical
The focus of this study focuses on providing adequate steady state capability. There-
fore, it is assumed that each electrical component will be configured in a manner
which provides meets transient performance constraints (e.g. MIL-STD-704). The
capability equations for electrical systems components take one of two forms: dis-
tribution element or transformation element. Distribution units convey functional
capability between multiple physical locations. Transformation units convert func-
tional capability from one form to another. While device controllers can be managed
as independent functional elements. However, for the purposes of this study it is
assumed that a transformation units include both transform and control elements.
6.6.1.1 Distribution Elements: Electric Buses
The capability provided by the distribution element (Capout) is determined in terms
of capability of the electrical sources (Capin), the required distribution length (L),
and the peak design capability (Capdes). The output capability for each of the three
electrical distribution element models is calculated by assuming a constant efficiency
(ηL) of 98% [69]. While this linear representation of bus efficiency is sufficient for
the purposes of addressing the validity of the proposed hypothesis, additional merit
may be achieved by higher fidelity representation of the electrical distribution system
(capturing the effect of allowable fusing current, required shielding attributes, etc.).
The relationships developed for these models are given in table 28.
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Table 28: Electrical Distribution Capability Transfer Functions
Unit Transfer Function
120V AC Dist:




ηL · AC120V Capin
]
28V DC Dist:













6.6.1.2 Transformation Elements: Generator, Power Converter
The structure of the transfer function for electrical transformation elements is similar
to that developed for the distribution elements. However, unit capability is deter-
mined in terms of these two upstream functional capabilities available. The output
capability of the DC to DC converter is calculated in terms of input electrical power
and available cooling. Generator output capability is calculated in terms of the avail-
able shaft power and cooling. The shaft power functional relationship includes a
vector of attributes characterizing the form of the function available. For this study
the shaft power relationship is decomposed into a vector of two attributes: available
horsepower and shaft speed (ShaftPowerCapin = [HPAvailable, ShaftSpeed]). Re-
laying both of these variables downstream is valid assuming that generator torque
loads do not significantly impact engine shaft speeds. This assumption holds for
the ‘more-electric’ and conventional vehicle system architectures for typical business
jet aircraft customer loads. Typical customer shaft horsepower extraction for these
aircraft does not significantly impact engine shaft steady state operating speeds.
The transfer function for the electrical generator calculates the available electrical













































Figure 64: Generator Efficiency Relationship
a 270V DC, Mosfet rectified, six-phase, brushless generator is illustrated in figure
64. The effect of speed on efficiency is minor compared to the effect of electrical
load. Generator efficiency drops dramatically with reductions in desired load, while
variations of the peak Machine efficiency due to speed do not exceed ±2% for large
variations in shaft speed. These trends are typical for efficiency calculations of electric
Machines [45, 141].
The transfer functions for electrical transformation elements are outlined in table
29. The available capability from these electrical units can be limited by three values.
The first limit is imposed by the max unit design capability. The second limit is
imposed by the supply of the primary source of upstream power. For a generator,
the output is limited by available input shaft speed. For a power converter, the
output is limited by the upstream power available. The third limitation stems from
a reduction in cooling capability. With a reduction in cooling capability, the level
of sustainable steady state load is limited. These considerations are reflected in the
transfer functions in table 29.
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Table 29: Electrical Transformation Capability Transfer Functions
Unit Transfer Function
DC-DC Converter:






















As discussed in the second chapter, hydraulic power has been considered the default
means for power assisted actuation since the 1930’s and 40’s. The primary function
the hydraulic system is to deliver pressurized hydraulic fluid flow to actuation systems.
The traditional source for hydraulic power is the engine. Shaft power is delivered to
the engine driven pumps (EDP) by way of the accessory gear box (AGB). Moir and
Seabridge’s rudimentary illustration of the hydraulic system is shown in figure 65.
While multiple elements are involved in the compilation of the hydraulic system
(reservoirs, filters, accumulators, etc), the composition adopted for this study is out-
lined in figure 65. The capability of the hydraulic system is determined by two transfer
functions. The hydraulic distribution system (outlined in red) delivers hydraulic fluid
to the actuators and the pump (outlined in blue) provides pressure and flow to the
distribution system. These transfer functions are given in table 30.
Modeling of this hydraulic distribution system assumes delivery of hydraulic fluid
at 3000 psi with allowable pressure losses (20-25%). Under this assumption this
distribution unit becomes a functional pass through. The amount of flow provided







































Figure 65: Rudimentary Hydraulic System [211]
Table 30: Hydraulic Capability Transfer Functions
Unit Transfer Function
Hydraulic Dist:














to the functional model could be included which calculates the expected pressure
loss and the functional effects of loss of cooling capability. However, for illustrative
purposes, the functional representation of the system here is adequate. The hydraulic
system capability is limited by the system attributes (HydCapdes), the input flow
(HydCapin), and limitation due to lack of cooling (k · CoolingCapin).
Constant pressure, variable flow pumps convert shaft power to fluid flow at a
constant pressure. Following Bernoulli’s equations, pump power is given by equation
44. The fluid volumetric flowrate is given by Q, the difference between the high and




Assuming a fixed operating pressure and return pressure the flow, Q, is calculated
with the relationship given in table 30. For this study a fixed pump efficiency (ηp)
was assumed. This is sufficient in addressing the hypotheses. However, higher fidelity
is available by defining this efficiency in terms of a pump curve efficiency map.
6.6.3 Pneumatic
The conventional aircraft utilizes customer bleed air to fulfill multiple functionalities
on an aircraft. Pneumatic air must be characterized by flow, pressure, and tempera-
ture. This high temperature and pressure air is used to provide ice protection to the
nacelle and wing surface. First order approximations of unit performance were used
for this study. The unit capability transfer functions employed for this analysis are
outlined in table 31.
Bleed air is further conditioned to maintain cabin pressurization, regulate cabin
temperature, and provide necessary airflow. The temperature of this bleed air is
maintained around 175◦C through heat exchange with air bled from the engine fan
[48]. The “more-electric” vehicle systems remove customer bleed requirements by
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compressing ram air for cabin environmental control and replacing pneumatic ice
protection with electrical heating.
Table 31: Pneumatic Capability Transfer Functions
Unit Transfer Function
Pneum Air Dist:
PnCapout = PnDuctCaps(PnCapin, PnCapdes, L)














PnCapout (3) = Tout ≈ Tin
Heat Exchanger:
PnCapout = HXCaps(HotPnCapin, ColdPnCapin, HotPnCapdes)




PnCapout (2) = Pout = Pin −∆PHX






PnCapout (1) = RamComCaps(RamAirCapin, ElecCapin, PnCapdes)
= min
 PnCapdes,RamAirCapin,
MaxF low (ElecCapin, RamTemp,RamPress)

6.6.3.1 Distribution Element: Pneumatic Tubing/Ducting
Assuming no pneumatic leakages and adiabatic flow, pneumatic distribution systems
are assumed to provide flow up to the design limit at the input temperature but
subject to head loss. Loss of head (hl) is given by equation 45. In this equation,
fr is the friction coefficient, Le is the straight pipe length equivalent for the system





































Figure 66: Cross Flow Heat Exchanger Diagram
The friction coefficient is given by the Colebrook equations [46]. In the equationRe
is the Reynolds number (Re = ṁ/πµD), and e/D is the relative roughness (assumed













6.6.3.2 Transformation Elements: Heat Exchanger
The second unit capability transfer function defined for this study is a precooling heat
exchanger. See the diagram in figure 66. The maximum pneumatic air capability is a
function of available high temperature air, the design capability of the heat exchanger,
and limits in the amount of low temperature air available to sufficiently reduce the
temperature of the high temperature air. This hot flow limit depends on the total
amount of heat that can be extracted by the cooling flow. This heat transfer rate
(q) is determined by equation 47. Ideal counter flow heat exchange indicates that the
output of the high temperature side approaches the input temperature of the cold
side. The effectiveness of the exchange (ε) expresses the relationship between the




























Figure 67: Heat Exchanger Flow Requirements
ε = q
qmax
= ˙mhotcp (Thot,in − Thot,out)min ( ˙mhot, ˙mcold) cp (Thot,in − Tcool,in)
(47)
The effectiveness-NTU method for a cross flow single pass heat exchanger analysis
calculates effectiveness in terms of the number of transfer units (NTU). This is given
in equation 48.
Assuming minimal variation in the specific heats of the hot and cold sides, NTU
is calculated by NTU = UA/ (min ( ˙mhot, ˙mcold) cp) and the heat capacity ration is
given by CR = min ( ˙mhot, ˙mcold) /max ( ˙mhot, ˙mcold).













With known input temperatures and available mass flows and by fixing the max-
imum allowable output temperature (≈ 200◦C) [48] equations 47 and 48 are used
to numerically determine the maximum available hot massflow. The ratio of cooling
flow to hot flow required is displayed in figure 67 as a function of input temperatures
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Figure 68: Bootstrap ACM System Diagram
6.6.3.3 Transformation Elements: Ram Compressor
The third type of element modeled for the pneumatic system is the electrically driven
ram compressor. One benefit to replacing bleed ECS with ram compressor is the
gained ability to regulate the pressure of the air independent of the engine thrust
settings. This reduces the amount of wasted energy used for precooling and the
operating temperatures of the pneumatic distribution system. The capability of the
ram compression is characterized as the amount of mass flow that can be provided
to the air cycle Machine (ACM) which can be regulated in support of environmental
control. Therefore, in order to determine the capability limits of the ram compressor,
the inlet airflow pressure and temperature requirements of the ACM must first be
understood.
It was assumed that air conditioning is achieved by the bootstrap air cycle as
illustrated in figures 68 and 69. The bootstrap air cycle Machine conditions com-










Figure 69: Bootstrap ACM T-S Diagram
exchangers are used to regulate temperature separated by a bootstrapped compres-
sor/turbine to regulate pressure. Additional heat is available from air which bypasses
the ACM and is throttled to cabin inlet pressure. It is assumed that the ACM Ma-
chine provides air to the aircraft ventilation system at a max pressure-altitude of 8000
ft and is mixed with an equal mass flow of recirculated air. Maintaining the required
cabin temperature (22◦C) requires air delivered to the cabin diffusers at ≈ 15◦C [48].
Assuming a fixed air cycle Machine design, the minimum required input tempera-
ture and pressure (Pin, Tin) from the ram air compressor was determined by fixing the
output flow conditions required and identifying the bounds on these variables for dif-
ferent cooling flow attributes. This was performed with the system of equations listed
in table 32. The ability of this bootstrap ACM to meet the output flow conditions
was assessed for each input case.
This analysis limits the allowable output flow conditions for the ram compressor,
thereby specifying required pressure ratio and compressor efficiency. The capability
transfer function for the ram compressor enforces the limits imposed by the ACM.
Compressor capability is determined in terms of the available ram air inflow and
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Table 32: Bootstrap ACM System of Equations
Eq Function
1: P1 = Pin
T1 = Tin
2: P2 = P1 (1− hlHW1)
T2 = T1 − ε1
min ((1− k) ṁa, ṁc)
(1− k) ṁa
(T1 − Tc2)











( γ−1γ ) − 1
)]
4: P4 = P3 (1− hlHX2)
T4 = T3 − ε2












out: Tout = (1− k)T5 + kTin
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Figure 71: Ram Compressor Operating Envelope
power. The operating limits of this centrifugal compressor is provided by the com-
pressor map shown. A typical centrifugal compressor map is given in figure 70. This
compressor map also shows iso-power lines. Assuming the ability to control compres-
sor rpm, increasing the power available allows higher pressure ratios for a given mass
flows.
The massflow capability of the ram compressor is effected by power available, ram
air available, and ACM flow requirements. This constrained operating envelope is
shown in figure 71. The green flow constraint changes with increases and decreases in
ram mass flow capabilities. The blue power constraint varies with losses in electrical
power capabilities. Pressure ratio limits (orange constraint) stems from the operating
envelope of the ACM.
The compressor transfer function is illustrated in figure 72 with ram compression
at 0.7 Mach number. The definition of this transfer function takes all limitations into













Figure 72: Centrifugal Ram Compressor Transfer Function
6.6.4 Powerplants
Unlike the other transfer functions introduced previously, the powerplant units (en-
gine and auxiliary power unit (APU)) are used to provide multiple capabilities. Both
the engine and APU are tasked to transform fuel and ram air capabilities to the
provision of both shaft power and bleed air. Additionally, the engine is responsible
for the system level function to propel. With multiple output capabilities, optimal
allocation of capability requires input regarding which output capability is preferred.
These preferences are set by a matrix of values accessible by external optimization
routines ([α]) The sizes of these matrices are given by number of output capabilities
provided by the unit. Table 33 gives the form of these transfer functions.
6.6.4.1 Transformation Element: Turbofan Engine
The engines employed for this business jet architecture study are two shaft, high by-
pass ratio, turbofan engines. Shaft power extraction is available from either the HP or
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LP shaft and bleed is provided in three types (high pressure bleed, low pressure bleed,
and fan bleed). In all, the capability allocation matrix for the engine unit is 6 vari-
ables in length. Additionally, engine output capabilities depend on mission variables
(altitude, Mach number) which determine the ram air input total pressure, output
static pressure, and input total temperature. The total temperature and pressure are
determined by isentropic ram compression at standard atmospheric conditions.
The engine capability transfer function developed for this study is a neural-
network surrogate generated from a detail level model of a two shaft high bypass
turbofan model with a sea level static thrust class of approximately 7000 lbf. The
data used for this regression was acquired by sampling the operating space of the en-
gine model with 40,000 space filling DOE sample operating points. Half of these cases
were executed by solving to fuel flow provided and half were executed by solving for
thrust provided. Customer loads (shaft hp and air flows) and flight conditions were
set as inputs. The model was then tasked to solve for available thrust, shaft speeds,
surge margins, and bleed flow conditions. Figure 73 shows the relationship between
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Figure 73: Thrust Specific Fuel Consumption Variation with Flight Conditions
thrust capability and available fuel flow for this engine model at the indicated flight
and load conditions.
Not all combinations of these input variables yield feasible model outputs. The
levels to which auxiliary output capabilities are available are limited for different
regions of the operating envelope (altitude, Mach number). Additionally, provision
of one capability impacts the ability of the unit to provide additional capabilities.
By sampling this space, capability limits were defined for each customer load in
terms of flight condition. The allocation variables ([α]) were then used to specify the
magnitude of the capability provided as a proportion of capability available.
These limits are displayed in figures 74 and 75. Figure 75 displays the maximum
allowable low pressure customer bleed and figure 74 displays the maximum limits
for all other customer loads. All loads are subject to limitations with reductions in
fuel flow available. Additionally, LP bleed is also limited with increases in altitude.















































Figure 74: Limits to Engine Auxiliary Load Available with Variation in Available












































Figure 75: Limits to Engine LP Bleed Available with Variation in Available Fuel








Figure 76: Ideal and Actual Brayton Cycle T-S Diagram Used for APU Modeling
feasibility limits, the allocation matrix ([α]), and the capability transfer function for
the thrust capability is given by the the thrust capability surrogate.
6.6.4.2 Transformation Element: Auxiliary Power Unit
The second transfer function in table 33 calculates the capabilities provided by the
auxiliary power unit. As indicated in the table, the APU provides shaft power and
pneumatic air while relying on input bleed air and fuel. This relationship is calculated
as an ideal Brayton cycle with a fixed pressure ratio available as displayed in figure
76.
High pressure bleed air is extracted following the compression portion of the cycle
(point 2). The air that remains is heated through combustion (2-3). This high
pressure air is then expanded through a turbine which provides both power for the
compressor and for shaft power customer loads (3-4). The maximum amount of bleed
air is fixed by the minimum amount of air which must remain in the cycle in order to
sufficiently compress the air for customer bleed. The maximum amount of shaft power
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available occurs when no air is extracted for bleed. Preference of one capability type
to the other governs how much air is bled from the APU. The system of equations
which determines the magnitude of these capabilities is displayed in table 34.
Table 34: Brayton Cycle APU System of Equations
Eq Function
1: P1 = PRam
T1 = TRam















˙mair (1− kbleed) cp
+ T2
]








In these equations, the variable kbleed determines the proportion of the airflow
which is bled from the compressor. This value is limited by the amount of heated
air necessary to drive the compressor with no horsepower extraction. The maximum
value of kbleed is graphed in figure 77 with inlet flow characteristics fixed by ram
compression. This graph was generated with an inlet massflow of 0.2 kg/s, an altitude
of 25kft, Mach number of 0.5, and a T3 operating at Tmax. The maximum kbleed is
also sensitive to variation in available massflow, and available fuel
Optimal allocation of capability requires a decision to be made as to which output,
bleed air or shaft power, will be provided for each failure conditions. The α variable
input sets the preference between these two capabilities. An α value of 1 corresponds
to the maximum allowable kbleed value. This yields maximum bleed air capability
with no shaft power. An α value of 0 corresponds to a kbleed value of 0. This yields a
maximum shaft power capability with no bleed air. Figures 78 a and 78 b illustrate











Figure 77: Maximum Bleed Air Mass Flow Proportion (kbleed) with Input Airflow
















































Figure 78: Transfer Functions for Auxiliary Power Unit Output Capabilities
in fuel flow available and α. These graphs are also generated with an inlet massflow
of 0.2 kg/s, an Altitude of 25000 ft, and a Mach number of 0.5.
6.6.5 System Reliabilities
In order to perform trades between the unit capability and reliability in meeting
operational performance constraints, the reliability of each of the units described
above must be defined. In defining the reliability of each of these units it was assumed
that the reliability is uniform over the range of functional requirements as illustrated
in figure 79.
The structure of this relationship between failure rate and magnitude of functional
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Figure 79: Assumed Relationship Between Reliability and Functional Requirement
Magnitude
requirements makes three fundamental assumptions. The first assumption is that the
all units are perfectly reliable at providing no functional requirements (the failure
rate at x = 0 is zero). The second assumption is that the unit is entirely incapable of
providing for functional requirements in excess of the limit load (B). Therefore, for
functional requirements higher than this load, Req > B, the failure rate is infinite.
The third assumption is that at any instant in time, the failure rate is uniform
over the whole range of functional requirements. Revisiting equation 3 from chapter
four, unit failure rates vary in time depending on unit mission loading.





λ (Req (τ) , τ) dτ
]
Reliability is a function of load history. As stated by Smith, reliability is the
“probability of non-failure in a given period [270].” Reliability at one instant in time
is therefore sensitive to loading during all previous timesteps. This failure rate is
therefore architecture and mission specific. Loading at a given time only affects λ (t)
and future reliability. This assumption is illustrated in figure 80.









Figure 80: Reliability Degradation for a Unit with Uniform Reliability
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and wear out failures impact variations in failure rate in time. Additionally, the duty
cycle and load profile for each unit effects its failure rate. In figure 80 the red line on
the x, y plane represents the cyclical loading of a unit throughout its life. The load
requirement profile (Req (τ)) causes the unit reliability to degrade over time. This
does not negate the assumption that at a given instant in time, reliability is uniform
for any functional requirement (figure 79).
For this study, it is assumed that unit reliabilities are given by Weibull distribu-
tions. The minimum reliability is of interest for this analysis. Therefore, assuming
that repair reinitializes the reliability calculations, the unit reliability used for criti-
cality analysis is given by equation 49. In this equation λ is the failure rate and tmax






A table of the assumed Weibull parameters for all units in this model is given in
table 35. The parameters used here were made following literature review and are
meant for illustrative purposes. The values of these parameters were defined within
reasonable ranges considering literature sources [21, 148, 308, 70]. Actual failure
calculations must be derived from vendor specific sources. The values as indicated
are sufficient in highlighting potential trades between redundancy, capability margin,
and maintenance schedule.
6.6.5.1 Load-Independent Uniform Reliability
The load-independent uniform reliability assumption yields inaccuracies with in-
creased unit complexity. Each unit can be considered as a self-contained system
with internal redundancies. As such, these units exhibit reliability profiles which
decrease with unit capability. Representing unit reliability in this fashion reduces
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Table 35: Hazards for Conventional and ‘All-Electric’ Architecture Concepts
Unit η β tmax = MTTR(hrs) F (t)max = 1− e
−( tmaxη )
β
AC Bus Failure 1400000 2.25 5000 3.12E-06
AC Gen Failure 200000 2.1 700 6.96E-06
AGB Fail 662500 3.25 5000 1.27E-07
APU Fail 80000 4.5 5000 3.81-06
DC Bus Failure 1400000 2.25 5000 3.12E-06
DC Gen Failure 160000 2.1 700 1.11E-05
Engine Fail 80000 4.5 5000 3.81E-06
Fan Duct Failure 80000 2.7 1500 2.17E-05
Fuel Pump Fail 125000 2.1 700 1.87E-05
Fuel Sys Fail 80000 2.7 1500 2.17E-05
HP Bleed Failure 80000 2.7 1500 2.17E-05
Heat Ex. Failure 80000 2.7 1500 2.17E-05
Hyd. Pump Failure 125000 2.1 700 1.87E-05
Hyd Sys Failure 250000 2.05 700 5.84E-06
LP Bleed Failure 80000 2.7 1500 2.17E-05
PCU Fail 200000 2.05 1500 4.40E-05
Pn Sys Failure 80000 2.7 700 2.78E-06
Ram Comp Fail 120000 2.45 1500 2.17E-05
Ram Duct Fail 80000 2.7 1500 2.17E-05
the number of optimization points needed to characterize the probability of fulfilling
partial system capabilities.
It is also assumed that the reliability of two units are each given by a tiered
load/reliability relationship as illustrated in figure 40 from chapter five. The reduction
in the number of design points required to characterize proportional losses for two
unit failure combinations is illustrated in figure 81. Each independent reliability
relationship corresponds to the intersection of xz and yz planes at x=14kW and
y=14kW respectively. The combined capability of these complex units is characterized
by a multidimensional tiered reliability relationship.
With these triple-redundant complex units, a total of 64 points would be necessary
to characterize the relationship between combined capability and failure probability.
These points are indicated with yellow circles in figure 81. Assuming a uniform relia-













































































































Figure 81: Reliability of Combined Unit Capabilities with Complex Unit Reliability
Structure
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four combinations are indicated with red x’s in figure 81. While this introduces inac-
curacies in the continuous reliability assessment of the architecture, it also simplifies
the reliability evaluation.
Questions also arise regarding the identification of the reliability which character-
izes a combined capability of a given magnitude. The four representative points for
the uniform approximation assume independent unit failures. However, the multiple
points which characterize partial unit failure must consider interdepedent internal
unit failures which are masked at the system level. Consider the combined level of
capability indicated by the contours on the on the xy plane in figure 81. The com-
bined capability of 14kW is projected on the reliability relationship with a red dashed
line. This isocapability line cuts across multiple combined failure states. The final
probability measure of a given capability must capture the total probability of failure
considering all interdependent states that generate that failure.
Applying complex unit reliability/capability relationships requires the ability to
identify or approximate multidimensional step functions for the combined failures of
multiple complex units. These challenges are allayed by assuming uniform reliability
relationships. Augmenting this assumption introduces ancillary research opportuni-
ties.
6.6.5.2 Eliminating Inconsequential Failure Combinations
The last assumption made to reduce the number of optimization cases is the elimi-
nation of all statistically insignificant failure combinations. Failure conditions which
exhibit the highest probability of occurrence are single point failures. Increasing the
number of concurrent independent failures decreases the probability of occurrence.
The limiting recognized probability of failure was determined by organizing the unit
failures by magnitude of failure probability. These failure cases are organized from
least probable to most probable. Assume that all failure states contribute to a system
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failure and that all failure combinations are independent. (Note: This assumption is
not used for actual probability calculation but only for limiting the number of op-
timization cases). With the least likely recognized failure case given as Pn and the





Minimum recognized independent failure probability is illustrated in figure 82.
The x axis in this figure represents the probability of failure for any failure case.
The y axis represents the union of all failure probabilities less than x, given by equa-
tion 50. The dark and light blue dots are calculations performed for the conventional
architecture. The dark blue dots begin calculations with Pn << 1 × 10−15 and the
light blue dots begin with Pn ≥ 1×10−14 indicated by the blue vertical line. The green
dots are calculated from all failure cases from the ‘more-electric’ architecture. The
light green dots begin union calculations at the green vertical line, Pn ≥ 1× 10−13.
The minimum recognized probability of failure (Pn) is selected to limit the failure
cases to those with probabilities greater than 1 × 10−11 (indicated by the horizontal
line in figure 82. As illustrated in figure 50, a Pn of 1 × 10−14 for the conventional
architecture is necessary to capture are failure probabilities greater than 1 × 10−11.
Over 775 cases must be calculated to maintain this level of fidelity. Following similar
analysis over 475 failure cases must be considered for the ‘more-electric’ architecture
with a limiting Pn of 1 × 10−13. These results are obtained using the maximum
probabilities of failure, (F (t)max), from table 35.
This analysis assumed that the union of failure case is given by the following
equation under the assumption that each failure case is independent.





































































































































































Union of All Pi<x
Figure 82: Pn limits for Conventional and ‘All-Electric’ Failure Cases
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However, the actual calculation of unions of potentially non-independent failure
intersections was accomplished by two corrections.
The first consideration must recognize that the union of the probability of event
X with event X ∩ Y is equal to the probability of event X [X ∪ (X ∩ Y ) = X]. If
the union of the probability of event X is already used in reliability calculations then
event X ∩ Y may be excluded in the union calculations. All of these exclusions can
are identified and considered in reliability calculations.
Unions of intersections must also be monitored for potential interdependencies.
Consider the case where failure state X represents the intersection of two unit fail-
ures, A and B (X = A ∩ B). Additionally, Y represents the the intersection of
unit failures A and C (Y = A ∩ C). In this scenario, P (X ∩ Y ) is not equivalent
to P (X) ·P (Y ) [P (A)P (B)P (C) 6= 1− (1− P (A) · P (C)) (1− P (B) · P (C))]. These
interdependencies are maintained in the reliability calculation algorithm by requiring
all exponents to be equal to unit. The reliability equation is posed in its entirety and
all repetitive multiplications are removed.
The algorithm and computer code used for determining the actual system level
failure probability calculations is given in appendix D. This code addresses the con-
siderations discussed regarding the non-independence of failure cases.
6.7 Optimization Formulation
As is evident in this analysis, the same percent loss of thrust yields different conse-
quences depending on when it occurs in the mission. Loss of thrust at takeoff is more
critical than loss of thrust during cruise. Additionally, environmental and operating
conditions influence the criticality relationships.
Sizing critical requirements must be derived during the most stringent operating
conditions. Since both thrust loss and ECS loss hazards vary with altitude, load
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shedding optimization must be performed for multiple operating conditions. To il-
lustrate the effect of varying function hazard relationships two operating states are
considered: takeoff at 6000 ft, and cruise at 35kft β = 1/3.
The function hazard relationships illustrated in table 26 and discussed in this
section act as the objective functions for load shedding optimization. The operational
hazard function from equations 15 (Operational Hazard = H ({X}∞)), is found in
terms of all function/hazard relationships for a given unit level failure (equation 51).
Load shedding optimization tries to minimize the maximum incurred operational
hazard by advantageously allocated capabilities.



































For complex architectures, capability allocations change which hazard or hazards
become dominant in this Min/Max optimization. The objective function is character-
ized by flat regions or shelves in which only give way following coordinated variations
in the design variables. When implementing gradient based optimization these shelves
present false optimum values (∇H ({ᾱ}) = 0). Furthermore, the optimal allocation
of failure requires the coordinated variation of allocation variables. With a large
number of design variables, stochastic optimization routines do not guarantee the
identification of the optimum.
Due to the assumption discussed previously, that the probability of failure for a
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unit is constant with magnitude of failure, only the optimal allocation of failure for
the total loss of unit capability must be obtained. However, with this complex shelved
objective function it is necessary for the initial conditions to remain sufficiently close to
the optimal allocation. When the initial values of the design variables are sufficiently
close to the optimum, gradient based optimization is able to obtain the minimum
available hazard.
The optimal setting for the design variables was achieved by discretizing the mag-
nitude of the failure (0% to 100%) and optimizing allocation in sequence. The setting
of the design variables for optimal allocation ({ᾱ}) for the failure magnitude are then
used as the initial conditions for optimization at the next failure magnitude. Allow-
ing only small variations in the objective function in this manners, ensures that the
initial conditions are sufficiently close to the new optimum, thus avoiding shelves and
enabling the use of gradient based optimization in search for the minimum hazard.


















Figure 83: Ensuring Validity of Gradient Based Optimization Small Augmentations
of the Objective Function
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The colored lines in this image represent proportional unit failures. As the fail-
ure state changes, the relationship between the allocation variables and the hazard
incurred changes. This is illustrated with the shifting of the objective function was
the magnitude of the function loss changes. The black dots represent the minimum
hazard incurred for each failure state. Fine discretization of the failure percentage en-
sures that the initial conditions (e.g. ᾱ20 = ᾱ1final) for each subsequent optimization
is poised to ensure the validity gradient based optimization. These initial conditions
are illustrated by the white dots. The failure/hazard relationship can then be fit to
approximate the hazard for interstitial failure values.
The results of this optimization procedures are traces relating magnitude of failure
both to magnitude of hazard and to the optimal setting of the design variables. These
trace aids in the evaluation of the load shedding optimization. A stepsize of 5%
was initially used for identifying the magnitude of the hazard. The initial failure
percentage of 0% should naturally yield no hazards. Optimal allocation for failure
of increasing magnitude were then determine (5%, 10%, ...). Values of the allocation
variables for these evaluations are stored.
The primary indication as to whether the optimization was appropriately per-
formed is the slope of the loss verses hazard relationship. Hazard monotonically
increases with magnitude of failure. Following the identification of optimal load al-
location for a 100% failure, the failure space is further discretized with a stepsize of
1%. Allocations variables are fit with a hermetic cubic approximation in terms of
the magnitude of failure. Begining and 100% failure and proceding downward (99%,
98%, 99% ...) the hazard for each magnitude of failure is evaluated by applying that
allocation ({ᾱ}) indicated by the hermetic cubic approximation. If the value of this
hazard does not decrease with decreasing failure magnitude the optimization is per-
formed again. This process is illustrated in figures 84a and b for the ‘more-electric’
aircraft architecture concept.
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Hazards at 5% Step
























α[19] 1% Spline Est.
α[20] 5% Step
α[20] 1% Spline Est.
α[27] 5% Step
α[27] 1% Spline Est.
α[28] 5% Step
α[28] 1% Spline Est.
α[33] 5% Step
α[33] 1% Spline Est.
α[34] 5% Step
α[34] 1% Spline Est.
 
(b) Significant Allocation Variables with Combined APU and PCU Failure
Figure 84: Means for Determining Optimum Failure Allocation for Unit Failures
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The hazards indicated by the red circles in figure 84a are generated by the initial
5% failure samplings. These samplings generate the alpha cubic spline approxima-
tion in figure 84b. There are a total of 52 allocation variables for this architecture.
Figure 84b illustrates the 6 most significant of these variables for this unit failure.
The allocation variable fits shown in figure 84b are used to generate the loss/hazard
relationship indicated in blue in figure 84a.
Appendices G and H include the computational process for achieving this opti-
mization.
6.8 Hypothesis Testing Overview
Two hypothesis were introduced in the previous chapter regarding the need for higher
fidelity in the application of requirements during exploratory design of conceptual ar-
chitectures. Both hypothesis focus on the need to characterize the off-nominal aspects
of architecture operations and the need to systematically characterize reliability re-
quirements in context.
Conceptual safety and reliability tools place constraints on the physical system
in terms of functional hazards. In order to apply load shedding optimization in a
continuous fashion both the physical and operational domains must be characterized.
In the physical domain, alternative concept architecture were defined for the ve-
hicle systems of a medium range business jet. Two concept architecture models were
defined: a conventional architecture and a ‘more-electric’ architecture. The functional
relationships between the systems was defined and transfer functions were outlined
which characterize the capability of units within these architectures.
In the operational domain, function/hazard relationships were defined for each of
the architecture functions at multiple operating conditions. These functions act as
constraints on the functional performance of the architecture and as the objective
function for load shedding optimization. All but one of these functions were defined
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heuristically following three basic assumptions. The first set of hazard characteriza-
tions assume that maximum hazards begin to occur with any reduction in functional
capability. The second set of function/hazard relationship assume that hazard is di-
rectly proportional to the percent loss of functionality. The third set applied heuristics
regarding the criticality of various levels of load and their associated criticality. The
function to propel was characterized considering the physics of the failure. Loss of
thrust was characterized in terms of its impact of the required takeoff distance and
its impact on available range during cruise.
Load shedding optimization was performed for both concept architectures in terms
of the three function/hazard relationships. Optimal failure allocation was assessed for
failure states which are statistically significant to the fulfillment of system functions.





The results obtained from evaluating the effect of load shedding optimization is pre-
sented at multiple levels of abstraction. Results are presented illustrating the overall
system level reliability, the risk associated with each system function, and the crit-
icality of individual components. System evaluations are achieved by four means:
Continuous Hazard Probability Evaluation, Functional Risk Assessment, Hazard Co-
variance Assessment, and Component Importance Evaluation. All of these metrics are
used to compare the application of requirements towards both architecture concepts
and assess the error associated with hazard characterization assumptions.
For complex systems catastrophic hazards (HS ≥ 0.8) are naturally less likely to
occur than minor hazards. Additionally, more significant hazards must be bounded
by more stringent probability constraints. The probability of failure is therefore
expressed in terms of the magnitude of the incurred system level hazard (Fs (HS)).
This tool was illustrated in chapter five when considering system level implementation
of load shedding optimization. The system level failure probability (Fs) is evaluated
with respect to magnitude of hazard and continuous reliability constraints.
The overall and undesirable risk is determined for each independent functional
failure. Two risk assessment metrics are introduced which characterize the system:
overall system failure risk (RSFO) and undesirable system failure risk (RSFU ). The
probability of incurring certain hazards is determined with respect to each function-
ality lost. For this study, system level hazard (HS) is determined by independently
evaluating the impact of the loss of each system function (HS = max [HF1, HF2, · · · ]).
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The risk associated with the provision of system level functions differs between ar-
chitecture concepts. Assimilar assignments of risk between concepts supports the
claim that architecture specific load shedding strategies should be considered during
requirement definition and early concept development. The relationship between the
probability of functional failure (FFi (HFi)) and the functional hazard constraints are
compared for concept architectures.
The load shedding ability of each concept is also illustrated by considering the co-
variance of the independent functional hazards. A system with perfect load shedding
capability exhibits a covariance of 1 between all functional hazards. The magnitude
of the system level failure is reduced by distributing the failure between the systems
functions according functional hazards. Concepts lacking the ability to do so will
have correspondingly low hazard covariance. The covariance matrix and HFi × HFj
multivariate plots are compared for the architecture concepts.
The last level of comparison looks at the importance of individual components
within the concept architectures. Birnbaum’s and component criticality importance
are evaluated for each unit. These metrics are expressed in terms of magnitude
of hazard incurred (ICk (t) ⇒ ICk (tmax, HS)) to identify which components will most
effect the reduction of risk. Additionally, another criticality metric is introduced which
calculates criticality in terms of unit capability. This metric, ‘component capability
importance’ (ICCk ), provides an additional design perspective towards sizing a complex
architecture.
These metrics are evaluated for both concept architecture in terms of all of the
function/hazard relationships. Comparisons between these architectures in terms of
system level and functional risk and component importance provide verification of
the hypothesis.
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7.1 Hazard Probability and Performance Risk
The initial measure employed to evaluate the architecture concepts is the risk asso-
ciated with the provision of functions. As discussed in chapter five, system failure
risk (RSF ) is calculated as the product of system failure probability (F ) and the
operational consequences of the failure.




















Negligible Minor Major Critical Catastrophic
Figure 85: Hazard Probability Constraint
All consequences of the failure (economic, social, environmental, etc.) are distilled
into a fixed probability constraint. Functional hazard assessment and preliminary sys-
tem safety analysis define the severity of failures in terms of probability limits. More
severe consequences are limited by lower failure probability limits. Traditional haz-
ard constraints are applied in discrete stages. This takes the form of the dashed blue
constraint in this figure 85. The hazard probability constraint used for this study is
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illustrated by the red constraint in the figure. This constraint interpolates logarithmi-
cally between the discrete hazard constraints. The most stringent constraints act on
catastrophic hazards (1×10−9). The hazard level is expressed on a [0,1] scale. Under






The severity of consequences are reflected by the inverse of the failure prob-
ability constraint value (FLim (HS)). Therefore, system failure risk (RSF ) is cal-
culated by the ratio of system failure probability (FS) to failure probability con-
straint (FLim), as given in equation 52. Both the system failure probability and
the probability constraint vary with the magnitude of system level hazard incurred
(HS). The failure limit used for this study and illustrated in figure 85 is given by:





Two metrics are used to evaluate the cumulative risk associated with a given archi-
tecture. The first is the overall system failure risk (RSFO). This metric is determined
by considering the integral of the risk in terms of magnitude of system hazard as is
given by equation 53. Feasible architecture design requires a cumulative overall risk





max [10−9, 1× 10−(10·h+1)]dh (53)
The second metric only considers undesirable risks. When the probability of
failure exceeds the probability constraint design augmentation is required. Therefore,










The total amount of undesirable risk due to system failure metric (RSFU ) is ob-
tained by integrating risk deficiencies in terms of hazard. For regions where failure
probability constraints are not violated the value of the integral yields zero undesir-
able risk. When constraints are violated the system risk integral is relative to the
ratio of the failure probability to the constraint. This is made clear with analysis of
the risk associated with the conventional architecture in table 36.
The architecture performance risk assessment is presented for each function/haz-
ard relationship: takeoff, cruise, and linear and discrete assumptions. The first results
column in this table gives the failure probability obtained with each load shedding
optimization case. The second results column gives the risk associated with this
performance. The third column gives the integral risk metrics.
From this table it becomes clear which mission segment introduces the most risk
for the conventional architecture. The takeoff and cruise segments introduce total
undesirable risks (RSFU ) of 3.54 and 1.22 respectively. While it may be tempting
at this point to eliminate the evaluation of load shedding for the cruise segment,
additional information must be considered. While the risk is lower for this segment,
one must consider which function loss is driving these hazards. This will be addressed
in the next section.
These two metrics represent the effectiveness of an architecture in meeting con-
tinuous reliability constraints. Feasible architecture designs require a cumulative
undesirable risk metric (RSFU ) equal to zero. The preferred value for the cumulative
overall risk metric (RSFO) is 1. The hazard probability relationship for an architec-
ture with this RSFO equal to 1 and a RSFU equal to 0 would lie directly on the hazard
probability constraint. Such an architecture would meet the reliability requirements
and eliminate all overdesign for reliability.
Also notable from the charts in this tables is the fact that the total risk associated






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the highest hazard considerations. Consider the system failure risk for takeoff; more
risk is associated with minor and major hazards than for critical and catastrophic
hazards for the conventional architecture. For this mission segment, non-catastrophic
reliability constraints are more design critical for the current form of the conventional
architecture. The risk measures for the function/hazard approximations both over-
estimate this risk. Allocating and evaluating load shedding using the linear approxi-
mation yields an undesirable risk equals 4.05. The step approximation dramatically
overestimates the risk. This is due to the fact that very small deviations in functional
performance is assumed to yield large hazard consequences. These comparisons il-
lustrate the necessity to accurately express the function/hazard relationships. An
overestimation of total risk leads to the oversizing of the architecture.
Risk analysis was repeated for the ‘more-electric’ architecture. The results are
presented in table 37. Results are again presented for each function/hazard relation-
ship used during load shedding optimization. Failure probability and risk are plotted
in terms of hazard magnitude and the total risk metrics are given.
Similar to the conventional architecture the step approximation greatly overpre-
dicts the total risk associated with this architecture for the same reasons discussed
previously. In contrast, however, the takeoff and cruise segments yield fairly compa-
rable risk values for the ‘more-electric’ architecture concept. It is also notable that
the linear approximation underpredicts the risk associated with this architecture. In-
formation provided by the linear approximation alone would lead to an architecture
design which may not guarantee fulfillment of reliability requirements. This same
approximation applied on the conventional architecture would lead to system overde-
sign. Approximations of the function/hazard relationships have dissimilar impact of
system sizing for dissimilar architectures. The unique sources of this system risk is






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7.1.1 Function Specific Hazard Probability
The conventional and ‘more-electric’ architecture exhibit unique sources for system
risk. The system level performance risk presented in the previous section is gener-
ated differently for assimilar architecture concepts. Overall system level hazard is
calculated as the maximum of the independent hazards associated with each sys-
tem function (HS = max [HF1, HF2, · · · ]). Each function presents its own associated
risk. Differences in the criticality of the system level functions for each architecture
concepts indicate disparate motives which drive design decisions.
In order to understand the drivers for system level reliability, a risk analysis is per-
formed for each independent functional hazard. This analysis takes a similar form to
the analysis performed on the overall hazard in the previous section. The functional
sources of risks associated with the conventional architecture were compared for take-
off and cruise. Additionally, the results of the linear function/hazard relationship for
the ‘more-electric’ architecture are compared with takeoff results.
Independent functional risk for the conventional architecture takeoff are given in
table 38. The green and blue curve represent the hazard probabilities derived from the
takeoff and cruise segment load shedding optimizations respectively. All functions,
save the provision of 120VAC power, exhibit failure probabilities that exceed con-
straints. The loss of thrust, 28VDC power, and pneumatic air flow also contribute to
undesirable risk. However, functional failure which introduces the most performance
risk for the conventional architecture is the provision of hydraulic power.
The significant functional failures vary with mission segment due to variations in
the function/hazard relationships for the vehicle systems architectures. Additionally,
the relative significance of each functional failure varies with the magnitude of the
hazard. Figure 86 gives the risk associated with each individual functional failure
for the conventional architecture at takeoff and at cruise. Overall risk values over 1


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 86: Comparisons of Risks Introduced by Functional Failures for the Conven-
tional Architecture
As illustrated with these graphs, the provision of hydraulic fluid introduces the
largest risk during the takeoff mission segment for minor (0.2 ≤ HS < 0.4) and major
hazards (0.4 ≤ HS < 0.6). The risk associated with failures of larger magnitude
is dominated by pneumatic and hydraulic hazards for both the cruise and takeoff
mission segments. In contrast to takeoff, the risk associated with mid-range hazards
is no longer dominated by the hydraulic system. With reductions in the criticality of
thrust, the capability and reliability of shaft power at the AGB is transfered from the
fuel pump to the hydraulic pump. Reductions in capability of the fuel system, engine,
and AGB results in a lower impact on the provision of hydraulic power. Subsequent
sections will discuss the unit level aspect of this failure state.
Takeoff functional risks for the ‘more-electric’ architecture are given in table 39.
The risk for the takeoff objective function is given in green and the risk for the linear
approximate objective function is given in blue.
The reduction in perceived risk obtained by assuming a linear relationship between
function loss as hazard results from an inaccuracies in defining the hazard associated
with loss of thrust. The linear hazard approximation yields an underprediction of
thrust risk for hazards of catastrophic and critical significance and overpredictions of
thrust risk for hazards of major significance. The hazard probabilities for the other






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of the electrical functions slightly overpredict the risk for hazards of catastrophic























Figure 87: Comparison of Risks Introduced by Functional Failures for the ‘All-
Electric’ Architecture
The linear approximation more accurately predicts the design issues associated
with off-nominal performance better than the step hazard approximations. However,
the application of inaccurate hazard estimates opens designers to potential prob-
lems. Assuming step hazards will lead to systems which are overdesigned but linear
assumptions may lead to systems which are underdesigned. Leveraging the effects
of load shedding on off-nominal requirements requires accurate identification of the
function/hazard relationships.
Evident from continuous hazard probability analysis is the fact that unique ar-
chitectures respond differently to failure. Critical functions, overall performance risk,
and sensitivity to assumptions are emergent attributes of the architecture. With the
two examples considered here, the single heuristic used to size the architectures pre-
sented in table 23 from the previous chapter is insufficient to capture all off-nominal
requirements.
Additional insights into the implications of load shedding optimization can be
obtained by considering all the hazard probabilities for the other functional hazard
relationships. The risk attributes for all of the function/hazard relationships for both
architectures are given in appendices I and J.
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7.2 Hazard Correlation
Analysis performed in the previous section indicate that the ‘more-electric’ architec-
ture, as sized according to the similar heuristic, does exhibit less performance risk
for this embodiment of the ‘more-electric’ vehicle systems architecture than the con-
ventional architecture. This result must not be overstated. It is only valid for the
current embodiment of each architecture and does not indicate greater performance
attributes. Weight, cost, and other metrics besides risk must also be considered.
However, this advantageous risk performance occurs due to the ability of the ‘more-
electric’ architecture to distribute failures among the system level functions. By so
doing a general reduction in the severity of failure is achieved.
The metric used to characterize an architectures ability to shed loads is the sample
correlation matrix of the functional hazards. Each unit level failure state for which
load shedding optimization was performed represents and independent observation of
system failure. Each case yields a vector, hF ∈ Rp×1, indicating the level of hazard
realized by each system function (p is the number of system level functions). The
statistical relationship between system level functional hazards can be given by the
correlation matrix. For a given number of independent samples (n), the Pearson
product-moment correlation matrix for system hazards is given by equation 55. In
this equation hi,j is the j-th sample result for the i-th function hazard. The i-th






















)2 ,∀(i, j) = [1, p] (55)
The correlation matrix of the system level hazards expresses the ability of an
architecture to distribute failure between the system functions. The min /max opti-






Figure 88: Correlation Between the Magnitude of System Level Functional Hazards
This is illustrated in figure 88. Each axis represents the magnitude of independent
system level function hazards. Assume that flight control is provided exclusively by
electrical actuation and utility actuation is provided exclusively by hydraulic actua-
tion. The failure of either function yields catastrophic failures. For such an architec-
ture, point A represents the consequences of electrical distribution failure. Point B
represents hydraulic system failure. An architecture which applies segregated redun-
dant actuation (hydraulic and electric) for these functions yields hazards of point C
for either distribution system failure.
A perfectly shedding architecture would have a correlation matrix of ones. While
this is infeasible for real architecture concepts, large positive correlation values indi-
cate a greater ability to distribute load failures. The Euclidean Norm (‖ρ‖2) of the
correlation matrix can be used as a single metric characterization of the shedding
flexibility of the architecture. The norm is limited on 1 ≤ ‖ρ‖2 ≤ N , where N is
the number of functions provided by the system. Larger values of the norm of the
correlation matrix indicate higher flexibility to shed loads.
A multivariate plot for functional hazards for the conventional and ‘more-electric’
architectures optimized for the takeoff segment requirements is given in figure 89.
1120 failure combinations were evaluated for the conventional architecture and 665
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Figure 89: Comparison of Functional Hazards with Load Shedding Optimization
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for the ‘more-electric. The disparity in the number of statistically significant fail-
ure cases is due to a reduced number of units for the ‘more-electric’ concept and
the reliabilities of all of these units. The black markers in these two figures indicate
100% unit loss for each failure case. The gray markers corresponds to proportional
failures for each failure case (0%, 1%, 2%, · · · , 100%). The axis of these plots repre-
sent the hazard associated with the loss of each function individual. Load shedding
optimization balances the failure effect among 5 architecture functions for the con-
ventional concept (provide pneumatic, 120VAC, 28VDC, hydraulic fluid, and thrust).
The ‘more-electric’ concept requires optimization of the effects among 4 functions
(provide pneumatic, 270VDC, 28VDC, and thrust).
Visual inspection of the hazard multivariates illustrates the effectiveness of load
shedding optimization. As is expected, neither architecture balance the functional
effects of failures perfectly. However, the multivariate of the ‘more-electric’ architec-
ture displays clustering along the diagonal. Correlation information of the functional
hazards are given in table 40. The hazard correlation matrices are given as well at the
relative magnitude of the matrix norm. The indices of the correlation matrices corre-
spond to loss of architecture functions. For the conventional architecture the indices,
[1, 5], are in the order [Pneumatic Air Loss, 120VAC Loss, 28VDC Loss, Hyraulic
Flow Loss, and Thrust Loss]. For the ‘more-electric’ architecture the indices, [1, 4],
are in the order [Pneumatic Air Loss, 270VDC Loss, 28VDC Loss, and Thrust Loss].
The number of functions (N) for the conventional and ‘more-electric’ architectures
are 4 and 3 respectively.
Higher correlations between functional hazards are seen for the ‘more-electric’ ar-
chitecture. This indicates greater flexibility in the provision of load shedding. Hence,
with larger magnitude correlation values, the ‘more-electric’ architecture concepts is
more apt at load shedding.
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1 0.337 0.422 0.541 0.606
0.337 1 0.243 0.291 0.393
0.422 0.243 1 0.334 0.462
0.541 0.291 0.334 1 0.523




1 0.677 0.398 0.498
0.677 1 0.641 0.748
0.398 0.641 1 0.538
0.498 0.748 0.538 1
 0.883





























Figure 90: Correlation Between System Functions for Both the Conventional and
‘All-Electric’ Architectures
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Extending these evaluations to the platform level functions supported by the ar-
chitecture, failure correlations of all system functions are depicted in figure 90. In this
chart, the vertical axis lists all combinations of system level functions. The bar charts
indicate the magnitude of the correlation between system level functional failures.
System functions provided by the same architecture function exhibit correlation val-
ues of 1. For example, the all electric architecture provides wing ice protection (Wing
IP) and control actuation (Control) with the same power type (270VDC power). As-
suming the ability to optimally allocate power external to the architecture, a loss in
270VDC power can be distributed to either function.
As is clear in this chart, the ‘more-electric’ architecture exhibits a greater ability
than the conventional architecture to proportionally allocate failures between almost
all platform level functions. The conventional architecture only exhibits higher cor-
relation in the failure of environmental control and thrust, and between environment
control and ice protection. This is logical due to the fact that engine bleed air is used
as the air source for environment control and wing ice protection in conventional
architectures.
Similar trends are evident for the other functional/hazard relationship objective
functions. This data is given in appendices K and L. For both mission segments and
the linear objective function approximation, the ‘more-electric’ architecture exhibits
higher hazard correlation.
This measure does not in itself justify the selection of one architecture over an-
other. Sizing and mission analysis must be performed to determine efficient fulfillment
of performance requirements. This analysis, however, does give insight into the ef-
fect that architecture structure and composition has on the efficient fulfillment of
reliability requirements.
262
7.3 Unit Level Importance
Component importance values identify the driving unit level design considerations
which are used to augment system requirements. These metrics act in architecture
optimization to determine what further variations must be made to remedy design
infeasibility or reduce overdesign. Comparison of these metrics for the two concept
architectures highlight the need to understand off-nominal operations and apply ac-
curate objective functions to optimal load shedding.
It has been illustrated in the preceding sections that architecture design must
consider an individual architectures ability to optimally allocate failure. The design
importance of a function depends on the architecture. In this section, the relative
emphasis placed on architecture units is explored.
Evaluating off-nominal requirements in terms of the magnitude of capability lost
requires the augmentation of traditional component importance metrics. Unit failures
must be evaluated on the spectrum of magnitude of loss. Comparing unit importance
and hazard probability in terms of magnitude of loss help identify which components
are most critical to the architecture performance and where focus should be placed
in architecture refinement and redesign.
7.3.1 Reliability Based Unit Importance
Traditional component importance measures attempt to determine which unit relia-
bility most greatly effect performance risk. This is done by identifying the sensitivity
of the system level reliability to the reliability of individual units. The units whose
reliabilities effect the system level reliability the greatest are deemed more important.
The first class of metrics describing component importance express this value in
terms of a differential change in reliability. Birnbaum’s importance measure describes
the relative growth of system reliability(RS) in terms of increases in the probability
of some unit k failure (Rk). In so doing this metric assigns component importance in
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terms of a partial derivative of system failure probability in terms of unit reliability
(equation 56). As seen in this equation, the reliability derivative can also be expressed







Birmbaum’s Importance metrics does not consider the magnitude of the reliability
change with respect to the systems baseline reliability. This is remedied by ‘Compo-
nent Criticality Importance’. This metric corrects scales Birnbaum’s importance by










Both the Birnbaum’s importance and ‘component criticality importance’ metrics
are easily calculated by simple augmentation of the failure probability equation. All
calculations made for this study assume that probability of failure is evaluated at
t = tmax for each unit as prescribed in table 35. Hereby, all importance metrics were
calculated independent of time.
Both of these importance metrics assign importance in terms of unit reliability
while assuming fixed unit capability. Performance risk, however, is not solely a func-
tion of failure probability. The magnitude of the hazard incurred with unit loss must
also be considered. Considering failure probabilities in an analog fashion requires
component criticality to be expressed in terms of failure magnitude. Therefore, much
like system risk assessment discussed in the previous section, unit importance values
must also be expressed in a cumulative fashion.
Cumulative importance of each component is obtained by integrating the impor-
tance in terms of the magnitude of the hazard incurred, as given in equation 58.
For importance values which do not vary with the magnitude of hazard, the haz-
ard integral yields the same result as the original importance equation. The empty
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I2k (h) dh (58)
Two different sets of bounds are applied to this integration. Overall component
importance is determined by integrating on the bounds as indicated in equation 58
(H = [0, 1]). The second set of bounds considers only regions of the hazard continuum
where probability constraints are breeched. These regions exhibit undesirable system
risk (RSF > 1).
Figure 91 illustrates the bounds applied for the calculation of cumulative undesir-
able risk. The bottom plot illustrates overall system probability of failure (FS) and
the probability constraint (FLim) in terms of the magnitude of hazard compared for
the takeoff requirements. The top plot gives the both the Birnbaum and “component
criticality” importance of the APU in terms of the hazard magnitude. As indicated
by the gray dashed lines, the bounds of the integral may be limited to regions where
reliability requirements are not met.
An additional limitation to these traditional importance metrics is the inadequate
capture of system risk. The basis for this importance is assigned directly to the
reliability of the system. There is no consideration of the required reliability due to
limitations on adverse effects. The loss of a given unit can be directly associated
with the occurrence of consequences with associated hazard levels. These hazard
levels are limited by different reliability constraints. Units with the same reliability
based importance as calculated by the method above may differ in importance on

































































Figure 91: Bounds on the Integration Towards Cumulative Risk Importance Iden-
tification for the Accessory Gear Box in the Conventional Architecture for Takeoff
Functional Hazards
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Risk importance following Birnbaum’s and “component criticality” importance

















Figure 92 illustrates the effect of scaling the importance values by risk ( FS
FLim
). This
plot applies risk scaling to both the Birnbaum and “component criticality” importance
















Figure 92: Risk Importance of the Accessory Gear Box in the Conventional Archi-
tecture for Takeoff Functional Hazards
Both importance values exhibit a similar trend. Considering equations 60 and 61;
Birnbaum’s risk based importance is requires scaling by system level risk and“component
criticality” risk based importance is equivalent to Birnbaum’s importance scaled by
component failure risk. When system failure probability exceeds the probability of
unit failure, Birnbaum’s importance is larger. Conversely, when unit failure proba-
bility exceeds that of system failure probability, “component criticality importance”
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is larger. The integral of both risk importance metrics will be integrated in terms of
hazard to yield a cumulative unit level risk importance metrics.
All normalized results for Birnbaum and ‘component criticality’ importance are
given in appendix M.
Tables 41 and 42 list the ten units whose risk based cumulative component crit-
icality importance (RI Ck ) drive design considerations for each architecture. These
results are obtained using the reliability values given in table 35, in the previous
chapter.
Table 41: Units of Highest Importance for the Conventional Architecture
Rank Takeoff Cruise Linear Approximation
1 Fuel Systems Fuel Systems Fuel Systems
2 Fuel Pumps Fuel Pumps Fuel Pumps
3 Hydraulic Pumps Hydraulic Pumps Hydraulic Pumps
4 Engines Fan Ducts Engines
5 Fan Ducts Engines Hydraulic Systems
6 Precoolers DC Generators Precoolers
7 Hydraulic Systems Precooler Fan Ducts
8 DC Generators DC Busses DC Generators
9 DC Busses Pneumatic Systems DC Busses
10 AC Bus AC Bus AC Bus
Table 42: Units of Highest Importance for the ‘All-Electric’ Architecture
Rank Takeoff Cruise Linear Approx.
1 Fuel Pumps Fuel Pumps Fuel Pumps
2 PCU’s Low Speed 270V Gen’s Low Speed 270V Gen’s
3 Low Speed 270V Gen’s PCU’s High Speed 270V Gen’s
4 Fuel Systems Fuel Systems Engines
5 Engines High Speed 270V Gen’s Fuel Systems
6 APU Fuel Pump Engines 270V Busses
7 Ram Compressors APU Fuel Pump PCU’s
8 Ram Duct - ECS Ram Compressors AGB’s
9 High Speed 270V Gens Ram Ducts 28V Busses
10 Ram Duct 28V Gen. Ram Compressors
The component importance indicates how the individual components relate to
the functional risk discussed in the previous chapter. Some of the results obtained
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through this analysis can be inferred from unit reliability, functional risk, and design
expertise. However, risk based cumulative component criticality importance gives a
systematic metric which highlights where design changes (in terms of reliability) must
be made to avoid overdesign.
From these results, the provision of fuel to the engines is of the highest relative
importance for both architectures. For the conventional architecture, the fuel systems
and fuel pumps exhibit the highest cumulative risk importance. For the ‘more-electric’
architecture, the fuel pumps hold the highest importance with the fuel systems ranked
forth and fifth. The largest effect on system risk can be achieved by augmenting the
reliability of the fuel pumps on both architectures. This result is not surprising. With
fuel as the sole source of energy in the system, the provision of fuel is correlated to
the provision of all architecture level functions.
The engine sits at fourth and fifth in terms of relative importance for the conven-
tional architecture, and fifth and sixth for the ‘more-electric’. While the engine plays
a central role in both architectures, a larger initial reliability value for this unit (see
table 35) places the engine lower on the list of importance.
Naturally, the provision of electrical power is of much higher importance for the
‘more-electric’ architecture. Electrical devices don’t appear in table 41 until rank 6 for
cruise. The conventional architecture places emphasis on the provision of hydraulic
flow and airflow towards independent support of control and ECS functions. However,
the ‘more-electric’ architecture ranks DC to DC power converter units (PCU) and
270VDC generators as high as 2. This architecture places electrical devices into a
more central role. Electrical power is used for all system level functions in addition
to supporting the ram air compression and fuel distribution.
The results in this study highlight the discrepancies in design focus which occur
when approximating the relationship between functional loss and hazard. The unit
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of highest importance vary with changes in the load shedding optimization objec-
tive function. The linear function/hazard approximation performs admirably for the
conventional architecture. The top ten unit criticality values obtained under this ap-
proximation coincide with those obtained from the takeoff and cruise cases. However,
significant variation to unit importance occurs by using this approximation for the
‘more-electric’ architecture concept.
The first significant difference is the drop in importance of the DC to DC Power
converter under the linear approximation. While ranked second and 3 in importance
for the takeoff and cruise segments respectively, the PCU drops to rank 7. Applica-
tion of this approximation would place less emphasis on the need for reliable power
conversion.
Also notable with the linear function/hazard approximation for the ‘more-electric’
concept is the introduction of different units on the importance listings. Neither the
higher fidelity takeoff or cruise objective functions place large importance on 270VDC
distribution of the engine AGB’s. However, this lower fidelity objective function places
270VDC Busses at rank 6 and engine AGB’s at rank 8. Limited to results from the
linear approximation, undue design emphasis would be placed on units which, in
reality, play a less significant role in providing adequate reliability.
7.3.2 Capability Based Unit Importance
A third importance metric must be introduced when considering variation in risk in
terms of magnitude of the component capability. Importance must be assigned to
components in terms of the magnitude of the capability they provide.
Birnbaum’s and ‘component criticality’ importance address the impact of unit
level reliability on system level risk. As discussed in the previous chapters, risk may
also be mitigated by varying unit capabilities. Therefore, a new metric is introduced,
‘Component Capability Risk Importance,’ which assesses which components have the
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greatest ability to affect changes to the analog hazard probability relationship at the
system level. This importance calculation is given by equation 62. The variable Ck














‘Component capability importance’ is the partial derivative of function or system
hazard probability in terms of the percent change in component capability. Dividing
this hazard value by the maximum allowable probability of failure for the given hazard
value expresses this importance value in terms of a risk partial derivative.
The total cumulative component capability risk importance is obtained by inte-
grating this risk value in terms of probability as illustrated in equation 63. Results
for this study are obtained by setting the bounds of the integration for regions of
undesirable risk as was discussed in the previous section.






















Reliability based importance values are greater than zero. Increases in compo-
nent failure probability increase the probability of failure. However, capability based
importance values are negative. One would expect that increases in component ca-
pability would yield lower overall risk. Portions of the hazard vs. probability curve
would be expected to shift to the left and this translation would, in effect, reduce the
undesirable risk.
Additional risk is introduced to the system with reductions of component capabil-
ity is illustrated in figure 93. This figure considers the importance of the AGB. A 10%
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reduction in AGB capability was imposed while holding the α capability values fixed.
The red line is the imposed probability constraint. The section of the graph shaded
in blue represents the original system risk. The green shaded region represents the









Figure 93: Shift in System Hazard Probability with 10% Reduction in Peak Steady
State AGB Capability for Takeoff Requirements
As is apparent in this figure, reductions in unit level capability shift the hazard
probability curve to the right. Higher severity loss occur with a higher probability.
The unit with reduced capability can not accommodate for the failure at the same
magnitude.
Defining the variation in system reliability in terms of unit capability introduces
challenges not encountered with importance calculations. The importance factors
introduced in the previous section can be obtained from closed form differentiation of
the reliability equations. However, derivatives in terms of unit capability require the
identification of the optimal allocation of unit failure with respect to the augmented
system. Each differential change in the composition of the physical architecture may
introduce variations in the load shedding optimization. Significant computational
resources would be necessary to accurately identify these importance values in a
timely fashion.
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Approximations to these importance derivatives are made here by applying the
existing failure allocation splines (α) and representing the partial derivatives and
applying backward finite difference derivative approximations. However, the the re-
sults of this differentiation depends on the the step size used. The nature of finite
difference derivative approximations desire small differentials. Additionally, the use
of small differentials also ensure that the (α) approximations hold. However, large
enough backward difference value are desired to capture increases in performance risk.
This issue is illustrated in figure 94.
Figures 94 a through d represent the hazard probabilities for the ‘more-electric’
architecture during takeoff. The dark blue line represents the hazard probability for
the baseline architecture. The other lines represent the hazard probabilities which
are calculated using differential for all statistically significant unit failures of the
‘more-electric’ architecture at takeoff. These charts are meant to be illustrative of
the differential increases in risk only. Numeric capability importance values are given
later. Offsets in hazard probabilities are determined for different differentials in AGB
capability. The backwards differentials used are 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.01% changes in
overall unit capabilities.
The shape of the hazard probability curve impacts the calculation of cumulative
undesirable risk importance. This is illustrated in figures 94 a and b. The component
capability importance value calculated with a large differential values are dominated
by variation in hazard severity for failures which were originally of minor importance.
When considering variations in undesirable risk only for the ‘more-electric’ hazard
probability curve at takeoff, small differentials (< 1%) do not consider variations in
the originally minor hazards. These importance values are dominated by variations
hazard magnitude of higher severity.
A compromise is necessary between the accuracy of the prescribed load shedding













































































































































































































(d) −0.1% Capability Differential
Figure 94: Cumulative Component Capability Risk Importance with Varying Back-
ward Finite Difference Derivative Differentials
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only considering variation in undesirable risk. Large differentials capture a larger
ranges of risk variations but are subject to inaccurate failure allocation. Conversely,
for this architecture, a differential value of 0.01 ensures sufficient closeness to the
optimal failure allocation settings (α) but gives all undesirable risk importance values
equal to 0.
Other issues encountered in the identification of component importance is the fact
that statistical significance can not be used for eliminating the number of importance
cases. Combinations of component will naturally yield higher importance values than
single components. The benefits of increasing one components capability may not
yield desired risk results without subsequent changes to components which provide for
that components requirements. Increases in component capability criticality require
targeted variations in component capabilities. For the purposes of this study, the
focus is placed on improvements obtained by increasing the capability importance of
individual units.
What further complicates the identification of component capability importance is
the nature of system level continuous reliability assessment. The capability improve-
ment or degradation of one unit does not in itself realize decreases in risk. Variations
in system reliability result from decreasing the hazard associated with the failure of
other system units. Capability performance, therefore, depends on the magnitude
of capability provided by redundant systems. Each differential system augmentation
requires the re-evaluation of all statistically significant failure cases.
Tables 43 and 44 list the most important units in terms of cumulative component
capability risk importance for the conventional and ‘more-electric architectures’. This
list is generated by averaging the cumulative importance values from all four differ-
ential values (10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1%). The importance values for each symmetric
unit is calculated as the average importance for all symmetric units.
All cumulative component capability importance data for the conventional and
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Table 43: Units of Highest Capability Importance for the Conventional Architecture
Rank Takeoff Cruise
1 Hydraulic Pumps DC Busses
2 Hydraulic System DC Gen’s
3 AGB’s Ram Duct
4 DC Busses Ram Heat Exchanger
5 DC Gen’s APU Bleed
6 Ram Heat Exchanger Pneumatic System
7 APU Bleed Engines Thrust
8 Engine Thrust Hydraulic Pumps
9 Ram Duct Fuel Systems
10 Fuel Systems Hydraulic Systems
‘more-electric’ architectures is given in appendix N. This data includes both archi-
tectures, mission segments (takeoff and cruise), and four magnitudes of differential
values.
Table 44: Units of Highest Capability Importance for the ‘All-Electric’ Architecture
Rank Takeoff Cruise
1 Engine Thrust Engine Thrust
2 Low Speed 270VDC Gen’s PCU’s
3 PCU’s Low Speed 270VDC Gen’s
4 270VDC Busses High Speed 270VDC Gen’s
5 High Speed 270VDC Gen’s 270VDC Busses
6 Ram Duct Ram Duct
7 Fuel Systems 28VDC Bus
8 28VDC Busses Ram Compressors
9 Ram Compressors Pneumatic System
10 Pneumatic Systems –
Compare these results with the results obtained using the reliability based cumu-
lative ‘component criticality importance’ (tables 41 and 42). Analysis of cumulative
‘component capability importance’ (tables 43 and 44) places emphasis on a different
set of technologies in terms of their performance risk. For the conventional architec-
ture fuel systems held the highest importance on the basis of vertical impact on risk
in terms of probability. In terms of horizontal impact on risk, fuel systems are de-
emphasized for ‘component capability importance’. The APU bleed system, engine
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accessory gear boxes, and DC electrical systems receive higher importance values.
Hydraulic systems remain highly important following both analysis.
The provision of fuel is also not of highest importance for the ‘more-electric’
architecture in terms of component capability. Higher import is placed on engine
thrust capability.
These results provide insight into the architecture augmentations which can take
place to optimize the architecture while avoiding undesirable risk. While fuel has a
large impact on risk in terms of reliability, sufficient capability is already provided.
Reductions in capability cost very little in terms of risk. It may be advantageous to
decrease potential oversizing of the fuel systems and improve its reliability.
The inferences from these results should also not be overstated. Derivatives used
for ‘component capability importance’ are estimated using the backward finite differ-
ence method. Therefore, the derivative is considering reductions in available perfor-
mance by removal of unit capability. While these results may be accurate, they do
not adequately reflect the ability to improve system performance.
Each unit plays a role within the context of the system. While reductions in
unit capability may reduce system performance, increases in unit capability do not
necessarily infer similar improvements. Reducing the capability of the AGB will de-
crease the amount of shaft power available for customer loads and engine auxiliaries.
In consequence, the system may exhibit higher performance risk. However, increas-
ing the AGB capability does not guarantee performance improvement. The system
level performance improvement must consider the capability of the auxiliary devices.
While higher shaft power may be available, higher generator capability must also be
made available to yield system level improvements. While identification of degrada-
tion is straight forward, the systematic identification of the combined improvements





The ability to ensure accurate allocation of requirements is critical during vehicle
systems architecture exploratory design. Fair comparisons between architecture con-
cepts demands that the application of requirements does not bias architecture trades.
Each architecture concept yields unique sets of requirements which emerge due to
complex unit level behavioral attributes. As such, systems architecture must cap-
ture off-nominal operational requirements in the context of each specific architecture
concept.
The objective was states as follows, “Provide systematic risk and reliability based
means for the identification of off-nominal operational requirements which can be
rapidly implemented during concept architecture trades.” It was asserted that contin-
uous function hazard assessment and systematic load shedding optimization provided
for this capability. Quantitative evidence to this effect was gathered by implement-
ing an analog extension to system safety analysis. This required the development of
several new safety and reliability metrics.
The case studies performed in the previous chapter illustrates the benefits of
accurate load shedding optimization. It also introduces a number of tools and met-
rics which enable a more rigorous and systematic exploration and assessment of off-
nominal performance.
Case study results provide evidence towards the justification of the hypothesis.
Experiments were executed which compared changes in design conclusions arising
through variations in the system of interest and in the form of the function/hazard
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relationship. It was made evident in this chapter that off-nominal system require-
ments interact with architecture in unique ways. Additionally, it was illustrated that
inaccurate design emphasis is generated through inaccurate representations of func-
tional hazards.
8.1 Hypothesis 1 Validation
Hypothesis 1: Optimizing load shedding strategies yields more accurate predictions
of unit level requirements than heuristically defined performance degradation during
the exploratory design of revolutionary vehicle systems architectures.
Applying load shedding optimization and performing analog system safety assess-
ment provide information not available when sizing systems with predefined heuris-
tics. Comparing the results obtained from off-nominal performance analysis of two
distinct architecture concept provides validation for this hypothesis. Although the
architectures were sized following the same heuristics, the performance risk associated
with each architecture was shown to be unique. Quantitative results are illustrated
in tables 36 and 37.
The application of the engine out sizing heuristic is insufficient to guarantee the
fulfillment of risk requirements. While both architectures exhibit undesirable risk
(RSFU ),the magnitude of this risk varies between concepts. For takeoff and cruise, the
conventional architecture has an undesirable risk magnitude of 3.54 and 1.16. The
cumulative undesirable risks for the ‘more-electric’ architecture are 2.44 and 2.47.
The hazard severity levels which introduces these risks vary between architecture
concepts. While the risk associated with the ‘more-electric’ concept is dominated
by catastrophic losses, the probability of major and minor failures introduce a large
amount of undesirable risk for the conventional architecture. This illustrates the
unique way in which hazard characterizations relate to architecture concepts
The sources of this performance risk vary due to differences in the architecture
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concept. Each unique architecture places different emphasis on function and unit
design. This is evidenced by considering the hazard probability relationships. The
fulfillment of catastrophic requirements does not always pose the highest performance
risk. The magnitude of risk associated with system functions varies in terms of the
magnitude of the hazard incurred.
Each unique architecture concept allocates risk to the provision of functions dif-
ferently. The hydraulic and pneumatic requirements drive the magnitude of undesir-
able risk for the conventional architecture during takeoff. Providing 28VDC power,
hydraulic fluid flow, and pneumatic air flow dominate performance risk for the con-
ventional architecture during cruise. Different functions dominate the risk attributes
of the ‘more-electric’ architecture. The provision of thrust introduces the most risk
during takeoff and cruise for the ‘more-electric’ concept.
The smaller amount of risk associated with the ‘more-electric’ architecture com-
pared to the conventional architecture is due in part to this architecture’s ability to
distribute failures among the system functionalities. A higher correlation between
functional hazards indicates this ability.
The definition of sizing critical requirements must take off-nominal operations into
account. Applying load shedding optimization and assessing off-nominal performance
as illustrated in this chapter provides increased justification for further architecture
design. Accurate sizing warrants a systematic method for capturing off-nominal op-
erational requirements. The metrics used to compare the off-design performance for
these architecture were developed towards this purpose.
8.2 Hypothesis 2 Validation
Hypothesis 2: Assumptions regarding the relationship between function loss and
hazard severity employed during traditional Functional Hazard Assessment bias ar-
chitecture design and lead to inaccurate estimation of unit level requirements.
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Testing the second hypothesis required the identification of issues which arise when
approximating the function/hazard relationship. Therefore, load shedding optimiza-
tion was performed under two different operating conditions and two function/hazard
approximations (linear and step hazard characterizations). Optimal load shedding
was performed and hazard probability was calculated for both architectures with
respect to all of these hazard objective functions.
Obvious limitations were encountered when performing load shedding optimiza-
tion with the step function/hazard relationships. This pseudo-step relationship be-
tween loss and hazard attempts to replicate the amount of information made available
during traditional functional hazard assessment. Applying this assumption to con-
ceptual design would dramatically overdesign the architecture.
Due to the dramatic overprediction of risk which occurs by applying this pseudo-
step hazard characterization applying a linear relationship between loss and hazard
more aptly illustrates the impact of applying inaccurate hazard assumptions. A lin-
ear relationship between loss percentage and hazard also yielded undesirable results.
This assumption overpredicts the risk associated with the conventional architecture
and underpredicts the risk associated with the ‘more-electric’ architecture. Apply-
ing this assumption does not guarantee adequate capture of off-nominal operational
requirements.
General assumptions regarding the function/hazard relationship also create a false
sense of importance for designers. The higher fidelity objective function indicates
that the risk associated with thrust requirements dominate all other functions for the
‘more-electric’ architecture. However, the linear hazard approximation sees higher
risk associated with the provision of 28VDC electrical power and pneumatic air flow.
It was also observed that component importance values are sensitive to the fidelity
of the function/hazard relationship. By varying the functional sources of performance
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risk, component importance values change. Therefore, inaccuracies in the hazard ob-
jective functions can misplace design emphasis in terms of unit requirements. This was
observed by considering the ranking of the units in term of their importance values.
Applying the linear approximation for the ‘more-electric’ architecture assigns greater





The challenges arising from the implementation and integration of electrical tech-
nologies in the aircraft subsystem architecture is comparable to the revolution ne-
cessitated at the advent of the turbojet era. Potential order of magnitude changes
in power demand on military and commercial platforms challenges the historically
adopted methods for aircraft subsystem definition. Additionally, with current ad-
vances in system-level technologies and the outsourcing of technology development,
architecture innovation and integration have become driving differentiators between
competing aircraft concepts.
Revolutionary aircraft systems architectures promise benefits over incremental
improvements achieved through technology insertion and system adaptation or evo-
lution. However, changes to the fundamental architecture of aircraft subsystems
introduce unique challenges in the definition and allocation of sizing critical unit and
platform level requirements. As discussed in the second chapter, the paradigm of air-
craft vehicle systems architecture design is changing due to the complexity introduced
by increased electrical power demands and propulsion efficiency.
As changes are made to the complex vehicle systems architectures, additional ef-
fort must be applied in the identification and management of emergent requirements.
Generally accepted rules of thumb concerning the relationship between aircraft capa-
bilities and system attributes and performance may not be legitimately applied.
The overarching objective for this thesis is the development of tools and techniques
which systemically identify these emergent requirements during concept architecture
validation. The tools and methods developed here are intended to be implemented
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early in the exploratory design process. Therefore, modeling tools must be flexible
to potential architecture alternatives. Additionally, results must be quantifiable and
provide insight towards architecture requirement definition.
This broad goal encompasses many architecture requirements and was refined to
a manageable level. Time, operation, and safety/reliability dependence are three
behavioral sources of architecture complexity. These three dimensions of behavioral
complexity lead to emergent off-nominal requirements. The traditional heuristic na-
ture of defining sizing critical load-shedding strategies and operating modes could
potentially under- or over-predict unit level requirements.
Sizing critical performance requirements are infrequently derived from normal op-
erating conditions but rather emerge from responses to system failures or off-nominal
operating states. During the early stages of conceptual architecting, responses to ex-
ceptional courses of events are often defined anecdotally and heuristically. However,
optimal implementation of revolutionary concepts require architecture specific load
shedding strategies in response to system failures. Fair comparisons between architec-
ture concepts must involve the identification of off-nominal performance requirements
unique to each individual concept.
The objective was refined to developing a method for identifying optimal deploy-
ment of a systems capabilities during these degraded system and operational states.
This method is necessary to evaluate the actual benefits achieved by adopting a rev-
olutionary architecture concept.
Two hypotheses were posed in this thesis which consider the impact of imple-
menting load shedding optimization during exploratory design. The first hypothesis
expresses the needed for identifying architecture specific load shedding strategies for
accurate prediction of unit level requirements. This in turn would ensure fair compar-
ison. Without implementing such a method, system architects deploy requirements in
a manner which biases solutions towards the status quo. Therefore, this work begins
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to enable more accurate evaluation of non-traditional architecture concepts early in
the exploratory design phase.
The second hypothesis considers the effect of inaccuracy in the defined relation-
ship between functional fulfillment and hazard. Traditional Functional Hazard Assess-
ment and other system safety analysis tools make fundamental assumptions regarding
failure states. Expressing the function/hazard relationship in a continuous fashion
enables accurate estimation of the impact of unit failures.
The case studies performed in this thesis illustrate the impact of optimal load
shedding during the assignment of system level requirements to the unit level. Load
shedding strategies were shown to be architecture specific. Additionally, the accuracy
to which this load shedding optimization is performed was shown to greatly impact
design conclusions.
These advantages come at a some cost. Structuring the architecture models,
modeling unit capability transfer functions, and executing load shedding optimiza-
tion for all statistically significant failure case pose difficulties for implementation of
SONOMA during architecture exporatory design. With increased architecture size or
decreases in component reliability, the number of statistically significant failure sce-
narios greatly increases. Load shedding optmization must then be performed for each
failure case. Depending on the number of allocation variables and the computational
cost for unit transfer function the time and resources available during conceptual
design complete performance of analog SSA may be infeasible.
The primary objective of this thesis was the development of tools and techniques
which systematically identify architecture specific emergent requirements for architec-
ture validation. While work is still necessary for implementing these methods in the
system optimization and design process, the methods and frameworks implemented
here provide a structured and flexible means for the elicitation of architecture specific
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requirements during hazard probability analysis. An extension of system reliabil-
ity evaluation tools was required to address the operational consequences of partial
function loss.
9.1 Significant Contributions
The first significant contribution from this thesis is the systematic structuring of load
shedding optimization to be implemented during exploratory design. Traditional ar-
chitecture sizing apply heuristic relationships regarding the unit level requirements
and the impact of unit loss on system functionality. In contrast, the approach taken
here directly identifies the most advantageous flow of capability between system units
to minimize operational hazards. This analysis was based on the functional depen-
dencies between these units.
The optimization process is given by equation 15 from chapter five and the algo-
rithm used is given in appendices G and H.









αi,j = 1 , ∀ i ∈ C
αi,j ≥ 0 , ∀ i, j
Where: Xi+1 = f ([A]×min (Xi,Ki) ,Op)
In order to take advantage of the results obtained by load shedding optimization,
or optimal failure allocation, both hazard assessment and system safety analysis are
required to be developed as continuous functions.
Hazard (t) = h [X, τ,Op (t)] (65)
The second significant contribution presented in this thesis is the extension of tra-
ditional functional hazard analysis and system safety analysis to consider the magni-
tude of unit and function loss when assessing an architecture. System level hazards
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are determined as functions of system capabilities (X), failure duration (τ), and the
operating conditions (Op) as was illustrated with equation 9.
Function/hazard relationships can be defined heuristically, be derived from certi-
fication and flight safety requirements, or be determined by system level performance
analysis. Replacing discrete hazard constraints on predefined unit failures with con-
tinuous hazard loss functions requires reliability to be assessed in a continuous fashion.
This is achieved by identifying all statistically significant failure states and evaluat-
ing the probability and hazard level associated with each failure as is discussed in
appendix D.
The last contributions provided by this work are the tools and metrics used to eval-
uate and compare the off-nominal functional performance of complex architectures.
The metrics introduced in this thesis are outlined in table 45.
Table 45: Continuous Off-Nominal Architecture Performance Metrics
Symbol Name
FS (H)
FLim (H) Continuous System Risk
RSFO Cumulative Overall Risk
RSFU Cumulative Undesirable Risk



















RI2k (h) dh Cumulative Risk Importance
The first tool used to compare off-nominal performance is the comparison of con-
tinuous hazard probability. This tool indicates which functions introduce the highest
performance risk in terms of the failure probability constraints. Additionally, this
tool indicates what magnitude of hazard encounters the highest risk. The cumula-























Unit Capability & Reliability
Architecture Re-definition
Structure & Composition
Figure 95: Process Used for Integrating Emergent Operational Requirements During
Architecture Design, SONOMA
associated with off-nominal performance.
An architecture’s ability to distribute failures among its functions is measured
by the correlation of functional hazards. Architectures which exhibit larger values
of functional hazard correlation provide greater flexibility in terms of load shedding.
Correlation values of 1 indicate an ability to ideally distribute failures between func-
tions. The Euclidean Norm of the correlation matrix provides a single value metric
to compare between architecture concepts.
The last set of metrics introduced to identify off-nominal architecture require-
ments are the cumulative risk based importance values. The traditional importance
values are given as partial differentials of system failure probability in terms of unit
failure probability. The new cumulative risk importance metrics are generated by in-
tegrating the product of the traditional importance value and system risk in terms of
hazard. Additional importance metrics are also introduced which consider the partial
differential of system risk in terms of the differential changes in unit capability.
The combined contribution of all of these tools is a process illustrated in figures
51 and 95. The SONOMA process is used to identify the off-nominal performance
of an architecture and make recommendations for future architecture refinement. It
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identifies over- and under- designed units and identifies the most stringent functional
requirements. This analysis considers unique features of the architecture concept and
allows for the tailoring of requirements in this context.
Systematizing the process for identifying off-nominal performance supports the
objective of this thesis. The unit level requirements are emergent and architecture
specific. In order to justify architecture selection, system sizing and performance
analysis must take these considerations into account. This in turn supports the ability
to more quickly explore the vehicle systems design space with greater confidence.
9.2 Ancillary Research Opportunities
The work presented here introduced multiple potential future research opportunities.
These opportunities were introduced in context within this document but are outlined
here for convenience.
As was discussed in the methods chapter, the impact of a failure depends on both
the magnitude and duration of a given failure. The test cases executed for this thesis
only considered reductions of unit capabilities of indefinite duration. Further effort
is required to capture the effect of failure duration on system hazards. Additionally,
this work also did not consider undesirable increases in unit and system capability.
Extension of this analysis towards these ends provides opportunities for further archi-
tecting research. It was shown in this work that assuming a pseudo-step loss/hazard
relationship greatly overpredicts system risk for both architectures. Additionally, it
was shown that the linear assumption may over or underpredict risk depending on
the structure and composition of the system. If approximations of the loss/hazard
relationship are required additional research is necessary to be able to identify the
appropriate structure of this approximation for the comparison of complex systems.
A second extension to this work would be the reconciliation of the potentially
complex nature of system units. Characterizing the hazard probability space in this
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thesis was accomplished by assuming a constant relationships between unit failure
magnitude and failure probability. However, each unit can in its own right be consid-
ered a complex system with internal redundancies. Therefore, the failure probability
of complex unit exhibits a tiered structure in terms of capability loss. As discussed in
the methods chapter, this presents challenges in determining the probability of given
magnitudes of system failures. Allowing units to exhibit continuous or multi-tiered
failure probabilities would required a finer sampling of the failure space and a means
for estimating the probability of failures of a given hazard magnitude for combined
unit failures.
This thesis comments on how off-nominal performance considerations would po-
tentially impact further design refinement. However, closing the design loop in terms
of architecture attribute optimization was not developed in full. A system level cost
or utility function for an aircraft architecture must consider the impact of unit de-
sign capability (Cap), unit reliability (Weibull parameters α and β), and maintenance
scheduling (MTTR) on overall platform level architecture efficiency and performance.
These decisions are informed by the metrics defined in this thesis and constrained by
allowable system risk.





 s.t.: yi −HLim(xi) ≤ 0
Where: xi = fxi (Cap) and yi = fyi (η, β,MTTR)
Closing the design loop requires efficient evaluation of optimal load shedding. This
introduces additional ancillary research opportunities. Further improvements towards
systematic implementation of off-nominal requirements may require the development
of optimization methods tailored to expedite the identification of optimal capability
allocation. Identifying off-nominal operational requirements may also be accelerate
290
by developing a means for recognizing trends in unit and system failure relation-
ships. These trends may relate to the system structure and composition, or system
relationships which are not based on functional dependencies. At the same time,
improvements may be achieved through determining how frequently load shedding
optimization must play a role in exploratory design.
The final recognized ancillary research opportunity is the extension of the func-
tional relationships between system units. The work presented in this thesis assigned
each allocation variable, αi, to the fulfillment of a single functional capability. How-
ever, it was discussed that each functional capability must be decomposed into dif-
ferent characteristics (e.g. the function to provide airflow is expressed in terms of
mass flow rate, pressure, and temperature). Under failure conditions, some units,
like the environment control system, may be able to reduce the impact of failure
by augmenting the functional capability characteristics. For the ECS system, the
amount of mass flow may be increased if the air temperature is allowed to increase
or decrease. The hazard associated with higher or lower cabin inflow temperatures is
weighed in relation to the hazard associated with reductions in mass flow. In this case




SCENARIO BASED STRATEGIC PLANNING AND
HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION
Strategic planning is primarily interested in scenarios as tools to assist in fore-
casting and contingency planning. Managers utilize scenarios to capture a spectrum
of possible situations which must could be encountered. Kahn describes these sce-
narios as “future history [159].” Here scenario based design is used for structured
imagination intended to avoid underpredicting and overpredicting the requirements
during the decision making process. This is illustrated in figure 96. Schoenmaker
illustrates strategic planning by the incredulity with which the idea of air strikes on
naval ships was handle in the early 1900’s and by Royal Dutch/Shell’s preparations
for the oil crisis in the 1970’s [260].
The goal of scenarios in strategic planning is to determine a course of action
during “what-if” situations [113]. While this typically occurs at an organization level,
methods for determining similar considerations at the system and technology will be
discussed with off-nominal sizing cases identification.
Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) places the user at the center of the de-
sign focal point. While not discussed formally as dedicated processes until the mid
80’s [113], scenario based design techniques play an important role in HCI system
illustration, design/redesign, and evaluation [38]. Examples of development in HCI
are direct manipulation of graphical objects, the mouse, windows, text editing, hyper-
text, and gesture recognition [216]. Such studies require an understanding of human
factors in relation to a system under specific conditions. Kuutti writes:
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Figure 96: Schoemaker’s Process for Scenario Development in Strategic Planning
[260]
“It is necessary to delineate the system and describe it by the services
it is giving to users, but because the system will get its meaning from
the situation in which it will be user, it is also necessary to describe the
context as well [181].”
Illustrative scenario based design processes are creative in nature. HCI uses sce-
nario techniques to describe the use and usability of future computer systems. Sim-
ilarly to strategic planning, HCI uses scenarios to envisage future means in which
human’s interact with a computer and provides rationale for the pursuit of specific
technologies or design strategies.
The second use for scenarios, design/redesign, takes a detailed approach in deter-
mining the specific interface tools, hardware, and software are necessary to interact
with external “human processors [39].” Functional specification are derived following
scenario descriptions [38]. Some research goes to the extent of modeling the user as an
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external processor that receives information from the computer, determines proper
action, and execute pursuit appropriate results [39]. This aids in the definition of
functional specifications what happens when users take specific action.
In regard to HCI evaluation, the aerospace community benefits from relative stan-
dardization of aircraft controls. Much research and development towards designing
and analyzing pilot and operator control interfaces in terms of the workload required,
controllability, and other human factors. Since the late 60’s and early 70’s standard
techniques like the Cooper-Harper and University of Stockholm rating scales have
provided means towards evaluation of pilot workload. Workload is a term in the
aerospace community referring to the portion of the total capacity of the pilot which
is necessary to perform a task [23]. These task based evaluations of operator interfaces
are common in platform valuation.
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APPENDIX B
SCENARIO BASED REQUIREMENTS ENGINEERING
TOOLS
Inquiry-Based Cycle Model (IBCM): Potts, Takahashi, and Anton’s inquiry-
based cycle model (ICBM) [234] for requirements analysis consists primarily on man-
aging relationships between hypertext descriptions of requirements. Focusing on the
elicitation of requirements from stakeholders with no clear customer authority, the
ICBM method consists of three phases as illustrated in figure 97: documentation,
discussion, and evolution.
Scenarios play a role during the requirements documentation process through text,
tables, and diagrams [113]. These scenarios are described as “end-to-end transactions”
between the system and its environment [234].
During requirements discussion, scenarios facilitates discussion. Potts writes:
“Answering the what-if question by analyzing specific scenarios gives
stakeholders insight into general requirements and helps in the refinement
process[234].”
Detrimental to the application of IBCM to the identification of architecture emer-
gent requirements is the high level of abstraction taken. This tool is intended to be
used during the requirements phase of development and necessitates a low degree of
formality. It is also based on the assumptions made by the stakeholder before concept
definition takes place. “Progress becomes impossible unless an assumption or deci-
sion is made [234].” Each assumption must be validated to ensure applicability to the
specific architecture. It is a process based method characterized by a long iteration
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Figure 97: Inquiry-Based Cycle Model for Requirements Analysis [234]
cycle in a meeting based format. Potts estimates that defining 16 scenarios would
take approximately 500 to 1000 man hours [234].
Questions Options Criteria (QOC): Questions, Options, & Criteria (QOC) is
another semi-formal use-case requirements engineering method. It attempts to mirror
typical decision making processes which are applied by designers. While QOC is not
in itself a scenario based design techniques, it is used to define and refine operational
requirements. Questions are used to uncover design issues, options represent means to
provide solutions to issues discovered during questioning, and criteria are arguments
supporting or opposing given options [195]. A QOC diagram is shown in figure 98.
In this image solid lines and boxes represent positive assessments and dashed lines
and boxes are negative assessments.
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Figure 98: QOC Diagram Showing Different Navigation Properties [195]
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This process is essentially provide means for the generation of qualitative evalu-
ation matrices of potential solutions to evaluation criteria. As expressed by Mack,
QOC “provide[s] a scheme for making design decisions explicit, and analyzing them
in relation to user needs, and possible tradeoffs among potentially conflicting design
implications[194].”
Integrating this method with scenario based design tools presents questions re-
garding the accomplishment of a requirement or task. The option is a system which
provides fulfillment to the requirements by means of a specific method or tool. The
criteria can be direct evaluation of the solution or may be a specific scenario in which
the solution will be used. Thus, scenarios enter into the process as a question (how
to fulfill a task), options (solution includes a method) and criteria (method can be
used using specific solution). Maclean and McKerlie write:
“When tasks are viewed as Criteria, our approach relies on the designer
to provide the argumentation to justify the extent to which the task under
consideration is satisfied by the possible Options identified [195].”
QOC is essentially an evaluation tool which is qualitative in nature. Specific tasks
must be independently defined and constructed to act as questions, options, criteria.
Thus, this tool would be useful in evaluating particular architecture solutions for a
series of tasks. However, it would need to be augmented to address emergent operating
scenario identification.
Claims Analysis (CA): Like QOC, Claims Analysis (CA) analyzes the relation-
ship between the system in light of user needs and options, and forces detailed and
complete descriptions of design decisions. A claim is “the set of hypothesized causal
relations pertaining to a given feature within a given scenario [255].” Claims represent
the assumptions made by the designers regarding the benefit or detriment induced
by specific system features. This requires designers and requirement engineers to
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systematically address the logic behind specific trades and expand on the existing
scenarios. Rosson and Carroll write:
“Analyzing a feature-consequence relation in a scenario encourages the
designer to engage in what-if scenario reasoning, envisioning slight variants
of the scenario that may not have been expanded in a narrative but that
help to complete the analysis of a feature’s consequences [255].”
Additionally, CA assists designers to identify connections between scenarios. Im-
plementing specific solutions during different scenarios may yield adverse or advan-
tageous claims, necessitating decisions as to value of the solution.
This process assists in formulating evaluations of the operations and design space.
Again, it does not directly address the formulating of scenarios but manages the
qualitative assessment of the specific operational and physical solutions with regard
to its claimed benefit.
Formal Scenario Analysis (FSA): Hsia et. al. introduced a formal approach
to scenario analysis in 1994 [139]. In contrast to the other methods introduced with
requirements development, FSA is a formal process of defining and developing sce-
narios. The scenarios correspond to interactions specific users have with the system.
This process is visualized in figure 99.
Scenarios are generated considering the views of specific users of the system. Hsia
et. al. use the example of a private branch exchange (PBX). In this environment the
user views are those from specific “callers” or “callees”. Each user group generates
a number of scenarios called a user view. These scenarios represent sequences of
potential actions the user can take in relation to the system.
The first tool scenario structuring tool introduced with FSA is a scenario tree. In
a scenario tree the nodes represent states and arrows represent events. Each node
has one “parent” node but may have multiple “children” nodes. As specific actions
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Figure 99: Process for Formal Scenario Analysis [139]
are taken the scenario procedures from parent to child throughout the tree. For FSA
the terminating branches of the tree end in the same state as the initial state. Thrust
the tree represents legitimate sequences of states and actions that may occur linking
the initial state to some final state. Each route throughout the tree presents distinct
requirements on the attributes of the system. FSA translates the tree into a formal
textual description of the tree.
The formal textual description is used to translate the scenario tree into the second
scenario structuring tool introduced with FSA: deterministic finite-state Machine. A
deterministic finite-state Machine, like the scenario tree, represents states with nodes
and transitions with arrows. However, these are displayed in a graph as opposed to a
tree with the initial and final states embodied in the same state. The state Machine
is deterministic because each event results in a specific state. It is finite because the
number of states is confined to those expressed by the user views. The tools used for
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Figure 100: Tools for Formal Scenario Analysis [139]
scenario identification are displayed in figure 100.
FSA tools provide guidance towards the identification of sizing scenarios which
drive the design of the system. Each path through the tree or state model represents
a scenario scenario which could present new requirements to the system. While all
states can be identified for a simple state diagram, complex systems interactions
require means for identifying significant scenarios or simplifying the tree in order to
be able to explore the system.
Task Analysis and Modeling (TA/TM): A task is more than a simple action,
but a “purposeful activity [153]” intended to achieve a specific goal. Task analysis
and modeling (TA/TM) approaches emerged from the HCI field [152] and, like use-
case modeling, focus on the “context of usage [153].” Task modeling has driven the
development of methods including and primarily GOMS (Goals, Operators, methods,
and selection rules) [39, 149] as well as the formalization of a user knowledge through
task knowledge structures (TKS) [152]. Johnson writes:
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“In developing the technology of computer systems it is often neces-
sary to focus upon properties of the technology. However, in developing
systems that are intended to be used by people in the varied contexts of
their work, private, social, and leisure activities, the focus of design must
be on the suitability of the designed artifact to support and complement
human activity [153].”
Many techniques for task definition take a very tightly focused view in order to
understand details which are necessary for HCI definition. However, TKS does not
address the command level to interaction design. TKS extends the GOMS approach
to human computer interface design by exploring and leveraging task-knowledge. It is
intended towards a higher level view by focusing on what Johnson terms “work tasks
[153].” The basic motivation behind a task knowledge structuring is to understand
the structured or unstructured way in which people do their work and characterizing
these plans and procedures to drive design requirements.
TKS describes a task as encompassing goals, subgoals, procedures, objects, and
actions. These are generated from observing the way work is currently done, formal-
izing these task descriptions and task models and generalizing these models. Goals
are structured through decomposing high to lower level goals and defining subgoal
relationships. Tools addressing these categories include textual descriptions, lists,
and object diagrams for goal decomposition.
Johnson evokes an example for X-ray system design in generating the TKS seen in
figure 101. As evident with this example, this tool is semi-formal. Categories of infor-
mation are delineated and structured models are used for goal relationships. However,
additional modeling would be required to generate executable representations of the
embodied scenarios.
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Figure 101: Task Knowledge Structure for ”Taking and X-ray” Johnson [153]
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The primary focus for this method is also the understanding of common sequences
of actions in order to delineate requirements. For aircraft design, standardized meth-
ods exist to provide the framework for operational requirements identification in the
form of a mission. The content for this tool and its methods are not ideally aligned





Responsibility-Driven Approach: This approach to scenario based design fo-
cuses on informally characterizing specific objects, relationships, and responsibilities.
Wirfs-Brock et. al. breaks this method into two phases: the exploratory phase and
the analysis phase [303]. During the exploratory phase object and conceptual entity
classes are defined in terms of attributes and external interfaces. These classes are
grouped and textually described. General class responsibilities and relationships are
assigned to classes with the use of Class-Responsibility-Collaboration Cards (CRC’s).
Once object classes, responsibilities, and collaborations are identified the analysis
phase begins. Hierarchical relationships between classes are built and shared class
responsibilities are explored. With these classes defined and collaborations mapped,
potential subsystems are tacitly defined when complex collaboration is necessary.
Finally, the responsibilities and relationships between subsystems are more specifically
defined in terms of conceptual operations.
This process for object identification and specification relies heavily on informal
methods for identifying classes, objects, and relationships. Scenarios play a role
during the initial phases of explorations. Here informal descriptions of scenarios
are used to identify specific ‘nouns.’ These nouns become the framework for classes,
which are formalized into systems. Object graphs and hierarchies, textual descriptions
(CRC’s), Venn diagrams, and other tools are recommended (but not prescribed) in
order to generate information in developing a class and system specification document
[303].
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The responsibility-driven approach described here is a traditional, tacit knowl-
edge based process for software architecture definition. It takes an up front con-
ceptual design perspective. However, its informal methods for generating systems
decompositions drive towards the specification and development of a single hierar-
chically structured systems architecture. Scenarios play an initial role in initializing
the generation of systems and requirements, however there is no formal means for
specified for formating and deploying these scenarios. Additionally, there is no for-
mal means for capturing additional operational requirements which are sensitive to
physical implementation.
Use-Cases Diagrams: Similar to the scenarios which comprise the user view with
FSA, Jacobson’s [146] use-cases model ways in which the system can be used. They
provide an important view on the requirements by assisting the designer in determin-
ing functional requirements and systems processes, and structuring requirement for
an object model [296]. Use-case models are not intended to model the internals of the
system. The use-case approach focuses on external interactions between the system
under design and its external systems or users. However, a use-case is not a scenario.
A use-case expresses all the possible paths of events, but a scenario describes part
of the possible paths. [113]. In this sense a use-case can be seen as FSA user view.
Jacobson writes
“Scenarios normally mean use-case instances ... use-cases are treated
more formally, and described in a model of their own, as well as in inter-
actions between objects in different object models. Scenarios are normally
described as interactions between objects only [146].”
Two basic conceptual elements are necessary for use-case modeling: actors and
use-cases. Figure 102 shows a simple use-case model of a ATM system. The actors
which interface with the system are the bank customer, the bank system, and the
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Figure 102: Notional use-case Model of ATM System [146]
ATM operator. Their relationships with the ATM fall into four distinct use-cases as
depicted.
Relations between use-cases are captured. Use-cases at high levels of abstraction
may require use-cases defined at lower levels. This is termed a “use” relationship.
Additionally, the performance of one use-case may depend upon the other use-cases
being performed. These are termed “extends” relationships. Extends help to capture
“optional parts of use-cases, complex and alternative courses, subsequences that are
executed only in certain cases, and the insertion of several different use-cases into
another use-case [146].”
In the case of a commercial or military aircraft at the level of platform concep-
tual design, the actors can be generalized. From an external view of the system,
platform level serves services provided remain the same regardless of the architecture
implementation. The diagrams are typically very simple and are used primarily as
communication tools between systems engineerings and stakeholders [296].
The use-case model falls short of managing some temporal and physical aspects
of scenario based design. Use-cases focus on interaction, not process. The use-case
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focuses primarily on the services that a system provides. Qualitative aspects like “re-
sponse times, weight, or size” are seen as “supportive” in nature [296]. Concurrence,
conflicts and object modeling are not addressed with use-case modeling.
State Transition Diagrams: The framework for state Machine came about to
manage issues arising from design and analysis of reactive systems. While a transfor-
mational system received inputs, performs transformations, and produces outputs, a
reactive system accepts stimuli from its environment and is required to “maintain a
certain ongoing relationship [120].” Difficulty arises in understanding and decompos-
ing the behavior of the a reactive system. Both behavioral specification and imple-
mentation (design) are necessary for design and construction or a reactive systems
[120]. Based on Mealy and Moore definitions of finite state automata, state charts
were initially introduced as a visual language and methodology for formally specifying
the behavioral space [119].
IEEE standard glossary of software engineering terminology define a state as “a
condition or mode of existence that a system, component, or simulation may be in
[274].” State Machines or state transition diagrams express the state of a system with
a node and transitions between states as arrows between nodes. Transitions induce
changes in state as a result of some activity or event introduced from external actors or
environment, or internal system objects. While implementation or structure models
remain reactive, statecharts are transformational. Objects exist in states, operations
cause a transition between states [248].
Harel illustrates statecharts which were precursors to the state transition diagram
with a simple digital watch as displayed in figure 103. Each state represents the
current display on the watch and events triggered by pushing buttons a through d.
Additionally alarm states are toggled at different times (P1: alarm 1 enabled at T1,
P2: alarms 2 enabled at time T2, P: alarm 1 and 2 enabled at T1=T2).
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Figure 103: Harel’s Watch State Chart Illustrations [119]
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One difficulty in the definition of activity diagrams is the need to maintain a
behavioral perspective. Even with the simple watch example transitions and states
were defined following some predefinition regarding the implementation space. With
highly flexible architecture trades, the physical definition is highly variable. Thus,
the transitions and states must be so defined in order to be independent of the design
variables. At the platform level, a state representation of the mission profile may
enhance the ability to more closely interrelate the operation/mission requirements
and the operational implications of adopting specific systems.
Activity Diagrams: Like state and transition diagrams, activity diagrams are “be-
havioral in nature [296]”: meaning that they describe processes not structural. How-
ever, while state diagrams use nodes to represent system states, activity diagrams
use nodes to represent sequences of actions. Information, objects, or controls relate
the various actions making up an activity. Actions can occur concurrently or serially,
and logic can dictate the relationships between actions.
Considering literature from Pahl et. al. [229] and Suh [282] a function is defined as
the objective physical performance of a given object [12]. A function can be described
as an actions with qualifications. To enumerate a function, something must be done
to a given extent. Thus, in a general sense a function is fundamentally characterized
by an action. Activity diagrams are similar to functional flow block diagrams (FFBD)
in the information their composition and structure [75].
As discussed in the third chapter, functions play critical role in formulating the
requirements definition and physical embodiment of the system. Functions or actions
provide the means by which requirements are allocated and communicated to the
embodied elements of the system. an important role in allocating requirements to
the unit level.
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Figure 104: Interaction Diagram for ATM Cash Withdrawal Operation [146]
Interaction Diagrams: Working in conjunction with use-case diagrams in provid-
ing use-case design, interaction diagrams are object models which focus on internal
interactions between system objects and external interactions between the system and
use-case actors. Serial and parallel operations performed by systems objects repre-
sent sequences of events which must be accomplished in the fulfillment of a particular
use-case. Jacobson continues his ATM example with the interaction diagram seen in
figure 104.
The objects are listed across the top of the of figure 104 are system objects with the
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left and right columns representing external actors. Events are represented by arrows
between the columns. On the left hand side of the interaction diagram, interactions
between the system and external actors are listed.
For every use case, an interaction diagram shows how the participating objects
interact. Thus, for a complex architecture defined by complex operations many inter-
action diagrams would be necessary to describe all potential sizing scenarios. Using a
functional induction based approach to system composition presents additional chal-
lenges in the implementation of interaction diagrams during conceptual architecting.
With variable system objects characterizing concept architecture trades, potential
variations in architecture would require a redefinition of the interaction diagram for
each use case. Adequate flexibility would require augmentation to interaction diagram
methods to allow for the identification of emergent operation mode requirements.
This approach begins, however, does begin to explore internal relationship in the
system. Interactions between systems in the interaction diagram effect the usability
of the system in performing the denoted operation. Timing and sequencing are also
introduced with the interaction diagram. For concept level architecture some time
dependence is of import when defining requirements. However, the level to which
sequences of distinct interactions begins to complicate requirements derivation.
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APPENDIX D
ALGORITHM FOR DETERMINING STATISTICAL
SIGNIFICANCE OF UNIT FAILURES
The Matlab R© code, “./StatisticalSignificance.m”, given below determines which
failure states are statistically significant ([combins] matrix). It also finds which failure
combination preclude the consideration of other failure states ([covers] matrix). The
third output, [AllProbs], lists the failure probabilities of all units corresponding to
their IO index. Lastly, combfails capture all the maximum number of concurrent
failures required to give statistically significant failures.
The [combins] output is a n×m matrix. Each row represents a single statistically
significant failure state. Each column in the row lists the IO indices which are affected
during this failure.
The [covers] variable is also an n× p matrix. Each row, i, in the [covers] matrix
characterizes the failure case in [combins] of the same row index, i. The columns in
this matrix indicate which other rows in [combins] preclude the need for considering
this the failure case in row i. Consider the scenario when the case at index i is the
combined failure of unit 1 and unit 2. If case at index j is the failure of unit 1,
then case j covers case i [Pi ∪ Pj = ((PA ∩ PB) ∪ PA) = PA = Pj]. The i’th row of
the [covers] matrix is given as covers [i, :] = [j · · · ]. In this scenario, if j is already
considered in the union calculations, the probability of i need not be addressed.
The inputs to this significance function include the an array of strings which are
the labels for system IO. This matrix is of same length as the X vector discussed in
the methods chapter and includes names of each functional relationship. Each IO la-
bel is formated as (unitname) (functionalcapabilityname) (directionofflow). The
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direction of flow is given by ds or us indicating downstream and upstream capability
relationships respectively.
The other input, [unitvaratts], gives all attributes values for the units. The fist
column of this string array gives the name of the unit attribute. This is formatted
as unitname functionalcapabilityname attributename. The second column of this
array includes the value of this attribute. If the capability attribute name includes
probability information (F ) and the namespace matches the IO, this value is recorded
and linked to the IO index.
./StatisticalSignificance.m
1 function [ combins , covers , AllProbs , c o m b f a i l s ]= S t a t i s t i c a l S i g n i f i c a n c e ( IO , u n i t v a r a t t s )
2 %% This f u n c t i o n d e t e r m i n e s a l l s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g i n i f i c a t i o n f a i l u r e c o m b i a n t i o n s ( combins ) and
which c o m b i n a t i o n s p r e c l u d e t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f o t h e r s f o r p r o b a b i l i t y c a l c u l a t i o n s ( c o v e r s )
%%
3 A=length ( IO ) ;
4 B=s i z e ( u n i t v a r a t t s ) ;
5 %% Determine a l l u n i t f a i l u r e p r o b a b i l i t i e s i n a r c h i t e c t u r e %%
6 for i =1:A( 1 ) % Look a t a l l IO V a r i a b l e s
7 L=length ( outputname ) ;
8 i f strcmp ( outputname (L−1:L) , ’ ds ’ ) % I d e n t i f y downstream cap IO
9 for j =1:B( 1 ) % Look f o r f a i l u r e prob i n f o
10 u n i t a t t r i b u t e s = regexp ( u n i t v a r a t t s ( 1 , j ) , ’ ’ , ’ s p l i t ’ ) ; % Parse u n i t a t t v a r i a b l e name
11 C=s i z e ( u n i t a t t r i b u t e s ) ;
12 i f strcmp ( u n i t a t t r i b u t e s (C( 3 ) ) , ’ Rel ’ ) % Check i f u n i t a t t r i b u t e name
13 outputnamecheck=s t r c a t (C( 1 ) , ’ ’ , C( 2 ) , ’ d s ’ ) ; % Recase o u t p u t v a r i a b l e name
14 i f strcmp ( outputname , outputnamecheck )
15 AllProbs ( i )=s t r 2 d o u b l e ( u n i t v a r a t t s ( 2 , j ) ) ; % I n d e x F a i l u r e P r o b a b i l i t y
16 i f AllProbs ( i ) > 0







24 %% C o n s t r u c t upper bound o f f a i l u r e p r o b a b i l i t y (P( k ) ) f o r f a i l u r e c o m b i n a t i o n s assuming a l l u n i t s
e x i b i t max p r o b a b i l i t y o f f a i l u r e %%
25 maxprob=max( Al lProbs ) ; % Determine max f a i l prob
26 for i = 1 : length ( f a i l n o d e s )
27 combs=nchoosek ( length ( f a i l n o d e s ) , i ) ;
28 i f i>1
29 Pk( i )=Pk( i −1) + combs ( i ) ∗( maxprobˆ i ) ;
30 e l s e
31 Pk( i )=combs ( i ) ∗( maxprobˆ i ) ;
32 end
33 end
34 %% L imi t number o f c o m b i n a t i o n s a l l o w e d by e r r o r ( e r r o r must k e p t l e s s than 10ˆ−11) %%
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35 combcount = 0 ;
36 for i = 1 : length ( f a i l n o d e s )
37 error=Pk( i ) − Pk( length ( f a i l n o d e s ) ) ; % Calc i comb f a i l prob e r r o r
38 i f theval >10ˆ(−11) % Determine n e c e s s a r y i l i m i t
39 c o m b f a i l s = i ; % Number o f r e q combined f a i l
40 tempcombins = nchoosek ( f a i l n o d e s , i ) ;
41 for j =1:combs ( i )
42 for k = 1 : i
43 combins1 ( j+combcount , k )= tempcombins ( j , k ) ; % L i s t i n i t s t a t s i g f a i l u r e s
44 end
45 end
46 combcount = combcount + combs ( i ) ; % Count i n i t s t a t s i g




51 %% S e l e c t e d s i g n i f i c a n t f a i l u r e s b a s e d on f a i l u r e c a s e p r o b a b i l i t y %%
52 x=0;
53 combcount = 0 ;
54 D=s i z e ( combins ) ;
55 for i =1:D( 1 ) % Look a t a l l c o m b i n a t i o n s
56 probs = 1 ; % C a l c u l a t e f a i l prob
57 for j = 1 : c o m b f a i l s
58 i f combins1 ( i , j ) ˜=0
59 probs = probs ∗ AllProbs ( combins1 ( i , j ) ) ;
60 end
61 end
62 i f probs > 10 ˆ (−14) % Check f a i l c a s e prob
63 x=x+1;
64 for k = 1 : c o m b f a i l s
65 combins2 ( x , k ) = combins1 ( i , k ) ; % L i s t s t a t s i g f a i l f i n a l
66 end
67 combcount = combcount +1; % Count f i n a l s t a t s i g f a i l
68 end
69 end
70 %% I d e n t i f y which p r o b a b i l i t y c o v e r s %%
71
72 for i =1: combcount % Look a t a l l f a i l combs
73 c u r r e n t c o u n t = 0 ;
74 for k=1: c o m b f a i l s
75 i f t h e f a i l s ( i , k )˜=0
76 c u r r e n t c o u n t=c u r r e n t c o u n t +1; % # o f combined f a i l u r e s
77 end
78 end
79 t h e i n d e x = 1 ;
80 for j = 1 : ( i −1)
81 l a s t c o u n t = 0 ;
82 for k = 1 : c o m b f a i l s
83 i f t h e f a i l s ( j , k ) ˜= 0
84 l a s t c o u n t=l a s t c o u n t + 1 ; % # o f combined f a i l u r e s
85 end
86 end
87 i f c u r r e n t c o u n t > l a s t c o u n t % 1 s t c o v e r s c h e c k
88 thenums = 0 ;
89 for k = 1 : l a s t c o u n t
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90 for m = 1 : c u r r e n t c o u n t
91 i f t h e f a i l s ( j , k ) == t h e f a i l s ( i , m) % 2nd c o v e r s c h e c k




96 i f thenums == l a s t c o u n t
97 c o v e r s ( i , t h e i n d e x )=j ; % F a i l u r e i c o v e r e d by j





All of the “./StatisticalSignificance.m” routine are used to find the continuous
hazard probability relationship.
The outputs of ./F indHazardProbRelationship.m function characterize this re-
lationship between hazard and probability. The variable [failstates] is a 1×m vector
listing all of the discrete hazard values at which a step change is probability occurs.
The probability is given in the Probs vector of the same length as [failstates]. The
output [theequations] is a m× n× p matrix representing the closed form probability
equation. For each state (n), the first column of the sub-matrix represents a sign
value (-1 or +1), the remaining columns include the indices of each unit indices. The
probability is determined by replacing the index value with the unit failure proba-
bility, taking the product of all values within a single row, and summing all of the
products.
PF = P1 + P2 · P3 − P1 · P2 · P3
Using this notation the equation above is given by the theequations matrix here:

+1 1 0 0
+1 2 3 0
−1 1 2 3

This function receives five inputs as discussed previously. The first input [combins]
lists all statistically significant failure combinations. Each row of this matrix contains unit
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value indices representing which units are failure for this case. The magnitude of the hazard
incurred and the failure probability are given in the [FinHazard] and the [Allprobs] vectors.
The [covers] variable indicates which failure combination in [combins] remove the necessity
to take the union with other rows in formulating [theequation] (e.g. P1 covers P1 ∩ P2).
Lastly, the variable [combfails] indicates the minimum number of columns required in
[theequation] to give statistically significant probability calculations.
./FindHazardProbRelationship.m
1 function [ f a i l s t a t e s , Probs , t h e e q u a t i o n s ]= FindHazardProbRelationship ( combins , covers , FinHazard ,
Al lprobs , c o m b f a i l s )
2 %% This f u n c t i o n c a l c u l a t e s t h e h a z a r d p r o b a b i l i t i e s i n terms o f d i s c r e t e h a z a r d s t e p s %%
3 f a i l s t a t e s=unique ( FinHazard ) ; % L i s t u n i q u e h a z a r d s t a t e s
4 Probs=zeros ( length ( f a i l s t a t e s ) , 1 ) ; % I n i t i a l i z e Probs
5 t h e e q u a t i o n s=zeros ( length ( f a i l s t a t e s ) ,10000 ,2+ c o m b f a i l s ˆ2) ; % I n i t i a l i z e t h e e q u a t i o n
6 a l l p r o b s=h o r z c a t ( A l l p r o b s ( 1 , : ) , 1 ) ; % A l l p r o b s : 1 i n l a s t c o l
7 A=s i z e ( FinHazard ’ ) ; % Find s i z e o f FinHazard
8 B=s i z e ( c o v e r s ) ; % Find s i z e o f t h e c o v e r s
9 used=zeros ( 0 , 1 ) ; % Temp a r r a y t o c h e c k c o v e r s
10
11
12 for i =1: length ( f a i l s t a t e s ) % C onsider f a i l u r e magni tudes
13 used=zeros ( 0 , 1 ) ;
14 r =1;
15 for j =1:A( 1 ) % C onside r each f a i l u r e s t a t e
16 i f FinHazard ( j )>=f a i l s t a t e s ( i ) % Check f a i l u r e magni tudes
17 yes =1;
18 for k=1:B( 2 )





24 i f yes==1 % L i s t used c a s e s




29 % E x c e c u t e f u n c t i o n which f o r m a t s t h e union o f combined f a i l u r e s
30 [ sumofprods , t h e s i g n s ]= g r o u p m u l t i p l i c a t i o n s ( used , combins , c o m b f a i l s ) ;
31 check=sum( sumofprods ˜=0 ,2)<=c o m b f a i l s ; % L i m i t s t o s t a t s i g u n i o n s
32 sumofprods (˜any( check , 2 ) , : ) = [ ] ;
33 t h e s i g n s (˜any( check , 2 ) , : ) = [ ] ;
34 C=s i z e ( sumofprods ) ; % Determine union eq l e n g t h
35 t h e e q u a t i o n s ( i , 1 : C( 1 ) ,2:1+ c o m b f a i l s ˆ2)=sumofprods ; % Write t h e e q u a t i o n s o u t p u t
36 t h e e q u a t i o n s ( i , 1 : C( 1 ) , 1 )=t h e s i g n s ( : , 1 ) ; % Write s i g n s t o t h e e q u a t i o n s
37 t h e e q u a t i o n s ( i , 1 : C( 1 ) ,2+ c o m b f a i l s ˆ2) =−0.1; % Mark t h e end o f t h e m a t r i x
38 p r o b i n d i c e s=sumofprods+(length ( a l l p r o b s ) ) ∗( sumofprods==0) ; % Format sum o f p r o d s m a t r i x
39 TheProbs=a l l p r o b s ( p r o b i n d i c e s ( : , : ) ) ; % R e p l a c e i n d i c e s w i t h p r o b s
40 TheProbs2=prod ( TheProbs , 2 ) ; % C a l c u l a t e p r o b s f o r s t a t e i






46 function [ sumprods , t h e s i g n ]= g r o u p m u l t i p l i c a t i o n s ( used , combins , c o m b f a i l s )
47 %% This f o r m a t s t h e u n io n s o f a l l combined f a i l u r e i n t e r s e c t i o n s %%
48
49 a l l a c t i v e=combins ( used , : ) ; % ID a l l f a i l u r e s t a t e s
50 sign =1; % I n i t i a l i z e s i g n f u n c t i o n
51 t h e s i g n=zeros ( 0 , 1 ) ;
52 sumprods=zeros ( 0 , c o m b f a i l s ∗ c o m b f a i l s ) ; % I n i t prob f u n c t i o n m a t r i x
53 for i =1: c o m b f a i l s
54 t o u s e=sum( a l l a c t i v e ˜=0 ,2)<( c o m b f a i l s+2− i ) ; % Checks s t a t s i g
55 i f sum( t o u s e )>0
56 theused =(used ) ’ ;
57 theused (˜any( touse , 2 ) , : ) = [ ] ;
58 i f length ( theused )> i | | i==1
59 thecomb=nchoosek ( theused ( : , : ) , i ) ; % Find a l l f a i l s t a t e combos
60 S=s i z e ( thecomb ) ;
61 X=zeros ( S ( 1 ) , 0 ) ;
62 for j =1: c o m b f a i l s % Formulate t h e e q u a t i o n
63 i f j<=i
64 clear F
65 F ( : , : )=combins ( thecomb ( : , j ) , : ) ;
66 X=h o r z c a t (X, F) ;
67 e l s e
68 X=h o r z c a t (X, zeros ( S ( 1 ) , c o m b f a i l s ) ) ;
69 end
70 end
71 X=sort (X, 2 , ’ descend ’ ) ;
72 Y=h o r z c a t ( d i f f (X, 1 , 2 ) , ones ( S ( 1 ) , 1 ) ) ;
73 X=sort (X.∗ (Y˜=0) , 2 , ’ descend ’ ) ;
74 sumprods=v e r t c a t ( sumprods ,X) ;
75 s i g n s=sign∗ones ( S ( 1 ) , 1 ) ;
76 t h e s i g n=v e r t c a t ( t h e s i g n , s i g n s ) ;
77 end
78 end
79 sign=−sign ; % F l i p s i g n f o r n e x t combo #
80 end




2 for i =1: length ( f a i l s t a t e s )
3 i f i>1
4 i f T o t a l f a i l s t a t e s ( 2∗( i −1) )>=f a i l s t a t e s ( i )
5 T o t a l f a i l s t a t e s ( 2∗( i −1)+1)=T o t a l f a i l s t a t e s ( 2∗( i −1) )+eps ;
6 e l s e
7 T o t a l f a i l s t a t e s ( 2∗( i −1)+1)=f a i l s t a t e s ( i ) ;
8 end
9 e l s e
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10 T o t a l f a i l s t a t e s ( 2∗( i −1)+1)=f a i l s t a t e s ( i ) ;
11 end
12 T o t a l f a i l s t a t e s ( 2∗( i −1)+2)=T o t a l f a i l s t a t e s ( 2∗( i −1)+1)+eps ;
13 T o t a l f a i l p r o b s ( 2∗( i −1)+1)=f a i l p r o b s ( i ) ;
14 i f i<length ( f a i l s t a t e s )
15 T o t a l f a i l p r o b s ( 2∗( i −1)+2)=f a i l p r o b s ( i +1) ;
16 e l s e
17 T o t a l f a i l p r o b s ( 2∗( i −1)+2)=0;
18 end
19 end
20 HazProbs=interp1 ( T o t a l f a i l s t a t e s , T o t a l f a i l p r o b s , 0 : 0 . 0 0 1 : 1 , ’ n e a r e s t ’ ) ;
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APPENDIX E
ANALYTICAL HAZARD FUNCTION PROPAGATION
There are three ways in which requirements can be allocated to systems. A relationship
which involves one element on the demand side and one element on the supply side is termed
‘simple.’ Multiple demand side element placing requirements on one supply side element is
termed a ‘combination’ relationship. The requirements are combined from the load demands
of multiple requirements sources. Multiple supply side elements fulfilling requirements gen-
erated from one demand side element is termed an ‘allocation’ relationship. Here a single
requirement source may be allocated to a number of potential suppliers. When multiple
demand side elements place requirements on multiple supply side elements the relationship
consists of a ‘combination’ followed by an ‘allocation.’ These relationships are outlined in
table 46. The notation here is source centric; meaning that the functional notation intends
to determine the requirements and reliability of one of the source elements. Functional
requirements flow from demand element to source element. CapN is the capability or ca-
pacity of source element N , UN and AN denote the functional requirements from unit and
allocation elements respectively.
The equations in table 46 are read as follows. The simple relationship in this table
indicates the functional and criticality requirements placed on unit 2 from unit 1 given
the capacity of unit 2. The functional notation for an allocation relationship determines
the requirements on unit 1, given the allocated requirements on functional group 1, the
capacity of unit 1, and all other units within the functional group. The combination rela-
tionship indicates the functional and reliability requirements on the elements upstream of
the combination given the requirements from all demand side elements and the capacity of
the upstream element.
Describing requirements assigning relationships following this convention for the sake
of system modeling translates well to functional induction. Each relationship is designated
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Combination (U1, U2, . . . , Un)
By convention, arrows point upstream with the flow of functional requirements and opposite the
flow of energy, material, or information.
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Figure 105: Simple Relationship
by a functional intra-relationship and ‘allocations’ are used to describe requirements placed
on a given number of potential sources each of which has can provide the desired function.
Elements which can provide spatial or complete fulfillment of the same function belong to
a ‘functional group.’
These relationships, driven by functional induction form the framework for analysis in
this thesis. Maintaining these relationships with the information provided by the upstream
and downstream elements facilitates the flow of behavioral hazard derived safety and relia-
bility requirements throughout the system and the necessary relationships for architecture
safety analysis.
The criticality associated with the fulfillment of a given function at the unit level re-
lates directly to criticality at the platform level. ‘Simple,’ ‘allocation,’ and ‘combination’
relationships augment are means by which criticality is defined for the upstream elements
and reliability is defined towards the downstream functional requirements. Each of these
relationships augment the criticality and reliability depending on the units involved in the
relationship. In addition to the flow of reliability requirements and attributes through these
relationship elements, each of the units must designate the criticality requirements associ-
ated with their own induced requirements as a function of the criticality of the loads that
they are supporting. Just as reliability is sensitive to both unit reliability and the relia-
bility of supporting the unit’s induced functions, as the load an element supports becomes




Reliability Relationship The reliability of a downstream unit is a function of its own
reliability and the reliability of the unit supporting its induced functions. Assuming that
the unit capability is directly contingent on the induced functions, this reliability can be
expressed by multiplication. The magnitude of the induced function requirements on unit
2 (Req2) from figure 105 is a function of the magnitude of the functional requirement on
unit 1 (Req1). Defining the ‘system’ as unit 1 and 2 shown in figure 105 and using f (Req1)
to represent this relationship the reliability of unit 1 is given by:
Psystem (Req1) = P1 (Req1) · P2 (f (Req1)) (66)
Criticality Requirement Relationship When the criticality requirement of the
downstream element is known, this requirement/hazard relationship can be propagated
upstream. Expanding the relationship shown in table 46, the ‘simple’ relationship defining
the hazard relationship for unit 2 (U2crit) to the hazard relationship of unit 1 (U1crit) is















With increasing capacity of unit 2, the percentage loss at which hazards begin to be
introduced becomes larger. However, at 100 % function loss the hazard remains the same.
This hazard relationship is also scaled by the relationship between function and induced
function given through unit 1, and the level of dependence of unit 1 on the induced func-
tion. When failures in the induced function do not directly correlate to failures of in the
downstream unit the dependence of unit 1 on its own induced function must be defined and
included as a scaling factor in equation 67.
While the hazard related to failures of individual elements is given by this criticality
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Figure 106: Allocation Relationship
relationships, the actual reliability which constrains the upstream unit must take the reli-
ability of additional upstream and downstream capability. This holds for each of the unit
types.
E.2 Allocation Relationship
With complex graphs, subsequent upstream relationships may necessitate that information
be made available from all downstream functional dependencies. These relationships are
affected by the complexity of the system graph.
Criticality Requirement Relationship Propagating criticality through an ‘allo-
cation’ relationship is more complex than for a ‘simple’ relationship. Indeed, a ‘simple’
relationship can be considered a unique form of an ‘allocation,’ where there exists only
one element in the functional group to which hazards must be allocated. The ‘allocation’
block is considered an element in the system for this analysis with no physical attributes
whose capabilities are defined by the upstream functional group, and whose requirements
and criticality are defined by the downstream unit. Assigning criticality to units within a
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Comparing equation 68 for an allocation relationship and equation 67 for a simple
relationship, a simple relationship is one in which requirements are allocated to only one
upstream element. For the ‘allocation’ relationship, the capability of other upstream units
must also be taken into account. Depending on the capacity of the other units within the
group, the criticality of each individual unit changes. For example, if one unit is responsible
for individually supporting the entire load, its criticality will be much higher than if multiple
units are available. With increasing capacity of the redundant units, the criticality of a
complete capability loss of one of the units within the group is greatly reduced. This can
be seen as a shifting of the criticality relationship for the allocation element using
The allocation element is an representation of the entire functional group subsequent
downstream units. An ’allocation’ element has no intrinsic physical properties which alter
the reliability or capability requirements of the system. Induced requirements and criticality
attributes are inherited from downstream and capability and reliability attributes are inher-
ited from the functional group. If the functional group is induced, subsequent downstream
elements perceive the upstream group as an allocation element.
Reliability Relationship Determining the reliability of the allocation element is gen-
erated using the parallel formatting of unit combinations as introduced in Method 2. These
relationships were discussed in section Proportional Function Failure.
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Figure 107: Combination Relationship
E.2.0.1 Combination Relationship
Criticality Requirement Relationship The ‘combination’ relationship is the most
complex of the three relationship types. In assigning criticality, the multiple downstream
elements each contribute the hazard associated upstream ‘combination’ unit loss. Similar to
the ‘allocation’ unit, ‘combinations’ have no physical attributes. Capability and reliability
attributes are inherited from the bounding upstream unit and requirements and critical-
ity are inherited from the combined downstream units. In this situation, where multiple
requirements are placed on the same unit, the criticality of the combination unit (C) is
calculated by equation 69.
(U1,4, U2,4, . . . , Un,4)





max (Reqi) (1−%lossReqi (Uicrit)) (69)
Ccrit (%lossC) = %loss−1C (Ccrit)
For convenience sake, while the other relationships which express the criticality in terms
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of functional requirement loss, ‘combination’ relationships express the loss in terms of crit-
icality. This relationship is then inverted to generate criticality in terms of failure.
Figure 108 illustrates the hazard relationship for a ‘combination’ element in terms of
three downstream units with displayed criticality curves. These three units demand 2, 3,
and 4 units of some notional functional requirement from a single entity. Thus, the total
capacity demanded from the upstream combination element in 9 units. Through equation
69, the hazard associated with these combined elements was determined.
As is evident in figure 108 (a), in order for a marginal hazard to occur, unit 1 has to
be failed by approximately 1.45, unit 2 must be fail 1.4, and unit 3 must fail by 1.9. If the
criticality of these unit failures are independent and trades are made to minimize hazard,
then the criticality element must lose 4.75 out of a 9 units of capability. As can be seen in
figure 108 (b), this is indeed the case.
Reliability Relationship Load shedding optimization strategies are managed through
combination relationships. With one element supporting multiple loads, the loss of this
element requires represents a degradation in one or multiple downstream elements. Deciding
which of these elements lose functional support necessitates optimization. The percent
function loss of downstream elements is determined through the optimization process shown
in equation 70. The hazard is minimized by varying which downstream load is no longer
supported. This optimization is constrained by the remaining capacity of the combination
element element. The probability of an induced function loss on an element downstream
from a combination relationship is determined thusly.
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 ≤ (1− fail%C)CapC
(70)
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Figure 109: Combination-Allocation Relationship for Notional System Providing
Electrical Power
E.3 Complex Allocation-Combination Relationships
Consider the notional example displayed in figure 109. The hazard associated with the up-
stream Unit 9 (Fuel System) must be expressed as the combination of multiple downstream
elements all supporting a similar allocation element. With total loss of U9, R1 (provide
electrical power) cannot be fulfilled. Therefore, the U9 failure/hazard curve cannot be cal-
culated directly as a function of the adjacent unit criticality. Structural information must
propagate upstream all the way from the boundary requirement.
Requirements and criticality communicated through each of the edges in this directed
graph must carry information regarding requirement origin and augmentation. Edge tags
for the figure above are displayed in table 47. In this table, the allocation relationship is





. Combinations are displayed with comma
separated and parenthesized elements or allocations. Edges which stem from units in an
allocation relationship are tagged by the proportion of the downstream requirement (in this
case R1) provided by the unit. In order to fully characterize the sources of criticality for
upstream units, criticality elements sum the requirements being received from downstream.
For allocation-combination graphs efficiency information must be taken into account
while considering optimal load shedding. Assuming paths are shed in order of efficiency
329























































































































(least efficient to most efficient) the slope of the function/hazard relationship will sequen-
tially increase as the shed parallel paths increase in efficiency. Graph tags, therefore, include
information regarding the efficiency of the paths. The parenthesized groupings of elements
seen in table 47 indicate that the associated criticality curve (R1 in the case of edge 10)
must be reformed with regards to the capability and efficiencies of the parallel unit paths.
Looking at combination elements in this example, the criticalities of engines U7 and
U8 are derived through an efficiency scaled simple relationship with the buses U1 and
U2 respectively. Additionally, the criticality of the fuel system (U9) receiving edge 10
can be expressed as an efficiency adjusted simple relationship with the original boundary
requirement to provide power R1. With total loss at U9 the requirement, R1, cannot be
fulfilled.
Decomposing and propagating unit criticality in this fashion imposes reliability con-
straints which limit the capacity and reliability of each unit depending on its specific func-
tional dependencies. These reliability constraints are defined with respect to architecture
specific load shedding strategies generated by hazard minimization for every combination
relationship which consider the support of the ultimate downstream functionality.
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E.3.1 Staggered Combinations and Allocations
Load shedding optimization is further complicated when multiple boundary functions, com-
binations, and allocations interact simultaneously. Two staggered relationships are displayed
in figure 110. In the staggered combination situation (figure 110a), U5 supports both re-
quirements R1 and R2. However, multiple combinations are imposed. The staggered allo-
cation relationship (figure 110b) presents an issue of combining portions of a downstream
requirement which can be fulfilled by multiple sources following multiple allocations.
Applying the notation introduced in the previous section assists in propagating require-
ments. This notation and decomposition is applied here for the staggered combination
graph. For illustrations sake linear function/hazard relationships for the boundary require-
ments are assumed. This assumption is not a requirement to apply this criticality propaga-
tion but is employed to simplify the visualization of the effect of allocation and combination
relationships. Unit efficiencies are also assumed constant for this example. The criticality
relationships for each of the graph edges are displayed in figure 111. The horizontal axis of
these graphs represents the magnitude of capability loss of the upstream element connected
by the edge. The vertical axis represents the normalized criticality (catastrophic hazard =1,
no effect=0). Associated allocation-combination notation and calculated graph notations
are given in table 48.
Assuming a linear relationship between function and hazard for the boundary require-
ments yields figure 111a and b. The loss of ability to support requirement 1 or 2 (R1,
R2) yields catastrophic consequences. Edges 1 and 2 come from the allocation element up-
stream of R1. As shown in figure 111 c and d, loss of functionality of each redundant unit
yields no hazardous effect until a threshold has been crossed. This threshold is defined by
the overall capacity of the functional group. Additionally, total failure of one of the units
does not mean loss of functional capability. The max hazard incurred by each independent
unit failure corresponds to the capacity of the element with regard to the total functional
requirements.








































































Figure 110: Requirements Propagation with Complex Allocations and Combina-
tions
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(a) Edge R1 (b) Edge R2
(c) Edge 1 (d) Edge 2
(e) Edge 3 (f) Edge 4
(g) Edge 5
Figure 111: Function/Hazard Relationships for Edges of the Staggered Combination
Graph Depicted in Figure 110a.
333










X1 = U1max + U2max −R1max








X2 = U1max + U2max −R1max




























































































































First column in reference to the graph displayed in figure 111
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upstream unit. However, this criticality is offset by the overrating of U3 and scaled by U3
efficiency.
Calculating the criticality of requirements communicated through edge 4 begins to ad-
dress optimal load shedding. No hazard is seen with failures of units upstream of U4 until
all overrated capability has been lost from U2, U3, and U4. The first linear increase in
hazard occurs with with simultaneous failure through U2 and U3 until the max hazard
for U2 loss has be seen. The steeper linear section occurs once U2 has lost all functional
support and R1 has lost all possible capability through U4 failure. Therefore, this second
section represents loss to R1.
Edge 5 has 4 linear sections. The first is a constant offset which includes the overrating
associated with the path R2-U3-U4 and the maximum available overrating from R1-U1 or
R1-U2-U4. The second section includes load shedding for the least efficient path from U1
to U5 and the path from U2 to U5. Once load has been shed from the least efficient path,
the third section represents proportional losses through the more efficient path.
Characterizing the system in terms of a directed graph through functional induction
relationships between elements allows criticality relationships to be propagated through-
out a complex system through unit interdependencies. Supplying information regarding
downstream graphical relationships to the upstream load providers allows complicated rela-
tionships to be reduced in terms of their impact on the ultimate provision of some capability
demand expressed at the platform level. Propagating this information throughout the sys-
tem is necessary in order to optimize load shedding for each combination relationship.
While calculations for this example do not extend into the time domain, these graphs
can represent the projection of the hazard curve for a given failure duration (τ).
Additionally, with more complex unit requirement propagation (i.e. a requirement crit-
icality coming out of a unit has a nonlinear relationship with incoming requirement critical-
ity) downstream %loss must be expressed as a function of upstream %loss. Therefore, to
fully characterize this continuous relationship future work will explore the use of surrogate
models in defining the efficiencies as a function of magnitude of requirements and other
environment conditions.
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E.4 Analytical Formulation Limitations
Certain limitations exist in applying this analytical process to the allocation of criticality
throughout a system. As is evident in the analysis presented in tables 111 and 48, even
relatively small systems mathematic formulations become very complex. As the system size
and interconnectivity increases analytical formulations become inordinately heavy. Linear
gains are also applied to represent the relationships between upstream capability available
and downstream capability for each component of the system.
Additionally, certain system features necessitate numeric evaluation. These include
systems dedicated to multiple system boundary functions which are allocated to multiple
upstream combinations. When the total requirement is entirely allocated to the source
the graph can be simplified as indicated in the figure 112 a. Because the combination
elements C1 and C2 completely fulfill the requirements from allocation elements A1 and
A2, the allocations/combinations relationships can be reposed as a combination/allocation
relationship. This is illustrated in figure 112 b.
Table 49: Information Communicated with Graph Edges from Figure 112





















































































When combination elements are not entirely dedicated to the partial fulfillment of down-
stream requirements, allocation variables must be applied. Consider the system in figure
113. The analytical formulation in this circumstance cannot be reduced completely and

















































Figure 113: Irreducible Allocation-Combination Relationship
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Table 50: Information Communicated with Graph Edges from Figure 113


























































































































































































αi,j = 1 , i = 1 : 3
Considering the complex nature of aircraft subsystems and the desired variability in
architecture concept during exploratory design, an analytical approach is insufficient in it-
self for identifying and allocating off-nominal requirements. Determining ideal allocation of
capabilities during off-nominal operations requires numeric analysis of the complex archi-
tecture.
Another shortcoming to this analytical approach is that it does not assign criticality to
component groups. Fail-safe requirements dictate that no single point failure will result in
a catastrophic consequence. The reliability requirements for a single system or component
are not solely a function of loss incurred by its own loss, but also the combined loss when
multiple failures occur simultaneously. The emergent nature of these requirements requires
the criticality of groupings of components to be ascertained.
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APPENDIX F
ADJACENCY MATRICES FOR VEHICLE SYSTEMS
ARCHITECTURES
The adjacency matrices are sparsely populated. All values in the adjacency matrix are zero
except for the indices listed in the following tables.
F.1 Conventional Architecture
Table 51 lists all matrix indices which are set by the allocation vector (α) for the conventional
architecture. Table 52 lists all matrix indices which are equal to 1 for the conventional
architecture.








The α values in table 51 are augmented by the optimizer to identify optimal failure
allocation for each fail case. Not all α values act through the adjacency matrix. Additional
values are assigned directly to units which provide for multiple functionalities.
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Table 52: Conventional Architecture Adjacency Matrix Indices Equal to One
A[65,1] A[82,2] A[124,3] A[3,11] A[18,18] A[132,27]
A[73,1] A[86,2] A[126,3] A[11,11] A[61,18] A[113,31]
A[122,1] A[89,2] A[1,9] A[5,13] A[22,22] A[130,33]
A[66,2] A[97,2] A[9,9] A[13,13] A[62,22] A[116,35]
A[74,2] A[100,2] A[2,10] A[128,14] A[25,25] A[117,36]
A[108,2] A[10,10] A[63,25]
A[15,39] A[28,45] A[20,50] A[118,55] A[120,61] A[42,69]
A[39,39] A[45,45] A[50,50] A[119,56] A[121,62] A[69,69]
A[16,41] A[134,46] A[21,52] A[23,58] A[38,67] A[44,70]
A[41,41] A[19,48] A[52,52] A[58,58] A[67,67] A[70,70]
A[17,43] A[48,48] A[29,54] A[30,60] A[40,68] A[46,71]
A[43,43] A[54,54] A[60,60] A[68,68] A[71,71]
A[47,75] A[53,78] A[59,84] A[55,92] A[36,101] A[37,109]
A[75,75] A[78,78] A[84,84] A[92,92] A[101,101] A[109,109]
A[49,76] A[46,79] A[34,87] A[64,95] A[56,103] A[80,112]
A[76,76] A[79,79] A[87,87] A[95,95] A[103,103] A[112,112]
A[51,77] A[57,83] A[35,90] A[34,98] A[72,106] A[94,113]
A[77,77] A[83,83] A[90,90] A[98,98] A[106,106] A[105,114]
A[111,115] A[32,127] A[7,133] A[14,139] A[27,145]
A[26,123] A[127,127] A[133,133] A[139,139] A[145,145]
A[123,123] A[4,129] A[8,135] A[14,141] A[33,147]
A[31,125] A[129,129] A[135,135] A[141,141] A[147,147]
A[125,125] A[6,131] A[12,137] A[27,143] A[33,149]
A[131,131] A[137,137] A[143,143] A[149,149]
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F.2 ‘All-Electric’ Architecture
Table 53 lists all matrix indices which are set by the allocation vector (α) for the ‘more-
electric’ architecture. Table 54 lists all matrix indices which are equal to 1 for the ‘more-
electric’ architecture.


















Do to the more integrated nature of the electric architecture, more than double the
number of α values are required for load shedding optimization. Sixteen of these allocation
variables assign capability from the 270VDC Busses (A[-,11] and A[-,12]).
342
Table 54: ‘All-Electric’ Architecture Adjacency Matrix Indices Equal to One
A[53,1] A[18,2] A[60,2] A[103,3] A[3,10] A[22,22]
A[59,1] A[21,2] A[79,2] A[105,3] A[10,10] A[29,22]
A[93,1] A[24,2] A[82,2] A[1,8] A[107,13] A[25,25]
A[95,1] A[44,2] A[97,2] A[8,8] A[111,14] A[30,25]
A[50,2] A[100,2] A[2,9] A[19,19] A[26,40]
A[54,2] A[9,9] A[39,19] A[40,40]
A[20,42] A[23,48] A[43,56] A[49,62] A[101,66] A[37,74]
A[42,42] A[48,48] A[56,56] A[62,62] A[73,67] A[74,74]
A[32,45] A[33,51] A[46,57] A[46,63] A[76,68] A[38,77]
A[45,45] A[51,51] A[57,57] A[63,63] A[128,69] A[77,77]
A[113,46] A[41,55] A[47,61] A[109,64] A[131,70] A[31,80]
A[55,55] A[61,61] A[98,65] A[134,71] A[80,80]
A[34,83] A[115,87] A[15,94] A[36,102] A[4,108] A[7,114]
A[83,83] A[117,88] A[94,94] A[102,102] A[108,108] A[114,114]
A[127,84] A[119,89] A[16,96] A[27,104] A[5,110] A[11,116]
A[130,85] A[121,90] A[96,96] A[104,104] A[110,110] A[116,116]
A[133,86] A[123,91] A[35,99] A[28,106] A[6,112] A[12,118]
A[125,92] A[99,99] A[106,106] A[112,112] A[118,118]
A[13,120] A[14,124] A[52,129] A[17,135]





OPTIMIZATION ROUTINE FOR CONVENTIONAL
ARCHITECTURE
The routine entitled ./F indMinHazards.m determines the optimal allocation of capability
which minimizes the operational hazards associated with the failure of the units indicated
by the {cindex} array. Four outputs are generated by this routine. All optimal failure
information is given in 1 % increments for magnitude of failure from 0% failed to 100%
failed.
[AllCaps] - This 2 dimensional, n × 101 matrix lists all n unit and system input and
output capabilities for level of failure.
[Hazard] - This matrix gives the magnitude of the system level hazard incurred from 0
to 100% failure in increments of 1%.
[alphavals] - This 2 dimensional, p × 101 matrix gives the values of the capability
allocation variables for all magnitude of failure.
{initalphas} - This vector gives the initial setting for the α variables which yield 0
hazard. This information is used as the starting point for subsequent optimizations.
Seven input variables are used to generate the hazard information: the adjacency matrix
([A]), initial capability ([C]), external unit capability limits ({Clims}), the failure indices
({cindex}), the initial allocation variable values ({allalphas}), the adjacency matrix indices
for these allocation variables ([matrixalphainds]), and the mission segment being considered
(misseg).
The adjacency matrix is constructed with the adjacency matrix, [A], the allocation vari-
ables, [allalphas], and the locations where these allocation variables act, [matrixalphainds].
[A] is a square matrix which maps the flow of capability between system units. When mul-
tiple users receive capability from one unit in the system the allocation variable determine
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how capability is proportionally assigned to the users.
The initial capability matrix [C] and any external limitation on unit capabilities ({Clims}).
The capability matrix carries all necessary information that is required to characterize the
functional relationship between two units. Shaft power capability is given C(,1) = power
and C(,2) = speed. Pneumatic airflow is given by C(,1) = ṁ, C(,2) = Pressure, and
C(,3) = Temperature. Thrust is the most complicated capability variable. Engine thrust
capability requires is characterized by C(,1) = Thrust, C(,2) = %Failure, C(,3) =
FuelF low, C(,4) = EngineBleedHP , C(,5) = EngineBleedLP , C(,6) = EngineBleedFan,
C(,7) = EngineHPShaftLoad, and C(,8) = EngineLPShaftLoad. With two engines
providing thrust the overall thrust capability is characterized by these variables for both
engines.
The {cindex} vector is used to limit the capability of the listed units. The indices in
this vector correspond the specific row values in the [Clims] matrix. As failures are imposed
the capability limit value is scaled by the loss.
./FindMinHazards.m
1 function [ AllCaps , Hazard , a l p h a v a l s , i n i t a l p h a s ]= FindMinHazards (A, C, Clims , cindex , a l l a l p h a s ,
matr ixalphainds , misseg )
2 %% This f u n c t i o n d e t e r m i n e s l o a d s h e d d i n g o p t i m i z a t i o n (LSO) f o r t h e C o n v e n t i o n a l A r c h i t e c t u r e .
3 t h e s t e p =5; % S e t s t e p s i z e f o r LSO
4 m a t r i x a l p h a i n d s=t r a n s p o s e ( m a t r i x a l p h a i n d s ) ; % Format a l p h a v a l i n d i c e s
5
6 o p t i o n s=optimset ( ’ Tolfun ’ ,1 e−3) ; % O p t i m i z a t i o n s e t t i n g s
7 o p t i o n s=optimset ( opt ions , ’ TolX ’ ,1 e−3) ;
8 o p t i o n s=optimset ( opt ions , ’ MaxIter ’ ,10000) ;
9 i n i t i a l a l p h a v a l s ( 1 , : )=a l l a l p h a s ;
10 e x i t f l a g=zeros ( 1 , 1 0 1 ) ;
11
12 as=length ( a l l a l p h a s ) ; % I n i t i a l i z e o u t p u t v a r s
13 a l p h a v a l s=ones ( 1 0 1 , as ( 1 ) ) ;
14 Hazard=zeros ( 1 , 1 0 1 ) ;
15
16 %% Perform i n i t i a l o p t i m i z a t i o n s
17 checkhazval =0;
18 s =0;
19 for x=0: t h e s t e p : 1 0 0
20 for f =1: length ( c index )
21 Clims ( c index ( f ) )=(1−x /100)∗C( cindex ( f ) , 1 ) ; % Impose % f a i l u r e
22 end
23 check=GethazardConv (A, C, Clims , i n i t i a l a l p h a v a l s ( s , : ) , . . .
24 matr ixalphainds , misseg ) ; % Check i n i t i a l h a z a r d
25 i f check==0 | | checkhazval==1 % Check need t o f i n d o p t i m a l
345
26 a l p h a v a l s ( x +1 , :)=i n i t i a l a l p h a v a l s ( s , : ) ;
27 Hazard ( x+1)=0;
28 e l s e
29 % Use g r a d i e n t b a s e d f m i n s e a r c h t o f i n d optimum
30 [ a l p h a v a l s ( x +1 , :) , Hazard ( x+1) , e x i t f l a g ( x+1)]= f m i n s e a r c h (@( a l l a l p h a s ) GethazardConv (A, C,
Clims , a l l a l p h a s , matr ixalphainds , misseg ) , i n i t i a l a l p h a v a l s ( s , : ) , o p t i o n s ) ;
31 end
32 checkhazval = Hazard ( x+1) ;
33 s=s +1;
34 c a p a b i l i t y ( s )=(1−x /100)∗C( cindex ( 1 ) , 1 ) ; % S t o r e f a i l s t a t e
35 i n i t i a l a l p h a v a l s ( s , : ) =a l p h a v a l s ( x +1 , :) ; % S t o r e a l l o c a t i o n v a r i a b l e s
36 i f x==0




41 %% F i t p c h i p s p l i n e t o a l p h a v a l s
42 a l l c a p s=C( cindex ( 1 ) , 1 ) :−C( cindex ( 1 ) , 1 ) / 1 0 0 : 0 ;
43 for j =1: as ( 1 )
44 a l p h a v a l s ( : , j )=pchip ( c a p a b i l i t y , i n i t i a l a l p h a v a l s ( : , j ) , a l l c a p s ) ;
45 end
46
47 %% E s t i m a t e h a z a r d s w i t h a l p h a s p l i n e
48 for x=1:101
49 for f =1: length ( c index )
50 Clims ( c index ( f ) ) =(1−(x−1) /100)∗C( cindex ( f ) , 1 ) ;
51 end
52 Hazard ( x )=GethazardConv (A, C, Clims , a l p h a v a l s ( x , : ) , matr ixalphainds , misseg ) ;
53 end
54
55 %% Check h a z a r d s and f i l l i n w i t h l o c a l o p t i m i z a t i o n on s m a l l e r i n t e r v a l s
56 s =0;
57 yes =0;
58 for i =100:−1:1 % Check from 100% downward
59 i f min( Hazard ( ( i +1) : 1 0 1 ) )<Hazard ( i ) && i ˜=1 % Check i f monotonic
60 yes=yes +1;
61 e l s e
62 i f yes ˜=0
63 for new=1:( yes /3) : yes+1 % Run 4 o p t i m i z a t i o n s
64 ind=i+yes+1−new ;
65 for f =1: length ( c index )
66 Clims ( c index ( f ) ) =(1−( ind−1) /100)∗C( cindex ( f ) , 1 ) ;
67 end
68 c a p a b i l i t y ( s +1)=(1−( ind−1) /100)∗C( cindex ( 1 ) , 1 ) ;
69 [ i n i t i a l a l p h a v a l s ( s +1 , :) , Haz ( s +1) , e x i t f l a g ( s +1)]= f m i n s e a r c h (@( a l l a l p h a s )
GethazardConv (A, C, Clims , a l l a l p h a s , matr ixalphainds , misseg ) , a l p h a v a l s ( round ( ind
+1) , : ) , o p t i o n s ) ;
70 s=s +1;
71 end
72 for new=1: yes+1 % Resample w i t h s p l i n e f i t
73 ind=i+yes+1−new ;
74 cap=(1−( ind−1) /100)∗C( cindex ( 1 ) , 1 ) ;
75 for f =1: length ( c index )
76 Clims ( c index ( f ) ) =(1−( ind−1) /100)∗C( cindex ( f ) , 1 ) ;
77 end
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78 for j =1:sum( as )
79 a l p h a v a l s ( ind , j )=pchip ( c a p a b i l i t y , i n i t i a l a l p h a v a l s ( : , j ) , cap ) ;
80 end







88 %% Check h a z a r d s on 1% i n t e r v a l s
89 for i =100:−1:1
90 i f min( Hazard ( ( i +1) : 1 0 1 ) )<Hazard ( i ) % Check i f monotonic
91 for f =1: length ( c index ) % Optimize a l l e r r o r s
92 Clims ( c index ( f ) ) =(1−( i −1) /100)∗C( cindex ( f ) , 1 ) ;
93 end
94 [ a l p h a v a l s ( i , : ) , Hazard ( i ) , e x i t f l a g ( i ) ]= f m i n s e a r c h (@( a l l a l p h a s ) GethazardConv (A, C, Clims ,
a l l a l p h a s , matr ixalphainds , misseg ) , a l p h a v a l s ( i +1 , :) , o p t i o n s ) ;
95 end
96 end
97 Hazard=t r a n s p o s e ( Hazard ) ;
98
99 %% Find a l l c a p a b i l i t i e s w i t h o p t i m a l a l p h a a l l o c a t i o n s
100 AllCl ims=Clims ;
101 for i =1:101
102 for f =1: length ( c index )
103 AllCl ims ( c index ( f ) ) =(1−( i −1) /100)∗C( cindex ( f ) , 1 ) ;
104 end
105 X=FindBFCaps (A, C, AllClims , a l p h a v a l s ( i , : ) , m a t r i x a l p h a i n d s ) ;
106 AllCaps ( : , i )=X( : , 1 ) ;
107 end
108
109 %% Find p r o p o r t i o n a l a l p h a v a l u e s
110 thesum=zeros ( 1 0 1 , length ( m a t r i x a l p h a i n d s ) ) ;
111 for i =1: length ( m a t r i x a l p h a i n d s )
112 for j =1: length ( m a t r i x a l p h a i n d s )
113 i f m a t r i x a l p h a i n d s ( j , 2 )==m a t r i x a l p h a i n d s ( i , 2 )




118 a l p h a v a l s ( : , 1 : length ( m a t r i x a l p h a i n d s ) )=abs ( a l p h a v a l s ( : , 1 : length ( m a t r i x a l p h a i n d s ) ) ) . / thesum ;
The optimal allocation of capability is achieved by implementing the gradient based “fminsearch”
embedded Matlab R© routine. The optimization method is crucial to determining off-nominal
performance attributes. More efficient and accurate optimizers could be identified and im-
plemented for this process. However, the application of this optimizer was sufficient to
address the hypothesis for this research. Exploration of more ideal optimization processes
is a matter for ancillary research opportunities.
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Optimal failure allocation is achieved by augmentation of the values in the allalphas ma-
trix and determining its effect on the system as a whole. The function “./GethazardConv.m”
is used to determine the system capability. This portion of the Matlab R© code is autowrit-
ten from the structure and composition of the architecture as defined by the Architecture
Design Environment (ADEN) as discussed in the methods chapter.
Hazard is calculated by the “hazardfunction” function call which consists of table
lookups. These table lookups reflect the function/hazard relationship discussed in the
methods chapter. All boundary function capability values (Capsout) not equal to -1 in
this function call are active in hazard identification. This hazard lookup must also consider
the mission segment in which the evaluation must take place (misseg).
The system capability itself is determined by the function “FindBFCaps”. This code
is also autogenerated from the Architecture Design Environment. System attributes are
read from the global Matlab workspace as defined by the user from system sizing and mis-
sion analysis. Following the formatting of input variables this function determines system
capabilities by the the following equation:
Xi+1 = f ([A]×min (Xi,Ki) ,Op) (71)
The first column of the [C] matrix is given by {X}. This value is determined by repetitive
execution of the unit capability transfer functions, application of capability limits, and
multiplication with the adjacency matrix. Other capability info is also transferred. Once
the capability is converged the level of hazard associated with the available capability is
determined.
./GethazardConv.m
1 function Hazard=GethazardConv (A, C, Clims , a l l a l p h a s , matr ixalphainds , misseg )
2 Capsout=FindBFCaps (A, C, Clims , a l l a l p h a s , m a t r i x a l p h a i n d s ) ; % Get system c a p a b i l i t i e s
3 BFCaps=−ones ( 8 , 2 2 ) ; % A l l i n a c t i v e caps −1
4 BFCaps ( 2 , : )=Capsout ( 5 , : ) ; % Hot Pneumatic C a p a b i l i t y
5 BFCaps ( 4 , : )=Capsout ( 4 , : ) ; % 28VDC C a p a b i l i t y
6 BFCaps ( 6 , : )=Capsout ( 6 , : ) ; % 120VAC C a p a b i l i t y
7 BFCaps ( 7 , : )=Capsout ( 7 , : ) ; % H y d r a u l i c C a p a b i l i t y
8 BFCaps ( 8 , : )=Capsout ( 8 , : ) ; % Thrust C a p a b i l i t y




12 function Capsout=FindBFCaps (A, C, Clims , a l l a l p h a s , m a t r i x a l p h a i n d s )
13 %% This f u n c t i o n c a l c u l a t e s sys tem c a p a b i l i t i e s
14 %G l o b a l u n i t a t t r i b u t e s v a l u e s s e t e x t e r n a l l y by d e s i g n e r i n t h e ADEN
15 global AC120VLoads AC120VReq Cap design
16 global PreCooler 1 HotPn Cap design
17 global PreCooler 2 HotPn Cap design
18 global RamHX HotPn Cap design
19 global HPBleed 1 HPPn Cap design
20 global Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 6 o u t
21 global Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 5 o u t
22 global Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 3 o u t
23 global Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 5 o u t
24 global Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 3 o u t
25 global Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 3 o u t
26 global LPBleed 1 LPPn Cap design
27 global FanDuct 1 FanAir Cap design
28 global HPAGB 1 HPShaft Cap design
29 global HPBleed 2 HPPn Cap design
30 global LPBleed 2 LPPn Cap design
31 global FanDuct 2 FanAir Cap design
32 global HPAGB 2 HPShaft Cap design
33 global HPBleed 3 HPPn Cap design
34 global HPAGB 3 HPShaft Cap design
35 global Engine 1 HPPn Cap design
36 global Engine 1 LPPn Cap design
37 global Engine 1 FanAir Cap des ign
38 global Engine 1 HPShaft Cap design
39 global Engine 1 LPShaft Cap des ign
40 global E n g i n e 1 T h r u s t C a p d e s i g n
41 global I n t e g r a t i o n A l t i t u d e f t o u t
42 global I n t e g r a t i o n M a c h o u t
43 global Engine 2 HPPn Cap design
44 global Engine 2 LPPn Cap design
45 global Engine 2 FanAir Cap des ign
46 global Engine 2 HPShaft Cap design
47 global Engine 2 LPShaft Cap des ign
48 global E n g i n e 2 T h r u s t C a p d e s i g n
49 global APU HPPn Cap design
50 global APU HPShaft Cap design
51 global HSACGen 1 AC120V Cap design
52 global HSDC28VGen 1 DC28V Cap design
53 global Pump 1 Hyd Cap design
54 global FuelPump 1 FuelPress Cap design
55 global HSACGen 2 AC120V Cap design
56 global HSDC28VGen 2 DC28V Cap design
57 global Pump 2 Hyd Cap design
58 global FuelPump 2 FuelPress Cap design
59 global HSDC28VGen 3 DC28V Cap design
60 global FuelPump 3 FuelPress Cap design
61 global RamDuct RamAir Cap design
62 global F u e l S y s 1 F u e l C a p d e s i g n
63 global F u e l S y s 2 F u e l C a p d e s i g n
64 global DC28VLoads DC28VReq Cap design
65 global HotPnLoads HotPnReq Cap design
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66 global HydLoads HydReq Cap design
67 global ThrustLoads ThrustReq Cap design
68 global AC120VBus AC120V Cap design
69 global Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 2 o u t
70 global Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 2 o u t
71 global Z o n e L e n g t h f t 2 2 o u t
72 global DC28VBus 1 DC28V Cap design
73 global DC28VBus 2 DC28V Cap design
74 global HydSys 1 Hyd Cap design
75 global HydSys 2 Hyd Cap design
76 global HotPnSys 1 HotPn Cap design
77 global HotPnSys 2 HotPn Cap design
78
79 % I n i t i a l i z e c a p a b i l i t y i n f o
80 C1=zeros ( length (C) , 2 2 ) ;
81 t h e s i z e=s i z e ( m a t r i x a l p h a i n d s ) ;
82 a l p h a l e n g t h=s i z e ( a l l a l p h a s ) ;
83 matrixalpha=abs ( a l l a l p h a s ( 1 : t h e s i z e ( 1 ) ) ) ;
84 %Write a l l o c a t i o n v a r i a b l e ( a l l a l p h a s ) v a l u e s t o Adjacency m a t r i x
85 for i =1: t h e s i z e ( 1 )
86 t h e a l p h a s=abs ( t r a n s p o s e ( a l l a l p h a s ( 1 : t h e s i z e ( 1 ) ) ) ) ;
87 thesum=sum( ( s q u e e z e ( m a t r i x a l p h a i n d s ( : , 2 ) )==s q u e e z e ( m a t r i x a l p h a i n d s ( i , 2 ) ) ) .∗ t h e a l p h a s ) ;
88 matrixalpha ( i )=matrixalpha ( i ) /thesum ;
89 A( m a t r i x a l p h a i n d s ( i , 1 ) , m a t r i x a l p h a i n d s ( i , 2 ) )=matrixalpha ( i ) ;
90 end
91 alpha=a l l a l p h a s ( t h e s i z e +1: a l p h a l e n g t h ( 2 ) ) ;
92 % I n i t i a l i z e t h e c a p a b i l i t y m a t r i x
93 C( : , 1 )=min( Clims ( : ) ,C( : , 1 ) ) ;
94 for i =1:2∗ length (C)
95 C( : , 1 )=A∗C( : , 1 ) ;
96 C( : , 2 )=A∗C( : , 2 ) . / (sum(A, 2 ) ) ;




101 while x>0.000001 && k<3∗length (C)
102 D( : , k )=C( : , 1 ) ;
103 %Run A l l Unit T r a n s f e r F u n c t i o n s
104 [C( 1 3 , 1 ) ]=DS AC120VLoads Caps (C( 1 2 , 1 ) , AC120VLoads AC120VReq Cap design ) ;
105 [C( 1 8 , 1 : 3 ) ]= DS PreCooler Caps (C( 1 5 , 1 : 3 ) ,C( 1 6 , 1 : 3 ) ,C( 1 7 , 1 : 3 ) , PreCooler 1 HotPn Cap design ) ;
106 [C( 2 2 , 1 : 3 ) ]= DS PreCooler Caps (C( 1 9 , 1 : 3 ) ,C( 2 0 , 1 : 3 ) ,C( 2 1 , 1 : 3 ) , PreCooler 2 HotPn Cap design ) ;
107 [C( 2 5 , 1 : 3 ) ]=DS RamHX Caps(C( 2 3 , 1 : 3 ) , zeros ( 1 , 2 1 ) ,C( 2 4 , 1 : 3 ) , RamHX HotPn Cap design ) ;
108 [C( 3 9 , 1 : 3 ) ]=DS HPBleed Caps (C( 3 8 , 1 : 3 ) , HPBleed 1 HPPn Cap design , Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 6 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 5 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 5 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 3 o u t ) ;
109 [C( 4 1 , 1 : 3 ) ]= DS LPBleed Caps (C( 4 0 , 1 : 3 ) , LPBleed 1 LPPn Cap design , Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 6 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 5 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 5 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 3 o u t ) ;
110 [C( 4 3 , 1 : 3 ) ]=DS FanDuct Caps (C( 4 2 , 1 : 3 ) , FanDuct 1 FanAir Cap design , Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 6 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 5 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 5 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 3 o u t ) ;
111 [C( 4 5 , 1 : 2 ) ]=DS HPAGB Caps(C( 4 4 , 1 : 2 ) , HPAGB 1 HPShaft Cap design , Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 6 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 5 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 5 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 3 o u t ) ;
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112 [C( 4 8 , 1 : 3 ) ]=DS HPBleed Caps (C( 4 7 , 1 : 3 ) , HPBleed 2 HPPn Cap design , Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 6 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 5 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 5 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 3 o u t ) ;
113 [C( 5 0 , 1 : 3 ) ]= DS LPBleed Caps (C( 4 9 , 1 : 3 ) , LPBleed 2 LPPn Cap design , Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 6 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 5 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 5 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 3 o u t ) ;
114 [C( 5 2 , 1 : 3 ) ]=DS FanDuct Caps (C( 5 1 , 1 : 3 ) , FanDuct 2 FanAir Cap design , Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 6 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 5 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 5 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 3 o u t ) ;
115 [C( 5 4 , 1 : 2 ) ]=DS HPAGB Caps(C( 5 3 , 1 : 2 ) , HPAGB 2 HPShaft Cap design , Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 6 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 5 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 5 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 3 o u t ) ;
116 [C( 5 8 , 1 : 3 ) ]=DS HPBleed Caps (C( 5 7 , 1 : 3 ) , HPBleed 3 HPPn Cap design , Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 6 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 5 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 5 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 3 o u t ) ;
117 [C( 6 0 , 1 : 2 ) ]=DS HPAGB Caps(C( 5 9 , 1 : 2 ) , HPAGB 3 HPShaft Cap design , Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 6 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 5 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 5 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 3 o u t ) ;
118 [C( 6 7 , 1 : 3 ) ,C( 6 8 , 1 : 3 ) ,C( 6 9 , 1 : 3 ) ,C( 7 0 , 1 : 2 ) ,OneTempOut5 ,C( 7 1 , 1 : 1 4 ) ]= DS Engine Caps (C( 6 5 , 1 : 3 ) ,
C( 6 6 , 1 ) ,C( 6 4 , 1 ) , Engine 1 HPPn Cap design , Engine 1 LPPn Cap design ,
Engine 1 FanAir Cap design , Engine 1 HPShaft Cap design , Engine 1 LPShaft Cap design ,
Engine 1 Thrust Cap des ign , I n t e g r a t i o n A l t i t u d e f t o u t , I n t e g r a t i o n M a c h o u t , alpha ( 1 ) ,
alpha ( 2 ) , alpha ( 3 ) , alpha ( 4 ) , 0 , alpha ( 5 ) ) ;
119 C( 7 1 , 2 )=max( eps ,1−Clims ( 7 1 ) /7000) ;
120 [C( 7 5 , 1 : 3 ) ,C( 7 6 , 1 : 3 ) ,C( 7 7 , 1 : 3 ) ,C( 7 8 , 1 : 2 ) ,OneTempOut5 ,C( 7 9 , 1 : 1 4 ) ]= DS Engine Caps (C( 7 3 , 1 : 3 ) ,
C( 7 4 , 1 ) ,C( 7 2 , 1 ) , Engine 2 HPPn Cap design , Engine 2 LPPn Cap design ,
Engine 2 FanAir Cap design , Engine 2 HPShaft Cap design , Engine 2 LPShaft Cap design ,
Engine 2 Thrust Cap des ign , I n t e g r a t i o n A l t i t u d e f t o u t , I n t e g r a t i o n M a c h o u t , alpha ( 6 ) ,
alpha ( 7 ) , alpha ( 8 ) , alpha ( 9 ) , 0 , alpha ( 1 0 ) ) ;
121 C( 7 9 , 2 )=max( eps ,1−Clims ( 7 9 ) /7000) ;
122 [C( 8 3 , 1 : 3 ) ,C( 8 4 , 1 : 2 ) ]=DS APU Caps (C( 8 1 , 1 : 3 ) ,C( 8 2 , 1 ) ,C( 8 0 , 1 ) , APU HPPn Cap design ,
APU HPShaft Cap design , alpha ( 1 1 ) , alpha ( 1 2 ) ) ;
123 [C( 8 7 , 1 ) ]=DS HSACGen Caps (C( 8 5 , 1 : 2 ) ,C( 8 6 , 1 ) , HSACGen 1 AC120V Cap design ) ;
124 [C( 9 0 , 1 ) ]=DS HSDC28VGen Caps (C( 8 8 , 1 : 2 ) ,C( 8 9 , 1 ) , HSDC28VGen 1 DC28V Cap design ) ;
125 [C( 9 2 , 1 ) ]=DS Pump Caps (C( 9 1 , 1 : 2 ) , Pump 1 Hyd Cap design ) ;
126 [C( 9 5 , 1 ) ]=DS FuelPump Caps (C( 9 4 , 1 ) ,C( 9 3 , 1 : 2 ) , FuelPump 1 FuelPress Cap design ) ;
127 [C( 9 8 , 1 ) ]=DS HSACGen Caps (C( 9 6 , 1 : 2 ) ,C( 9 7 , 1 ) , HSACGen 2 AC120V Cap design ) ;
128 [C( 1 0 1 , 1 ) ]=DS HSDC28VGen Caps (C( 9 9 , 1 : 2 ) ,C( 1 0 0 , 1 ) , HSDC28VGen 2 DC28V Cap design ) ;
129 [C( 1 0 3 , 1 ) ]=DS Pump Caps (C( 1 0 2 , 1 : 2 ) , Pump 2 Hyd Cap design ) ;
130 [C( 1 0 6 , 1 ) ]=DS FuelPump Caps (C( 1 0 5 , 1 ) ,C( 1 0 4 , 1 : 2 ) , FuelPump 2 FuelPress Cap design ) ;
131 [C( 1 0 9 , 1 ) ]=DS HSDC28VGen Caps (C( 1 0 7 , 1 : 2 ) ,C( 1 0 8 , 1 ) , HSDC28VGen 3 DC28V Cap design ) ;
132 [C( 1 1 2 , 1 ) ]=DS FuelPump Caps (C( 1 1 1 , 1 ) ,C( 1 1 0 , 1 : 2 ) , FuelPump 3 FuelPress Cap design ) ;
133 [C( 1 2 3 , 1 : 3 ) ]=DS RamDuct Caps (C( 1 2 2 , 1 : 3 ) , RamDuct RamAir Cap design , Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 6 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 5 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 5 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 3 o u t ) ;
134 [C( 1 2 5 , 1 ) ]= DS FuelSys Caps (C( 1 2 4 , 1 ) , F u e l S y s 1 F u e l C a p d e s i g n , Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 6 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 5 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 5 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 3 o u t ) ;
135 [C( 1 2 7 , 1 ) ]= DS FuelSys Caps (C( 1 2 6 , 1 ) , F u e l S y s 2 F u e l C a p d e s i g n , Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 6 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 5 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 5 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 3 o u t ) ;
136 [C( 1 2 9 , 1 ) ]=DS DC28VLoads Caps (C( 1 2 8 , 1 ) , DC28VLoads DC28VReq Cap design ) ;
137 [C( 1 3 1 , 1 : 3 ) ]=DS HotPnLoads Caps (C( 1 3 0 , 1 : 3 ) , HotPnLoads HotPnReq Cap design ) ;
138 [C( 1 3 3 , 1 ) ]=DS HydLoads Caps (C( 1 3 2 , 1 ) , HydLoads HydReq Cap design ) ;
139 [C( 1 3 5 , 1 : 1 4 ) ]= DS ThrustLoads Caps (C( 1 3 4 , 1 : 1 4 ) , ThrustLoads ThrustReq Cap design ) ;
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140 [C( 1 3 7 , 1 ) ]=DS AC120VBus Caps (C( 1 3 6 , 1 ) , AC120VBus AC120V Cap design , Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 6 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 5 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 2 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 5 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 2 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 2 2 o u t ) ;
141 [C( 1 3 9 , 1 ) ]=DS DC28VBus Caps (C( 1 3 8 , 1 ) , DC28VBus 1 DC28V Cap design , Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 6 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 5 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 5 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 3 o u t ) ;
142 [C( 1 4 1 , 1 ) ]=DS DC28VBus Caps (C( 1 4 0 , 1 ) , DC28VBus 2 DC28V Cap design , Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 6 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 5 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 5 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 3 o u t ) ;
143 [C( 1 4 3 , 1 ) ]=DS HydSys Caps (C( 1 4 2 , 1 ) , HydSys 1 Hyd Cap design , Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 6 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 5 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 5 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 3 o u t ) ;
144 [C( 1 4 5 , 1 ) ]=DS HydSys Caps (C( 1 4 4 , 1 ) , HydSys 2 Hyd Cap design , Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 6 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 5 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 5 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 3 o u t ) ;
145 [C( 1 4 7 , 1 : 3 ) ]=DS HotPnSys Caps (C( 1 4 6 , 1 : 3 ) , HotPnSys 1 HotPn Cap design ,
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 6 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 5 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 3 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 5 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 3 o u t ) ;
146 [C( 1 4 9 , 1 : 3 ) ]=DS HotPnSys Caps (C( 1 4 8 , 1 : 3 ) , HotPnSys 2 HotPn Cap design ,
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 6 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 5 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 3 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 5 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 3 o u t ) ;
147 %Impose C a p a b i l i t y L i m i t s
148 C( : , 1 )=min( Clims ,C( : , 1 ) ) ;
149 %S p e c i a l management o f t h r u s t c a p a b i l i t y
150 C1 ( 8 , 2 )=max( eps ,1−Clims ( 8 ) /7000) ;
151 C1 ( 7 1 , 2 )=max( eps ,1−Clims ( 7 1 ) /7000) ;
152 C1 ( 7 9 , 2 )=max( eps ,1−Clims ( 7 9 ) /7000) ;
153 C1 ( 1 3 4 , 2 )=max( eps ,1−Clims ( 1 3 4 ) /7000) ;
154 C1 ( 1 3 5 , 2 )=max( eps ,1−Clims ( 1 3 5 ) /7000) ;
155 %Format c a p a b i l i t y v e c t o r
156 C1 ( : , 1 )=A∗C( : , 1 ) ;
157 C1 ( : , 2 ) =(A∗(C( : , 2 ) .∗C( : , 1 ) ) ) . / ( C1 ( : , 1 )+eps ) ;
158 C1 ( : , 3 ) =(A∗(C( : , 3 ) .∗C( : , 1 ) ) ) . / ( C1 ( : , 1 )+eps ) ;
159 %S p e c i a l management o f t h r u s t c a p a b i l i t y
160 C1 ( 8 , : )=C( 1 3 5 , : ) ;
161 X1 = nonzeros (A( 4 6 , : ) ’ .∗C( : , 2 ) ) ;
162 X2 = nonzeros (A( 4 6 , : ) ’ .∗C( : , 3 ) ) ;
163 X3 = nonzeros (A( 4 6 , : ) ’ .∗C( : , 4 ) ) ;
164 X4 = nonzeros (A( 4 6 , : ) ’ .∗C( : , 5 ) ) ;
165 X5 = nonzeros (A( 4 6 , : ) ’ .∗C( : , 6 ) ) ;
166 X6 = nonzeros (A( 4 6 , : ) ’ .∗C( : , 7 ) ) ;
167 X7 = nonzeros (A( 4 6 , : ) ’ .∗C( : , 8 ) ) ;
168 for r =1: length (X1)
169 C1(46 ,1+ r ) = X1( r ) ;
170 end
171 for r =1: length (X2)
172 C1(46 ,1+1∗2+ r ) = X2( r ) ;
173 end
174 for r =1: length (X3)
175 C1(46 ,1+2∗2+ r ) = X3( r ) ;
176 end
177 for r =1: length (X4)
178 C1(46 ,1+3∗2+ r ) = X4( r ) ;
179 end
180 for r =1: length (X5)
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181 C1(46 ,1+4∗2+ r ) = X5( r ) ;
182 end
183 for r =1: length (X6)
184 C1(46 ,1+5∗2+ r ) = X6( r ) ;
185 end
186 for r =1: length (X6)
187 C1(46 ,1+6∗2+ r ) = X7( r ) ;
188 end
189 C1 ( 7 1 , : )=C( 7 1 , : ) ;
190 C1 ( 7 9 , : )=C( 7 9 , : ) ;
191 C1 ( 1 3 4 , : )=C( 4 6 , : ) ;
192 C1 ( 1 3 5 , : )=C( 1 3 5 , : ) ;
193 %E v a l u a t e d i f f e r e n c e i n c a p a b i l i t y
194 x=sum( abs (C1 ( : , 1 )−C( : , 1 ) ) ) ;
195 %Update c a p a b i l i t i e s
196 C=C1 ;
197 k=k+1;
198 D( : , k )=C( : , 1 ) ;





FUNCTION CALL FOR OPTIMIZATION OF
‘ALL-ELECTRIC’ ARCHITECTURE
The function call used to calculate the system capability for the ‘more-electric’ architecture
concept is given below. This code was autogenerated by the Architecture Design Environ-
ment. Its structure is similar to the code generate for the conventional architecture and is
discussed in the previous appendix.
./GethazardAE.m
1 function Hazard=GethazardAE (A, C, Clims , a l l a l p h a s , matr ixalphainds , misseg )
2 Capsout=FindBFCaps (A, C, Clims , a l l a l p h a s , m a t r i x a l p h a i n d s ) ; % Get system c a p a b i l i t i e s
3 BFCaps=−ones ( 8 , 2 2 ) ; % A l l i n a c t i v e caps −1
4 BFCaps ( 3 , : )=Capsout ( 5 , : ) ; % Cool Pneumatic C a p a b i l i t y
5 BFCaps ( 4 , : )=Capsout ( 4 , : ) ; % 28VDC C a p a b i l i t y
6 BFCaps ( 5 , : )=Capsout ( 6 , : ) ; % 270VDC C a p a b i l i t y
7 BFCaps ( 8 , : )=Capsout ( 7 , : ) ; % Thrust C a p a b i l i t y




12 function Capsout=FindBFCaps (A, C, Clims , a l l a l p h a s , m a t r i x a l p h a i n d s )
13 %% This f u n c t i o n c a l c u l a t e s sys tem c a p a b i l i t i e s
14 %G l o b a l u n i t a t t r i b u t e s v a l u e s s e t e x t e r n a l l y by d e s i g n e r i n t h e ADEN
15 global APU HPPn Cap design
16 global APU HPShaft Cap design
17 global HSDC270VGen 1 DC270V Cap design
18 global HSDC270VGen 2 DC270V Cap design
19 global HPAGB 3 HPShaft Cap design
20 global Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 6 o u t
21 global Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 3 o u t
22 global Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 2 o u t
23 global Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 3 o u t
24 global Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 2 o u t
25 global Z o n e L e n g t h f t 2 2 o u t
26 global HPAGB 1 HPShaft Cap design
27 global Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 5 o u t
28 global Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 5 o u t
29 global Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 2 o u t
30 global LSDC270VGen 1 DC270V Cap design
31 global HPAGB 2 HPShaft Cap design
32 global LSDC270VGen 2 DC270V Cap design
33 global Engine 1 HPPn Cap design
354
34 global Engine 1 LPPn Cap design
35 global Engine 1 FanAir Cap des ign
36 global Engine 1 HPShaft Cap design
37 global Engine 1 LPShaft Cap des ign
38 global E n g i n e 1 T h r u s t C a p d e s i g n
39 global I n t e g r a t i o n A l t i t u d e f t o u t
40 global I n t e g r a t i o n M a c h o u t
41 global Engine 2 HPPn Cap design
42 global Engine 2 LPPn Cap design
43 global Engine 2 FanAir Cap des ign
44 global Engine 2 HPShaft Cap design
45 global Engine 2 LPShaft Cap des ign
46 global E n g i n e 2 T h r u s t C a p d e s i g n
47 global RamCom270V 1 CoolPn Cap design
48 global RamCom270V 2 CoolPn Cap design
49 global HSDC270VGen 3 DC270V Cap design
50 global HSDC28VGen DC28V Cap design
51 global RamDuct 1 RamAir Cap design
52 global RamDuct 2 RamAir Cap design
53 global PCU270to28V 1 DC28V Cap design
54 global PCU270to28V 2 DC28V Cap design
55 global F u e l S y s 1 F u e l C a p d e s i g n
56 global Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 3 o u t
57 global F u e l S y s 2 F u e l C a p d e s i g n
58 global DC28VLoads DC28VReq Cap design
59 global DC270VLoads DC270VReq Cap design
60 global PnLoads PnReq Cap design
61 global ThrustLoads ThrustReq Cap design
62 global DC270VBus 1 DC270V Cap design
63 global DC270VBus 2 DC270V Cap design
64 global DC28VBus 1 DC28V Cap design
65 global DC28VBus 2 DC28V Cap design
66 global CoolPnSys 1 CoolPn Cap design
67 global CoolPnSys 2 CoolPn Cap design
68 global DCFuelPump 1 FuelPress Cap design
69 global DCFuelPump 2 FuelPress Cap design
70 global DCFuelPump 3 FuelPress Cap design
71
72 % I n i t i a l i z e c a p a b i l i t y i n f o
73 C1=zeros ( length (C) , 2 2 ) ;
74 t h e s i z e=s i z e ( m a t r i x a l p h a i n d s ) ;
75 a l p h a l e n g t h=s i z e ( a l l a l p h a s ) ;
76 matrixalpha=abs ( a l l a l p h a s ( 1 : t h e s i z e ( 1 ) ) ) ;
77 %Write a l l o c a t i o n v a r i a b l e ( a l l a l p h a s ) v a l u e s t o Adjacency m a t r i x
78 for i =1: t h e s i z e ( 1 )
79 t h e a l p h a s=abs ( t r a n s p o s e ( a l l a l p h a s ( 1 : t h e s i z e ( 1 ) ) ) ) ;
80 thesum=sum( ( s q u e e z e ( m a t r i x a l p h a i n d s ( : , 2 ) )==s q u e e z e ( m a t r i x a l p h a i n d s ( i , 2 ) ) ) .∗ t h e a l p h a s ) ;
81 matrixalpha ( i )=matrixalpha ( i ) /thesum ;
82 A( m a t r i x a l p h a i n d s ( i , 1 ) , m a t r i x a l p h a i n d s ( i , 2 ) )=matrixalpha ( i ) ;
83 end
84 alpha=a l l a l p h a s ( t h e s i z e +1: a l p h a l e n g t h ( 2 ) ) ;
85 % I n i t i a l i z e t h e c a p a b i l i t y m a t r i x
86 C( : , 1 )=min( Clims ( : ) ,C( : , 1 ) ) ;
87 for i =1:2∗ length (C)
88 C( : , 1 )=A∗C( : , 1 ) ;
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89 C( : , 2 )=A∗C( : , 2 ) . / (sum(A, 2 ) ) ;




94 while x>0.000001 && k<3∗length (C)
95 D( : , k )=C( : , 1 ) ;
96 %Run A l l Unit T r a n s f e r F u n c t i o n s
97 [ OneTempOut1 ,C( 1 9 , 1 : 2 ) ]=DS APU Caps (C( 1 6 , 1 : 3 ) ,C( 1 8 , 1 ) ,C( 1 7 , 1 ) , APU HPPn Cap design ,
APU HPShaft Cap design , 0 , 0 ) ;
98 [C( 2 2 , 1 ) ]=DS HSDC270VGen Caps (C( 2 0 , 1 : 2 ) ,C( 2 1 , 1 ) , HSDC270VGen 1 DC270V Cap design ) ;
99 [C( 2 5 , 1 ) ]=DS HSDC270VGen Caps (C( 2 3 , 1 : 2 ) ,C( 2 4 , 1 ) , HSDC270VGen 2 DC270V Cap design ) ;
100 [C( 4 0 , 1 : 2 ) ]=DS HPAGB Caps(C( 3 9 , 1 : 2 ) , HPAGB 3 HPShaft Cap design , Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 6 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 2 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 3 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 2 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 2 2 o u t ) ;
101 [C( 4 2 , 1 : 2 ) ]=DS HPAGB Caps(C( 4 1 , 1 : 2 ) , HPAGB 1 HPShaft Cap design , Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 6 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 5 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 2 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 5 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 2 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 2 2 o u t ) ;
102 [C( 4 5 , 1 ) ]=DS LSDC270VGen Caps (C( 4 3 , 1 : 2 ) ,C( 4 4 , 1 ) , LSDC270VGen 1 DC270V Cap design ) ;
103 [C( 4 8 , 1 : 2 ) ]=DS HPAGB Caps(C( 4 7 , 1 : 2 ) , HPAGB 2 HPShaft Cap design , Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 6 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 2 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 2 2 o u t ) ;
104 [C( 5 1 , 1 ) ]=DS LSDC270VGen Caps (C( 4 9 , 1 : 2 ) ,C( 5 0 , 1 ) , LSDC270VGen 2 DC270V Cap design ) ;
105 [ OneTempOut1 , OneTempOut2 , OneTempOut3 ,C( 5 5 , 1 : 2 ) ,C( 5 6 , 1 : 2 ) ,C( 5 7 , 1 : 1 4 ) ]= DS Engine Caps (C
( 5 3 , 1 : 3 ) ,C( 5 4 , 1 ) ,C( 5 2 , 1 ) , Engine 1 HPPn Cap design , Engine 1 LPPn Cap design ,
Engine 1 FanAir Cap design , Engine 1 HPShaft Cap design , Engine 1 LPShaft Cap design ,
Engine 1 Thrust Cap des ign , I n t e g r a t i o n A l t i t u d e f t o u t , I n t e g r a t i o n M a c h o u t , 0 , 0 , 0 ,
alpha ( 1 ) , alpha ( 2 ) , alpha ( 3 ) ) ;
106 C( 5 7 , 2 )=max( eps ,1−Clims ( 5 7 ) /7000) ;
107 [ OneTempOut1 , OneTempOut2 , OneTempOut3 ,C( 6 1 , 1 : 2 ) ,C( 6 2 , 1 : 2 ) ,C( 6 3 , 1 : 1 4 ) ]= DS Engine Caps (C
( 5 9 , 1 : 3 ) ,C( 6 0 , 1 ) ,C( 5 8 , 1 ) , Engine 2 HPPn Cap design , Engine 2 LPPn Cap design ,
Engine 2 FanAir Cap design , Engine 2 HPShaft Cap design , Engine 2 LPShaft Cap design ,
Engine 2 Thrust Cap des ign , I n t e g r a t i o n A l t i t u d e f t o u t , I n t e g r a t i o n M a c h o u t , 0 , 0 , 0 ,
alpha ( 4 ) , alpha ( 5 ) , alpha ( 6 ) ) ;
108 C( 6 3 , 2 )=max( eps ,1−Clims ( 6 3 ) /7000) ;
109 [C( 7 4 , 1 : 3 ) ]=DS RamCom270V Caps (C( 7 3 , 1 ) ,C( 7 2 , 1 : 3 ) , RamCom270V 1 CoolPn Cap design ) ;
110 [C( 7 7 , 1 : 3 ) ]=DS RamCom270V Caps (C( 7 6 , 1 ) ,C( 7 5 , 1 : 3 ) , RamCom270V 2 CoolPn Cap design ) ;
111 [C( 8 0 , 1 ) ]=DS HSDC270VGen Caps (C( 7 8 , 1 : 2 ) ,C( 7 9 , 1 ) , HSDC270VGen 3 DC270V Cap design ) ;
112 [C( 8 3 , 1 ) ]=DS HSDC28VGen Caps (C( 8 1 , 1 : 2 ) ,C( 8 2 , 1 ) , HSDC28VGen DC28V Cap design ) ;
113 [C( 9 4 , 1 : 3 ) ]=DS RamDuct Caps (C( 9 3 , 1 : 3 ) , RamDuct 1 RamAir Cap design , Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 6 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 2 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 2 2 o u t ) ;
114 [C( 9 6 , 1 : 3 ) ]=DS RamDuct Caps (C( 9 5 , 1 : 3 ) , RamDuct 2 RamAir Cap design , Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 6 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 2 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 3 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 2 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 2 2 o u t ) ;
115 [C( 9 9 , 1 ) ]=DS PCU270to28V Caps (C( 9 8 , 1 ) ,C( 9 7 , 1 ) , PCU270to28V 1 DC28V Cap design ) ;
116 [C( 1 0 2 , 1 ) ]=DS PCU270to28V Caps (C( 1 0 1 , 1 ) ,C( 1 0 0 , 1 ) , PCU270to28V 2 DC28V Cap design ) ;
117 [C( 1 0 4 , 1 ) ]= DS FuelSys Caps (C( 1 0 3 , 1 ) , F u e l S y s 1 F u e l C a p d e s i g n , Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 6 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 5 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 2 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 5 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 2 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 2 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 2 2 o u t ) ;
118 [C( 1 0 6 , 1 ) ]= DS FuelSys Caps (C( 1 0 5 , 1 ) , F u e l S y s 2 F u e l C a p d e s i g n , Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 6 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 5 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 2 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 5 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 2 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 2 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 2 2 o u t ) ;
119 [C( 1 0 8 , 1 ) ]=DS DC28VLoads Caps (C( 1 0 7 , 1 ) , DC28VLoads DC28VReq Cap design ) ;
120 [C( 1 1 0 , 1 ) ]=DS DC270VLoads Caps (C( 1 0 9 , 1 ) , DC270VLoads DC270VReq Cap design ) ;
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121 [C( 1 1 2 , 1 : 3 ) ]=DS PnLoads Caps ( zeros ( 1 , 2 1 ) ,C( 1 1 1 , 1 : 3 ) , PnLoads PnReq Cap design ) ;
122 [C( 1 1 4 , 1 : 1 4 ) ]= DS ThrustLoads Caps (C( 1 1 3 , 1 : 1 4 ) , ThrustLoads ThrustReq Cap design ) ;
123 [C( 1 1 6 , 1 ) ]=DS DC270VBus Caps (C( 1 1 5 , 1 ) , DC270VBus 1 DC270V Cap design , Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 6 o u t
+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 5 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 2 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 5 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 2 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 2 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 2 2 o u t ) ;
124 [C( 1 1 8 , 1 ) ]=DS DC270VBus Caps (C( 1 1 7 , 1 ) , DC270VBus 2 DC270V Cap design , Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 6 o u t
+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 5 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 2 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 5 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 5 2 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 2 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 2 2 o u t ) ;
125 [C( 1 2 0 , 1 ) ]=DS DC28VBus Caps (C( 1 1 9 , 1 ) , DC28VBus 1 DC28V Cap design , Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 6 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 2 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 3 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 2 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 2 2 o u t ) ;
126 [C( 1 2 2 , 1 ) ]=DS DC28VBus Caps (C( 1 2 1 , 1 ) , DC28VBus 2 DC28V Cap design , Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 6 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 3 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 2 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 3 o u t+
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 3 2 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 2 2 o u t ) ;
127 [C( 1 2 4 , 1 : 3 ) ]= DS CoolPnSys Caps (C( 1 2 3 , 1 : 3 ) , CoolPnSys 1 CoolPn Cap design ,
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 6 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 2 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 2 2 o u t ) ;
128 [C( 1 2 6 , 1 : 3 ) ]= DS CoolPnSys Caps (C( 1 2 5 , 1 : 3 ) , CoolPnSys 2 CoolPn Cap design ,
Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 6 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 6 2 o u t+Z o n e L e n g t h f t 2 2 o u t ) ;
129 [C( 1 2 9 , 1 ) ]=DS DCFuelPump Caps (C( 1 2 7 , 1 ) ,C( 1 2 8 , 1 ) , DCFuelPump 1 FuelPress Cap design ) ;
130 [C( 1 3 2 , 1 ) ]=DS DCFuelPump Caps (C( 1 3 0 , 1 ) ,C( 1 3 1 , 1 ) , DCFuelPump 2 FuelPress Cap design ) ;
131 [C( 1 3 5 , 1 ) ]=DS DCFuelPump Caps (C( 1 3 3 , 1 ) ,C( 1 3 4 , 1 ) , DCFuelPump 3 FuelPress Cap design ) ;
132 %Impose C a p a b i l i t y L i m i t s
133 C( : , 1 )=min( Clims ,C( : , 1 ) ) ;
134 %S p e c i a l Management o f t h r u s t c a p a b i l i t y
135 C1 ( 7 , 2 )=max( eps ,1−Clims ( 7 ) /7000) ;
136 C1 ( 5 7 , 2 )=max( eps ,1−Clims ( 5 7 ) /7000) ;
137 C1 ( 6 3 , 2 )=max( eps ,1−Clims ( 6 3 ) /7000) ;
138 C1 ( 1 1 3 , 2 )=max( eps ,1−Clims ( 1 1 3 ) /7000) ;
139 C1 ( 1 1 4 , 2 )=max( eps ,1−Clims ( 1 1 4 ) /7000) ;
140 %Format c a p a b i l i t y v e c t o r
141 C1 ( : , 1 )=A∗C( : , 1 ) ;
142 C1 ( : , 2 ) =(A∗(C( : , 2 ) .∗C( : , 1 ) ) ) . / ( C1 ( : , 1 )+eps ) ;
143 C1 ( : , 3 ) =(A∗(C( : , 3 ) .∗C( : , 1 ) ) ) . / ( C1 ( : , 1 )+eps ) ;
144 %S p e c i a l management o f t h r u s t c a p a b i l i t y
145 C1 ( 7 , : )=C( 1 1 4 , : ) ;
146 X1 = nonzeros (A( 4 6 , : ) ’ .∗C( : , 2 ) ) ;
147 X2 = nonzeros (A( 4 6 , : ) ’ .∗C( : , 3 ) ) ;
148 X3 = nonzeros (A( 4 6 , : ) ’ .∗C( : , 4 ) ) ;
149 X4 = nonzeros (A( 4 6 , : ) ’ .∗C( : , 5 ) ) ;
150 X5 = nonzeros (A( 4 6 , : ) ’ .∗C( : , 6 ) ) ;
151 X6 = nonzeros (A( 4 6 , : ) ’ .∗C( : , 7 ) ) ;
152 X7 = nonzeros (A( 4 6 , : ) ’ .∗C( : , 8 ) ) ;
153 for r =1: length (X1)
154 C1(46 ,1+ r ) = X1( r ) ;
155 end
156 for r =1: length (X2)
157 C1(46 ,1+1∗2+ r ) = X2( r ) ;
158 end
159 for r =1: length (X3)
160 C1(46 ,1+2∗2+ r ) = X3( r ) ;
161 end
162 for r =1: length (X4)
163 C1(46 ,1+3∗2+ r ) = X4( r ) ;
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164 end
165 for r =1: length (X5)
166 C1(46 ,1+4∗2+ r ) = X5( r ) ;
167 end
168 for r =1: length (X6)
169 C1(46 ,1+5∗2+ r ) = X6( r ) ;
170 end
171 for r =1: length (X6)
172 C1(46 ,1+6∗2+ r ) = X7( r ) ;
173 end
174 C1 ( 5 7 , : )=C( 5 7 , : ) ;
175 C1 ( 6 3 , : )=C( 6 3 , : ) ;
176 C1 ( 1 1 3 , : )=C( 4 6 , : ) ;
177 C1 ( 1 1 4 , : )=C( 1 1 4 , : ) ;
178 %E v a l u a t e d i f f e r e n c e i n c a p a b i l i t y
179 x=sum( abs (C1 ( : , 1 )−C( : , 1 ) ) ) ;
180 %Update c a p a b i l i t i e s
181 C=C1 ;
182 k=k+1;
183 D( : , k )=C( : , 1 ) ;
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FUNCTIONAL HAZARD CORRELATION FOR THE
CONVENTIONAL ARCHITECTURE
The hazard correlation matrix is a measure of the ability of an architecture to disperse
failures between the system functions. Architectures that exhibit higher correlation between
the loss of system functionality have a greater ability to shed loads. For the conventional
architecture the indices, 1 through 5, are in the order [Pneumatic Air Loss, 120VAC Loss,
28VDC Loss, Hydraulic Flow Loss, and Thrust Loss]. The correlations between the loss of
these functions for 1120 unit failure combination cases are given in table 63. The number
of functions provided by the system is given by N and is equal to 4.
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Table 63: ConventionalFunctional Hazard Correlations






1 0.337 0.422 0.541 0.606
0.337 1 0.243 0.291 0.393
0.422 0.243 1 0.334 0.462
0.541 0.291 0.334 1 0.523






1 0.331 0.392 0.521 0.267
0.331 1 0.247 0.306 0.206
0.392 0.247 1 0.353 0.216
0.521 0.306 0.353 1 0.272






1 0.369 0.374 0.518 −0.022
0.369 1 0.199 0.302 −0.035
0.374 0.199 1 0.256 −0.018
0.518 0.302 0.256 1 −0.018





1 0.360 0.335 0.316 −0.053
0.360 1 0.316 0.225 −0.079
0.335 0.316 1 0.216 −0.047
0.316 0.225 0.216 1 −0.064




FUNCTIONAL HAZARD CORRELATION FOR THE
‘ALL-ELECTRIC’ ARCHITECTURE
For the ‘more-electric’ architecture the indices, 1 through 4, are in the order [Pneumatic
Air Loss, 270VDC Loss, 28VDC Loss, and Thrust Loss]. Load shedding optimization was
performed for 665 unit failure combinations. Table 64 gives the correlation between the loss
of functions for all system level functions of the ‘more-electric’ architecture. The number
of functions provided by the system is given by N and is equal to 3.
Table 64: ‘All-Electric’ Functional Hazard Correlations






1 0.677 0.398 0.498
0.677 1 0.641 0.748
0.398 0.641 1 0.538






1 0.776 0.646 0.644
0.776 1 0.750 0.614
0.646 0.750 1 0.520






1 0.910 0.859 −0.059
0.910 1 0.912 0.090
0.859 0.912 1 0.100





1 0.615 0.489 −0.067
0.615 1 0.623 0.375
0.489 0.623 1 0.224





IMPORTANCE FOR THE CONVENTIONAL AND
‘ALL-ELECTRIC’ ARCHITECTURES
Figures 114 and 115 cumulative component risk importance values normalized by the max-
imum cumulative risk importance value (
RI 2k
RI 2max
). Figure 114 gives the values for the
conventional architecture and figure 115 gives values for the ‘more-electric’ architecture.
Cumulative risk values are obtained on all ranges of undesirable risks. Each independent
architecture places emphasis on each unit differently depending on the risk associated with
the provision of function. The units that exhibit the highest importance become the design




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































IMPORTANCE FOR THE CONVENTIONAL AND
‘ALL-ELECTRIC’ ARCHITECTURES
Figures 116, 117, 118, and 119 display the cumulative component capability risk impor-
tance for both the conventional and ‘more-electric’ architectures. These metrics consider
how decreases in unit capability impact the overall performance risk of the architecture
concepts. Risk is integrated in terms of magnitude of hazard. Undesirable risk importance
only integrates on ranges which breech hazard probability constraints. The bounds on the
integration for overall risk extend for the whole range of hazard characterization.
Capability risk importance values were obtained using the backward finite difference
method. Failure allocation was fixed for these calculations. Importance values obtained
using large differentials are subject to inaccuracies which stem from inappropriate load
shedding. Additionally, undesirable risk importance values may be subject to limitations in
applicability when no constraint is breeched.
The information conveyed by these importance values gives insight into which units
contribute most to the performance risk of the system. Augmentation of unit capabilities
of systems with the highest importance values will lead to larger variations in overall and
undesirable risk. Additionally, this analysis highlights situations where oversizing has oc-
curred. The capability of units which are characterized by little to no importance can be
reduced with no adverse effect on performance risk.
Figures 120 and 121 summarize all risk values. The cumulative importance values
displayed in these figures were obtained by averaging the importance from each differential.
For symmetric units the importance values were also averaged. This data was used to
generate the tables seen in the results chapter.
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[190] Liscouët-Hanke, S., A Model-Based Methodology for Integrated Preliminary Siz-
ing and Analysis of Aircraft Power System Architectures. PhD thesis, Université de
Toulouse, 2008.
[191] Lombardo, D., Aircraft Systems. McGraw-Hill Professional, 1998.
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